De-Gendering Hegemony: How Parsing Out Attitudes Toward Productive, Reproductive, and Gender-Essentialized Labor Helps Explain the Cross-National Stall in Gender Equality by Bond, Erik










DE-GENDERING HEGEMONY: HOW PARSING OUT ATTITUDES TOWARD 
PRODUCTIVE, REPRODUCTIVE, AND GENDER-ESSENTIALIZED LABOR 









SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
 
























DE-GENDERING HEGEMONY: HOW PARSING OUT ATTITUDES TOWARD 
PRODUCTIVE, REPRODUCTIVE, AND GENDER-ESSENTIALIZED LABOR 
HELPS EXPLAIN THE CROSS-NATIONAL STALL IN GENDER EQUALITY 
 
 
A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE 












































































© Copyright by ERIK L. BOND 2017 
All Rights Reserved. 
This work is dedicated to everyone who has suffered under complex and pernicious 
inequities, and to the scholars and activists who work every day at dismantling them.    
It is most especially dedicated to my dearest, Lindsey, without whom it would not exist, 
to my dearest, Becky, who came along (and stayed) at just the right time, and to Potter, 
who was always happy to wait in the food box and even happier to come out afterward. 




I would like to acknowledge all of my mentors, peers, and collaborators who 
contributed to this project and to my academic career. Most especially I want to thank 
my advisor and mentor, Martin Piotrowski. Without his tutelage, patient mentoring, 
technical expertise, and willingness to include a novice in his research agenda, this 
project would not have been possible. Thank you also to Lindsey Tate, whose 
knowledge, keen insight, and unending love and support provide the foundations for 
this and all my efforts. Thank you to Becky Zelikson for supporting me with endless 
positivity, for always challenging my ideas, and for being an inspiring idealist with 
elbow grease. Thank you to Rick Wolford for being the most supportive colleague I 
could ask for and for helping me sort through my many ideas. Thank you to my 
committee for being endlessly flexible and willing to work with someone with a 
scattered brain and a graduation schedule to match. Thank you to the University of 
Oklahoma’s Sociology Department for five years of support, education, and great 
memories. Thank you to Potter Potting Rodriguez for keeping me focused through your 
insistence that every writing session necessitates walk breaks. 
  
v 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Figures................................................................................................................. xii 
Abstract.......................................................................................................................... xiii 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview of the Project ...................................................... 1 
Discussion of the Problem ...........................................................................................1 
The Stalled Gender Revolution ............................................................................ 1 
The Essential Links Between Gender Equality and Labor Equality .................... 2 
Asymmetrical Labor, Asymmetrical Progress ..................................................... 4 
Cultural Hegemony and Hegemonic Masculinity ................................................ 8 
The Hegemonic Coupling Framework ............................................................... 10 
Investigating the Significance and Consequences of Hegemonic Coupling ...... 14 
Project Summary ................................................................................................ 16 
Chapter 2: Review of the Literature ............................................................................... 18 
Gendered Activity in the Labor Force .......................................................................18 
The Path of Western Feminism .......................................................................... 18 
Women’s Gains in Equality in Productive Labor ............................................... 19 
Gendered Movement Patterns within Productive Labor .................................... 22 
Gender in Reproductive Labor ........................................................................... 25 
An Important Note Concerning Labor Hegemony ............................................. 29 
The Problem of Understanding and Removing the Gender Revolution “Stall” ........31 
Past Framings and Attempted Solutions............................................................. 31 
vi 
Placing Gender and Labor in International Perspective ..................................... 34 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework ................................................................................. 39 
Setting Up the Hegemonic Coupling Framework .....................................................39 
Gaining Better Theoretical Vision on the Hegemonic Coupling ....................... 39 
Classical Marxist Thought on Labor, Class, and Gender ................................... 39 
Contemporary Marxist Feminist Thought on Labor, Class, and Gender ........... 40 
New Theoretical Model: Hegemonic Coupling ................................................. 41 
Chapter 4: Research Design, Methodology, and Data ................................................... 47 
Data  
Data Set .............................................................................................................. 47 
Demographics of the Sample.............................................................................. 49 
Measures ....................................................................................................................51 
Observed and Latent Measures for Analysis ...................................................... 51 
Research Design ........................................................................................................55 
Chapter 5: Analysis 1 ..................................................................................................... 57 
Rationale and Methods ..............................................................................................57 
Rationale for Analysis 1 ..................................................................................... 57 
Methods for Analysis 1 ...................................................................................... 58 
Findings .....................................................................................................................59 
Results for Analysis 1: De-Gendered Conception of Labor ............................... 59 
Results for Analysis 1: Distribution of Household Labor .................................. 66 
Results for Analysis 1: Attitudes toward Women in Paid Labor ....................... 68 
Synthesizing Results for Analysis 1 ................................................................... 72 
vii 
Chapter 6: Analysis 2 ..................................................................................................... 75 
Orientation and Design ..............................................................................................75 
Rationale and Methods for Analysis 2 ............................................................... 75 
Analysis 2: Confirmatory Factor Analyses ........................................................ 77 
Analysis 2: Assessing the Appropriateness of Multiple Groups Analysis ......... 78 
Findings .....................................................................................................................79 
Analysis 2: Male Measurement Model Results .................................................. 79 
Analysis 2: Female Measurement Model Results .............................................. 80 
Synthesizing Results for Analysis 2 ................................................................... 81 
Chapter 7: Analysis 3 ..................................................................................................... 82 
Orientation and Design ..............................................................................................82 
Methods for Analysis 3 ...................................................................................... 82 
Findings .....................................................................................................................83 
Analysis 3: Male Structural Model Results ........................................................ 83 
Analysis 3: Female Structural Model Results .................................................... 86 
Synthesizing Results for Analysis 3 ................................................................... 88 
Chapter 8: Discussion, Conclusion, and Future Directions ............................................ 91 
Discussion..................................................................................................................91 
Synthesizing Analyses 1, 2, and 3 ...................................................................... 91 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................96 
Limitations and Future Directions ...................................................................... 96 
Theoretical Implications ..................................................................................... 97 
Preconditions for Un-stalling the Gender Revolution ........................................ 98 
viii 
De-coupling Hegemonies ................................................................................. 102 
Appendices ................................................................................................................... 120 
Appendix 1: Tables for Chapter 4 ...........................................................................120 
Appendix 2: Tables for Chapter 5 ...........................................................................123 
Appendix 3: Tables for Chapter 6 ...........................................................................147 
Appendix 4: Figures for Chapter 6 ..........................................................................153 
Appendix 5: Tables for Chapter 7 ...........................................................................157 
Appendix 6: Figures for Chapter 7 ..........................................................................165 
  
ix 
List of Tables 
Table 4.01. Sample statistics for continuous variables................................................. 120 
Table 4.02. Sample statistics for categorical variables................................................. 121 
Table 4.03. Sample representation by country. ............................................................ 122 
Table 5.01. How should mother and father divide paid leave? .................................... 123 
Table 5.02. How should mother and father divide paid leave? .................................... 124 
Table 5.03. How should mother and father divide paid leave? .................................... 124 
Table 5.04. What is the best care option for a young child? ........................................ 125 
Table 5.05. What is the best care option for a young child? ........................................ 125 
Table 5.06. What is the best care option for a young child? ........................................ 125 
Table 5.07. It’s the man’s job to earn money, the woman’s to keep the home. ........... 126 
Table 5.08. It’s the man’s job to earn money, the woman’s to keep the home. ........... 127 
Table 5.09. It’s the man’s job to earn money, the woman’s to keep the home. ........... 127 
Table 5.10. What a woman really wants is a family and children. ............................... 128 
Table 5.11. What a woman really wants is a family and children. ............................... 129 
Table 5.12. What a woman really wants is a family and children. ............................... 129 
Table 5.13. Division of household work: doing the laundry. ....................................... 130 
Table 5.14. Division of household work: doing the laundry. ....................................... 131 
Table 5.15. Division of household work: doing the laundry. ....................................... 131 
Table 5.16. Division of household work: care for sick family members. .................... 132 
Table 5.17. Division of household work: care for sick family members. .................... 133 
Table 5.18. Division of household work: care for sick family members. .................... 133 
Table 5.19. Division of household work: household cleaning. .................................... 134 
x 
Table 5.20. Division of household work: household cleaning. .................................... 135 
Table 5.21. Division of household work: household cleaning. .................................... 135 
Table 5.22. Division of household work: preparing meals. ......................................... 136 
Table 5.23. Division of household work: preparing meals. ......................................... 137 
Table 5.24. Division of household work: preparing meals. ......................................... 137 
Table 5.25. Should women work: youngest child under school age. ........................... 138 
Table 5.26. Should women work: youngest child under school age. ........................... 139 
Table 5.27. Should women work: youngest child under school age. ........................... 139 
Table 5.28. Should women work: youngest child in school......................................... 140 
Table 5.29. Should women work: youngest child in school......................................... 141 
Table 5.30. Should women work: youngest child in school......................................... 141 
Table 5.31. Working mom: preschool child is likely to suffer if mom has full time job.
 ...................................................................................................................................... 142 
Table 5.32. Working mom: preschool child is likely to suffer if mom has full time job.
 ...................................................................................................................................... 143 
Table 5.33. Working mom: preschool child is likely to suffer if mom has full time job.
 ...................................................................................................................................... 143 
Table 5.34. Working mom: family life is likely to suffer if mom has full time job. .... 144 
Table 5.35. Working mom: family life is likely to suffer if mom has full time job. .... 145 
Table 5.36. Working mom: family life is likely to suffer if mom has full time job. .... 145 
Table 5.37. Mean answers to all observed measures by latent category. ..................... 146 
Table 6.01. Results of confirmatory factor analyses for three latent measures. ........... 147 
Table 6.02. Results of assessing structural equations model fit across sex. ................. 148 
xi 
Table 6.03. Male measurement model comparisons. ................................................... 149 
Table 6.04. Male 3-factor measurement model results. ............................................... 150 
Table 6.05. Fit statistics for male 3-factor measurement model. ................................. 150 
Table 6.06. Female measurement model comparisons. ................................................ 151 
Table 6.07. Female 3-factor measurement model results. ............................................ 152 
Table 6.08. Fit statistics for female 3-factor measurement model. .............................. 152 
Table 7.01. Results for male 3-factor structural model DGCL latent measure. ........... 157 
Table 7.02. Results for male 3-factor structural model GERL latent measure. ........... 158 
Table 7.03. Results for male 3-factor structural model GEPL latent measure. ............ 159 
Table 7.04. Results for male 3-factor structural model measurement component. ...... 160 
Table 7.05. Fit statistics for male 3-factor structural model. ........................................ 160 
Table 7.06. Results for female 3-factor structural model DGCL latent measure. ........ 161 
Table 7.07. Results for female 3-factor structural model GERL latent measure. ........ 162 
Table 7.08. Results for female 3-factor structural model GEPL latent measure. ......... 163 
Table 7.09. Results for female 3-factor structural model measurement component. ... 164 
Table 7.10. Fit statistics for female 3-factor structural model...................................... 164 
 
xii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Path diagram of single-factor measurement model. ...................................... 153 
Figure 2. Path diagram of three-factor measurement model. ....................................... 154 
Figure 3. Path diagram of hierarchical-factor measurement model. ............................ 155 
Figure 4. Path diagram of bifactor measurement model. ............................................. 156 
Figure 5. Predictor relationships consistent across sex and latent measure. ................ 165 
Figure 6. Predictor relationships consistent for men across all latent measures. ......... 165 
Figure 7. Predictor relationships consistent for women across all latent measures. .... 165 
Figure 8. Predictor relationships consistent for both sexes within DGLC measure. .... 165 
Figure 9. Predictor relationships consistent for both sexes within GERL measure. .... 165 
Figure 10. Predictor relationships consistent for both sexes within GEPL measure.... 165 
Figure 11. Predictor relationships from male structural model by latent measure. ...... 166 




Starting with the problem of the two-decade stall in the developed world’s gender 
revolution, this project applies Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) techniques to 
answer three related questions: (1) “How have attitudes concerning gender-labor 
equality asymmetrically penetrated the developed world?” (2) “Can researchers better 
refine measurement of gender-labor attitudes by modeling a gender-essentialized 
concept of labor roles as distinct from more conventional attitudinal measures?” (3) 
“Does modeling this separate dimension improve our understandings of persistent 
gender-labor biases?” To answer these questions, I explore markers of gender-labor 
attitudes using data from 29 OECD countries (N = 37,632) in the 2012 wave of the 
International Social Survey Programme, a transnational, level-matched data set drawing 
mostly from OECD nations. Much of the research in this area treats progressive gender 
ideology as being composed of a largely homogenous set of values categorized under an 
umbrella often labeled “Gender Egalitarianism,” “Feminism” or something similar. 
However, my project works to demonstrate that this social construct is actually 
composed of a heterogeneous set of values that may vary widely in representation 
across country, sex, and labor status. I put forth a new theoretical framework—dubbed 
“Hegemonic Coupling Theory” (HCT)—which asserts that the intersections of 
hegemonic statuses (such as masculinity and paid employment) reinforce and sustain 
inequality independently of inequalities specific to either component status. I answer 
each of the project’s main questions in a separate analysis. First, I explore descriptive 
statistics for key attitudinal asymmetries across my twenty-nine-country sample. 
Second, using SEM, I compare three measurement models to demonstrate that a model 
treating three latent dimensions of gendered labor attitudes as distinct from one another 
(as asserted in HCT) is a better fit than two other models that treat them as overlapping 
or uniform. Finally, I show that the distinct attitudinal dimensions vary significantly 
across national welfare regime, sex, and other demographic factors. In sum, this project 
demonstrates that (1) meaningful attitudinal asymmetries do exist at the national and 
international levels, (2) the value set commonly labeled “gender egalitarianism” 
consists of a heterogeneous set of values, and (3) A gender-essentialized conception of 
labor roles remains an important and anomalous factor perpetuating gender-labor 
biases. These findings support the usefulness of the framework outlined in HCT. I 
conclude by recommending policy initiatives that would target lagging dimensions of 
gender egalitarianism and promote equity more effectively than the broad-based, 
generalized policies of years past. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview of the Project 
Discussion of the Problem 
 The Stalled Gender Revolution 
 The revolution towards gender equality in the developed world has notoriously 
“stalled out” (England 2010; Friedman 2015; Hochschild 1989) since the mid-1990s. 
Women have continued to make progress in select areas—most notably educational 
attainment. However, most facets of gender inequality in labor spheres have remained 
relatively stagnant over the last two decades, including paid labor force participation, 
wages, household labor responsibilities, and so on. (Bianchi et al. 2006; Cotter et al. 
2011). As early as 1989, Hochschild identified the reciprocal relationship between 
women’s progress toward equality and the evolution of men’s roles in society: without 
substantial movement of men into traditionally feminine roles such as caregiving, 
household labor, and other unpaid work activities, the gender revolution will remain 
forever incomplete. 
 The battle for gender equality has never been an exclusively gendered issue—
that is, not exclusively a matter of achieving equal cultural prestige of gender identities. 
Rather, the various fields on which the battle has been waged reveal the underlying 
nature of the conflict. The earliest efforts toward suffrage in the late 19th century 
focused on allowing women to vote and hold public office (i.e., to be independent, 
public actors in civil society). Subsequent battles have been waged on fronts of 
reproductive rights and bodily autonomy, independence from and self-determination in 
the marital contract, equal access to education, equal access to, treatment, and 
compensation in paid employment, and equal treatment in the justice system, to name a 
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few. The common thread linking these fields is the goal of creating equality of labor 
activity—both productive and reproductive—regardless of gender identity. 
 The Essential Links Between Gender Equality and Labor Equality 
That labor relations are foundational to gender equality should come as no 
surprise to sociologists, whose earliest and more modern theoretical traditions treat 
gender and labor as inherently linked. As early as 1884, Friederich Engels (with 
posthumous input from Marx) asserted in The Origin of the Family, Private Property, 
and the State that the origins of class oppression began with the sociopolitical 
marginalization of women relative to men. This gender asymmetry was made possible 
by the sexual division of labor, which institutionalized the ancestral labor activities of 
the sexes: men in charge of productive (mostly agricultural) labor, and women’s domain 
the home and its uncompensated, unquantified, largely unrecognized reproductive labor. 
Almost a century later, scholars in the Marxist and Material Feminist traditions framed 
gender as a performance, with people “doing” gender by routinely performing culturally 
prescribed labor activities, thereby fulfilling social constructions of what it means to be 
appropriately “man” or “woman” (West and Zimmerman 1987; Fenstermaker and West 
2002). 
 The steps taken toward gender equality over the 20th century validate gender 
theorists’ preoccupation with labor roles as lynchpins in the gender status quo. In the 
developed world, the largest gains toward equality have been made by feminist efforts 
toward equal access to and treatment in the paid labor force (Hochschild 1989) and (as a 
corollary to said labor force) in educational attainment (Bianchi et al. 2006; Cotter et al. 
2011). Recall that the Marxist/Materialist feminist frames attribute the marginalization 
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of women to a system that fundamentally privileges and values productive labor over 
reproductive labor, thereby marginalizing reproductive laborers (traditionally women). 
Different facets of women’s disadvantage, such as lack of political representation, lack 
of legal protections, lower earning potential, and so on, trickle down from the “master” 
disadvantage of being shackled to a type of labor that is framed as less valuable in the 
capitalist system of production. The fact that feminists have made several decades of 
progress loosening their attachment to reproductive labor, then, undeniably elevates the 
stations of women in society. However, such progress fails to modify the structurally 
unequal system that privileges productive labor roles over all others. 
Examining the state and evolution of the reproductive labor market also reveals 
important truths about the state of gender equality. Reproductive labor—that labor 
which, while essential to the reproduction of society, is uncompensated and therefore 
unrecognized in a capitalist market system—has long been central to feminist dialogues 
on gender and labor equality (Vogel 2013). The reproductive labor market is often 
identified as a key stall point in the gender revolution (Friedman 2015; Hochschild 
1989), both because of persistent asymmetry between men and women and also because 
women’s historical attachment to its unrecognized labor lies at the root of much of their 
disadvantage. Despite women’s increasing share of paid labor duties (which we must 
acknowledge as an important step toward equity), there is little indication that men are 
making balancing strides into reproductive labor activities. Hochschild (1989) famously 
coined the term “second shift” to describe the pattern that women with full-time jobs 
were still largely expected (by society, by spouses, and often by themselves) to perform 
most or all of the same domestic duties they always had. The exact parameters and 
4 
burden of this second shift work have been the subject of much debate, but the pattern 
itself has been substantiated in subsequent years (Lincoln 2008; Milkie et al. 2009; 
Pinto and Coltrane 2009). In addition to women voluntarily working a productive first 
and reproductive second shift, men have profoundly failed to compensate women’s 
progress with their own share of reproductive labor and, in the last two decades, have 
failed to measurably increase that share at all (Bianchi et al. 2000; Maume 2008; Raley 
et al. 2012). Men’s adherence to their traditional labor roles points to the structural 
inequality inherent in the current system: reproductive labor must be carried out if 
society is to continue but, so long as such labor is devalued, those most vulnerable in 
society will invariably perform it. Many/most of those will invariably be women and 
women of least privilege, at that. 
Asymmetrical Labor, Asymmetrical Progress 
A large suite of both structural and cultural barriers makes men’s movement into 
reproductive labor a difficult, disadvantageous, and unappealing choice, not the least of 
which is the loss of cultural standing brought about by deviating from traditionally 
masculine (re: high prestige) gender performance (Connell 1987; Friedman 2015). Even 
perceived involvement in reproductive labor can considerably impact a person’s career. 
Women who are perceived to be substantially attached to reproductive labor 
responsibilities (whether they are or not) experience substantial discrimination in the 
paid labor market (Correll et al. 2007; Hochschild 1997; Ridgeway 2011). Men, by 
contrast, generally benefit from married and parental life: not because their commitment 
to that sphere is seen as more positive than women’s, but due to a default assumption 
that they will always be more attached to the productive than the reproductive labor 
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force and instead outsource their reproductive labor duties to their spouse (Coltrane 
2004; Glauber 2008). In simplest terms, while a woman with a family appears an 
employment risk because of her potential reproductive labor responsibilities, a man with 
a family is seen as fulfilling his reproductive labor responsibilities through productive 
labor. 
 The patterns described above paint a meaningful and coherent picture: the 
incompleteness of the gender equality revolution is symptomatic of the state of gender-
labor relations. The gender revolution’s successes are found in the (generally desirable) 
productive labor market, where women have made substantial (if incomplete) strides 
toward inclusion and parity with men. Meanwhile, the reproductive labor market lags 
behind, with both sexes seeking ways to avoid its burdens altogether or at least offset 
the consequences of participation. However, because of women’s historical association 
with this sphere, they tend to be less successful than men in their efforts. Despite 
institutionalized egalitarianism, cultural scripts essentializing productive labor as 
masculine and reproductive labors as feminine maintain material inequity. Even 
proposed solutions to these inequities are circumscribed by such cultural constructs: 
women are encouraged to “lean in” to labor and find a way to “have it all”—rhetorical 
devices that would seem bizarre and nonsensical if directed at men (Friedman 2015). 
However, it is from this cultural asymmetry that we find an important clue about the 
deeper nature of these complex inequalities.  
Why have men made such meager movement into reproductive labor activity? 
Why does perceived attachment to reproductive labor harm women’s productive labor 
careers? We know that men who engage in reproductive labor—especially in intensive 
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ways, such as pursuing traditionally feminine careers, stay-at-home fatherhood, and so 
on—experiencing substantial stigma, judgment, and material consequences as a result 
of their actions (Barnett et al. 2000; Jacobs 1993; Williams 1992; Wooton 1997). 
Further, even when men do take on additional reproductive labor responsibilities in the 
home, they tend to pursue activities that carry culturally masculine stereotypes (Hook 
2010). These observations suggest that substantial amounts of disadvantage are 
embedded in the types of labor traditionally associated with women, regardless of the 
sex of the actual laborer. It seems implausible to achieve substantial progress toward 
equality by encouraging men to move in large numbers into a sphere of activity that is 
seen as disadvantageous and burdensome. Thus, we come to an important postulate: 
further progress toward gender equality appears to depend upon achieving greater 
equality between spheres or roles of labor, and not just between the people who occupy 
them. 
 However, the ways that employers and workers interact with gender 
asymmetries suggest that the distinction between gender inequality and labor inequality 
(and the connection between them) is often missed or dismissed. As said, employers 
tend to discriminate against women because of the cultural association between 
feminine gender identity and reproductive labor (Moss-Racusin et al. 2012; Ridgeway 
2011; Hays 1997) but favor men for the masculine gender identity’s perceived resilient 
independence from that same type of labor (Coltrane 2004; Coltrane and Adams 2008; 
Benard and Correll 2010). More than simple gender discrimination, both of these 
practices represent discrimination based on gender’s associations with labor. As much 
as these practice disadvantage many workers, a complimentary pattern exists among 
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workers, themselves. Despite women’s rising levels of education and professional 
credentialing, feminine workers still tend to pursue professions and career paths that 
fulfill normative expectations for their gender—even when those choices may 
exacerbate inequalities (England and Li 2006; Hook and Pettit, 2016; Xie and 
Schauman 2003). Yet even when workers do deviate from gender norms, they still tend 
to reinforce the corollary hierarchy of productive over reproductive labor. Women move 
more readily into traditionally masculine professions (Friedman 2012). Meanwhile, 
men’s movement into traditionally feminine work tends to be accompanied by some 
kind of reframing process that masculinizes (re: raises the status of) the work 
(Cottingham 2014). These trends, even if they may benefit some women, broadly 
perpetuate the hierarchy of masculine-type labor over feminine-type labor and so 
perpetuate the inegalitarian status quo. 
The complex, intersectional nature of gender-labor constructs produces 
inequalities that resist and adapt to change without actually disappearing. As in the 
examples above, steps toward gender equality in paid labor have thus far had the 
unintended consequences of reinforcing the inferiority of reproductive labor, 
disadvantaging those (disproportionately women) most connected to it, and reinforcing 
(mostly for men) the barriers to greater participation. From a gender performance 
framework, women have lifted the sex barrier (referring to the actual biological sex of 
the individual) from productive labor, but the gendering (re: masculine/feminine) of 
labor type and the associated inequalities remain firmly entrenched in the cultural 
milieu. From a Marxist/Material Feminist perspective, this pattern is a consequence of 
failing to address the labor equality on the way to the goal of gender equality.  
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These two frameworks are inherently linked: (1) one of the most fundamental 
ways that people do gender is through their labor activities, which consist of (2) the 
activities necessary to produce and reproduce the conditions for life and society. If one 
arena of performance (reproductive labor) and one gender construct (femininity) are 
each framed as deeply inferior, it comes as no surprise that women should seek to 
escape them and men to resist them, leaving them to be occupied primarily by 
individuals of lower status and means, compounding and cementing their disadvantage 
over time. By contrast, the hegemonic statuses of productive labor involvement and 
masculinity (which can apply to an activity or identity independent of biological sex) 
become endorsed, their cultural coupling reinforced by the ever growing number of 
people aspiring to embody them. In sum, independent of gender-based divisions of 
labor, evidence points to the cultural gendering of labor types as central to persistent 
gender inequality. 
Cultural Hegemony and Hegemonic Masculinity 
The concept of cultural hegemony was developed by Marxist theorist Antonio 
Gramsci to describe the ways that, in the process of conducting the activities inherent to 
being at the top of the socioeconomic hierarchy, a ruling class or culture establishes its 
ideological framework as universally applicable to all members of the society. Cultural 
hegemony enshrines the social, political, and economic status quo as natural, inevitable, 
and beneficial for all (Bullock and Trombley 1999). The hegemonizing process may 
take the form of a deliberate agenda by the dominant class or (more commonly) is 
simply the natural byproduct of cultural and material transactions undertaken in a 
stratified society. It is a truism to say that the beliefs and practices of the ruling class 
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inevitably become framed as the best or most correct beliefs and practices in a given 
culture—at least until unrest and dissidence begin to emerge and destabilize the ruling-
underclass relationship. Regardless of mechanism, the result of the hegemonizing 
process is an ensconced cultural story that stabilizes the structure and positions of 
individuals within the social order. 
Since its origins in the early 20th century, the cultural hegemony paradigm has 
been most prominently extended by gender scholars into the concept of hegemonic 
masculinity. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) describe hegemonic masculinity as the 
most culturally honored way of being masculine, requiring all men to define themselves 
and, thus, their position in the social system, in relation to that mode of gender 
performance. In practice, this means traits such as physicality, assertiveness, business 
acumen, earning potential, ability to attract mating prospects, and so on are the most 
legitimate ways of doing masculinity and, failing any such traits, a man must both 
accept his lower status and seek to justify and (hopefully) offset his lack of conformity 
to the archetypal model of manhood. Importantly, the hegemonic gender model’s 
dialectical logic applies both within and across gender identities—particularly when 
discussing gender relations in labor. While it is certainly true that those identifying as 
men must define their identity in relation to hegemonic masculinity, a significant part of 
that identity is bound up in demonstrating that they are not feminine—which is a less 
hegemonic status, regardless of how it is expressed. Though masculine qualities tend to 
carry more privilege across all gender identities, men who deviate from masculinity do 
not retain those privileges but instead experience proportionately severe sanctions for 
displaying qualities perceived as feminine (Cohen and Huffman 2003; Connell 1987; 
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Kivel 1992; Pascoe 2007). Furthermore, the ideal (re: most employable and valuable, 
regardless of sex) worker in a capitalist labor market traditionally embodies 
hegemonically masculine qualities such as assertiveness, business acumen, and 
independence from reproductive labor. Thus, defining oneself in conformity with 
hegemonic masculinity has become an increasingly salient goal for women workers as 
well as for men, since doing so represents the most obvious path to equal standing in the 
capitalist labor force and society more broadly. In short, the ideal-typical worker 
remains archetypally masculine, while the ideal-typical homemaker remains 
archetypally feminine. Discriminatory gender associations follow the labor type, 
regardless of the actual laborer’s gender, and labor discrimination devalues the gender 
identity, regardless of the laborer’s ability. The cultural story legitimizing the status quo 
remains largely undisturbed. 
The Hegemonic Coupling Framework 
The pattern observed above—of cultural constructs that define one another in 
reciprocal ways—serves as the foundation for this project’s theoretical contribution to 
the literature on gender and labor. To add to our understanding of the cultural interplay 
between gender and labor roles, I extend the paradigms of cultural hegemony and 
hegemonic masculinity to inform the concept of Hegemonic Coupling. A hegemonic 
coupling (HC) is a pairing of two or more hegemonic statuses that reinforce, sustain, 
and/or amplify one another’s cultural privilege. Typically, such statuses have been 
coupled in the collective consciousness for so long that they are seen as “naturally” 
paired (essentialized), as has been the case with masculinity and breadwinning or 
femininity and homemaking. The quintessential example of hegemonic coupling set 
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forth in this essay is that of masculine gender qualities (assertiveness, competitiveness, 
stoicism, independence from reproductive labor responsibilities) and productive labor 
involvement (particularly as one’s primary, full-time role). As I’ve demonstrated, the 
associations between these constructs appear to have little or nothing to do with either 
the biological sex or gender identity of the individual laborer (in many countries, a 
woman may embody both sets of qualities almost as readily as a man), indicating a 
particularly strong cultural (as opposed to material) coupling. 
The HC framework could include any high-prestige statuses that are tightly 
coupled in the cultural narrative. However, due to the framework’s focus on cultural 
hegemony (re: status hierarchies), it is most useful when discussing statuses that confer 
privilege. One example would be the coupling of White ethnicity with white-collar 
work, where persons of color would be expected to exemplify traits of “whiteness” to 
prove they are “suitable” for employment in that sector (Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2004; Koedel et al. 2014). A second example might be found in sexuality, where 
qualities associated with cis gender identities are coupled with heterosexual orientations 
(Dunkle and Francis 1990; Valentova et al. 2011). Masculine men and feminine women 
are typically assumed to be heterosexual (and thus to be more highly valued), and so 
non-heterosexual persons who seek mainstream acceptance may be inclined to embody 
those traits. These patterned relationships could easily apply to un-hegemonic 
couplings, as well—such as perceived associations between ethnic minority status and 
criminality—but that is an extension for another work.  
The privileges of maleness (referring to biological sex) and of being a man 
(referring to gender presentation) have mostly been identified and articulated through 
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popular and scholarly feminist efforts spanning more than two centuries. Cultural and 
policy-based efforts toward equality in various civic and private arenas have addressed 
some significant portion of these advantages, though of course cultural lag persists. 
However, the hegemony of the productive laborer role remains under-recognized, and 
its implicit gendering as “masculine” has not been properly parsed out or defined for 
purposes of either politics or scholarship. The fact that members of a society see the 
more desirable productive labor roles as embodying, necessitating, and conferring 
inherently “superior” masculine qualities—remains both structurally and culturally 
powerful (Friedman 2015). I argue that this conflation, far from being epiphenomenal to 
other biases, powerfully and independently shapes the gender equality “stall out.” 
Distinguishing between gender and labor hegemonies (and their relationships 
with one another) is difficult yet important. The labor spheres have historically been 
gender segregated, so labor values are easily conflated with gender values. For example, 
in Western society, whether we investigate what traits are most valued in a worker or 
what traits are most valued in a person, the answer tends to mostly consist of a list of 
the qualities of hegemonic masculinity: assertiveness, dominance, toughness, emotional 
restraint, rational thinking, courage, competitiveness, professional success, business 
acumen, willingness to take risks, and so on. This apocryphal coupling leaves us with a 
chicken-or-egg problem: is masculinity hegemonic because it is seen as economically 
viable, or is economic viability defined and identified by what is masculine? The 
original answer to this question is probably indiscernible, but the contemporary answer 
is surely, “Both.”  
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A power system invariably coalesces in ways that are most advantageous to its 
most privileged members, and what is culturally prized over time (re: hegemonic) is 
determined by what repeatedly proves advantageous in that system. Because gender 
roles and labor roles are both defined by the same capitalist system of production, they 
self-organize according to capitalist definitions of advantage (Hartmann 1981; Vogel 
2013).  Thus, freedom to avoid reproductive labor responsibilities (disadvantageous 
under capitalism) and maximize one’s availability to the productive labor market 
(advantageous under capitalism) becomes a prized set of qualities that are archetypally 
masculine. Men who embody those qualities rise to the top of the social hierarchy, 
simultaneously defining and reinforcing what it means to be hegemonically masculine. 
All other men (and women) must then define their own masculinity by degree of 
conformity to or deviance from the hegemonic standard. 
The hegemonic coupling of masculinity and productive labor defines gender 
relations for a particular cultural epoch and shapes the path of change as individuals and 
groups vie for status over time. As the dual statuses of advantage define and reinforce 
one another over time, essentialist attributions coalesce around them. These attributions 
take the shape of a cultural hegemony “story” (or a collection of stories) explaining how 
the status quo is natural, beneficial, and inevitable. Cultural stories in this canon all 
commit some kind of essentialist fallacy regarding gender, labor, and status. Common 
examples include attributing natural caregiving instincts and responsibilities for 
emotional labor to women because women have “always” been the caregivers in 
families, giving men more respect as rational thinkers, conflating business or monetary 
success with masculinity, and so on. Telling these stories time after time in place after 
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place eventually leads to the predictable (and familiar) institutionalization of these 
cultural archetypes. The fact that the archetypes are a blend of multiple hegemonic 
statuses tied to a specific historical arrangement (such as a utilitarian division of labor) 
is “forgotten” by the collective consciousness. A “successful” person (man, woman, or 
otherwise) is by definition someone who embodies traditionally masculine qualities and 
participates intensively in productive labor. As with hegemonic masculinity, all other 
positions in the social hierarchy are defined by their degree of conformity to or deviance 
from these criteria. 
Investigating the Significance and Consequences of Hegemonic Coupling 
The societal consequences of the above process are obvious and prevalent, such 
as when women suffer discrimination in the paid labor force because of their gender’s 
cultural ties to a devalued form of labor. However, the implications for social science 
scholarship are equally profound. If the hegemonic coupling model is accurate, then 
social science researchers must use extra care when studying attitudes toward gender 
and labor relations. What may seem like a representation of a gender attitude may in 
fact represent bias concerning labor roles, and vice versa. For example, an analysis that 
finds that respondents to a survey hold egalitarian attitudes toward men’s and women’s 
participation in the paid labor force may in fact represent only an acceptance that people 
of either gender identity should have access to the hegemonic coupling of paid labor 
and masculine qualities. The same respondents may still hold distinctly discriminatory 
attitudes toward people who participate in (or are perceived to be attached to) 
reproductive labor or who embody traits that fail to conform to hegemonic masculinity, 
meaning they may still carry substantial bias against women. In other words, those 
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respondents who appear by conventional measurement to be relatively gender 
egalitarian may in fact be far from it. Of those respondents, some will inevitably be in 
charge of employing others in paid labor, which returns us to the societal consequences 
discussed at the beginning of this paragraph. 
If the HC framework is valid, it indicates that there is room to improve social 
science scholarship’s understanding of gender inequities by rendering with greater 
clarity those cultural constructs that exist at the intersection of the hegemonic couplings. 
However, the necessary first step in that effort is to validate that a dimension of 
intersection even exists. Conventional scholarship in this arena typically focuses on 
gender attitudes and/or outcomes in one of two major areas corresponding 
(unsurprisingly) to the two arenas of productive and reproductive labor. The third 
dimension we wish to identify is the presence of an essentialist coupling between 
gender and labor, which might look like attitudinal bias that particular labor roles are 
inherently more “appropriate” or more “natural” for individuals of a particular gender 
identity. If this coupling is truly a hegemonic coupling, then what is “appropriate” and 
“natural” will systematically pair the more hegemonic gender with the more hegemonic 
labor role, and vice versa. Finally, if the concepts and construct I have outlined are 
indeed valid, then the logical next step is to see if and how that construct correlates 
similarly to and differently from more conventional measures of gender-labor attitudes. 
If the construct is a novel and meaningful addition to the social science canon, then 




For this project, I make an explorative attempt to (1) find evidence for 
anomalous heterogeneity in the distribution of gender-labor attitudes, (2) validate the 
hegemonic coupling (HC) model as a superior representation of gender attitudes 
compared with models that do not measure hegemonic coupling, and (3) demonstrate 
that novel asymmetries exist between three dimensions of what might traditionally be 
thought of as the relatively monolithic construct of “gender egalitarianism.” Through 
descriptive analysis of international data, I find that evidence of peculiar attitudinal 
heterogeneity does exist. I then make use of confirmatory factor analysis and structural 
equation modeling, constructing three latent attitudinal measures from a pool of twelve 
observed survey items. One latent construct represents the HC model as the degree to 
which a person sees labor as gender-essentialized in a way that favors the hegemonies 
of masculinity and productive labor. Two other constructs represent the extant 
literature, framing gender egalitarianism as attitudes toward gender equity in the (1) 
productive and (2) reproductive labor forces.  
I compare three measurement models representing different theoretical 
configurations of the relationship between these latent dimensions. The first model 
treats the three dimensions as functionally non-distinct aspects of gender egalitarianism, 
indicating that further investigation is unnecessary. The second model treats all three 
dimensions as fundamentally distinct but covarying, which supports the hegemonic 
coupling model as an improvement. The third model is hierarchical, treating the three 
dimensions as covarying and adding a second-level construct labeled “Gender 
Egalitarianism.” This third model represents a middle ground between the first two, 
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suggesting that each of the three attitudinal dimensions partially overlaps with the 
others in a single, common value set. The second model proves to be the best fit of the 
three, supporting the hegemonic coupling hypothesis. I then use this model to inform a 
structural (predictive) model that estimates gender-attitudinal scores for all three latent 
measures by macro-level institutional environment and various micro-level 
demographic statuses. As hypothesized, scores on the three latent attitudinal dimensions 
vary substantially at both macro and micro levels, with the measure representing the 
hegemonic coupling concept offering the most surprises. 
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
Gendered Activity in the Labor Force 
The Path of Western Feminism 
 Women in the developed world have had a rocky relationship with the paid 
work force for most of modern history, and much of that relationship can be attributed 
to the historically gendered division of labor. Popular cultural rhetoric has traditionally 
framed productive employment in an antagonistic relationship with women’s 
prescriptive domestic labor duties. This rhetoric emerges partly from resource 
constraints and economic demand for unpaid laborers, and partly due to constructs of 
gender essentialism, cultural inertia in general, and the acute resistance of men to 
renegotiate the division of labor in a way that would (without dramatic economic and 
cultural shift) substantially reduce male privilege (Friedman 2015; Vogel 2013). 
Because there exists no path into reproductive labor that does not depreciate men’s 
cultural and economic capital, “change” on the part of men in this socioeconomic 
system means sacrificing hegemonic privilege, so resistance to change is predictable 
and logical. 
 In OECD countries in particular, what evolution has transpired in women’s 
relationships to labor roles has been guided by the cultural institution of feminism. The 
“gender revolution” has largely progressed in lockstep with the cultural evolution of 
feminist constructs. Priorities (Friedman 2015) have typically emphasized lifting the 
structural and cultural barriers to women’s entry into male-dominated fields. Structural 
efforts in this vein have yielded the development and liberalization of institutional 
supports such as paid and unpaid parental leave, flex-time, and even greater access to 
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post-secondary and vocational education programs. Cultural efforts have focused on 
alleviating scripts that hamper women on the personal level, such as by raising women’s 
career aspirations, promoting interest in STEM fields, and so on. 
 It is worth positing that Western feminism has followed the progression outlined 
above because it emerged within a capitalist world system and therefore uses capitalist 
metrics for defining value, hierarchy, and equality. The Western feminist focus on 
women’s gains in productive labor equality has been guided by those areas of greatest 
leverage for reducing inequality in a capitalist system and as measured by capitalist 
standards. However, the most persistent sources of inequity facing women today are 
those that the capitalist economic system is fundamentally unable to address, since to do 
so would require a market-based system to have accounting mechanisms for human 
activities that occur outside of any market context. Critiques of Western feminism by 
Marxist/Material feminists emphasize that the system, not only women’s place in it, 
must be changed to achieve gender equality (Ferguson and Hennessy 2010). The 
argument that Western feminism has been shaped by the socioeconomic contexts of 
Western-capitalist society will be the focus of sections of this paper discussing 
reproductive labor relations and changes in men’s labor roles, as well as the theoretical 
basis for the project’s empirical investigations. 
Women’s Gains in Equality in Productive Labor 
 Overwhelmingly, education has been the least stalled dimension of progress 
toward gender equality, with women matching or outpacing men in grades (Duckworth 
and Seligman 2006; Perkins et al. 2004), high school graduation rates (Snyder and 
Dillow 2007), enrollment in and graduation from college (Buchmann and DiPrete 2006; 
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Cotter et al. 2004; Freeman 2004), and graduate and professional degree attainment 
(Cotter et al. 2004; England 2010; Snyder and Dillow 2007). The academy only began 
admitting large numbers of women in America in the 1930s and 40s. In many cases, this 
was “justified” by explaining that higher education was primarily necessary for the 
modern woman’s roles as wife and mother, and secondarily for her roles as citizen and 
professional (Nash and Romero 2012). This cultural lag remains evident in that even in 
the present there still exist substantial (and in some cases growing) gaps in the 
professional fields of study pursued by men and women (Ashcraft and Blithe 2010; 
Margolis and Fisher 2003). Qualifications aside, the academy remains the poster child 
for gains in gender equality. It may be that women’s initial success in this field was 
mediated by the fact that “student” is a consumer role rather than a producer one, and 
thus women’s entry into education was seen as less threatening than their direct entry 
into the productive labor force. Whether this is true or not, the two paths of education 
and employment are intrinsically linked in modern economies and so one naturally 
feeds into the other. 
 The next most successful arena for gender equality has undoubtedly been the 
productive labor force. Women made large gains in this arena over the latter half of the 
20th century (Casper and Bianchi 2002; Cotter et al. 2008; Goldin 2006; Sayer et al. 
2004), and even women with children made considerable progress despite the penalties 
associated with motherhood (Boushey 2008; Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013). 
However, this progressive trend has leveled off in the last two decades, with little 
measurable change occurring since the 1990s (Cohany and Sok 2007; Hollister and 
Smith 2014). In fact, men still maintain stronger attachment to the productive labor 
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force than do women by almost all standard metrics. Men have the dubious honor of 
working longer hours and doing so more frequently (Cha 2010; Jacobs and Gerson 
2004). They also maintain greater flexibility in the workforce (Noonan and Glass 2012) 
than do their female counterparts. Further, when it comes to perks in the workforce that 
help with juggling family life (e.g., flex time), women (despite typically greater need) 
far more than men are either outright denied them or avoid them for fear of 
discriminatory consequences (Cech and Blair-Loy 2014; Crittenden 2001; Families and 
Work Institute 2012; Glass 2004; Hochschild 1997; Munsch et al. 2014; Stone 2007a; 
Williams 2001). 
 As with employment patterns generally, the wage gap that narrowed throughout 
the 20th century has stabilized since the 1990s (Campbell and Pearlman 2013). A large 
portion of the famous 70-cents-on-the-dollar wage gap has actually been accounted for 
by more recent research, which attributes the lion’s share of the gap to human capital 
factors (e.g., educational foci, employment gaps for childbearing, etc.) and occupational 
segregation (Bianchi et al. 2006; Cohen et al. 2009; England 2010). The remaining gap 
(about 9%) is difficult to account for (Blau and Kahn 2006) but is often attributed to 
implicit bias and subtle discrimination—particularly against mothers (Benard and 
Correll 2010; Byron and Roscigno 2014; Correll et al. 2007; Cuddy et al. 2004; Glass 
2004; Kelly and Grant 2012). These findings support the assertion that there exists a 
persistent bias against the implicitly coupled statuses of femininity and reproductive 
labor roles. 
 Despite the persistent material and cultural consequences of reproductive labor 
involvement, both women and (less surprisingly) men tend to aspire to gender-
22 
stereotypical professions more often than gender-deviant ones (England and Li 2006; 
Xie and Schauman 2003). However, women aspire to male-dominated fields far more 
than the reverse (England and Li 2006; Friedman 2012); which is to say that there is 
more frequent transfer from the non-hegemonic status to the hegemonic status, both for 
practical reasons and because doing so is less an affront to culture than (for example) a 
man who deviates in the direction of feminine associations (Kivel 1992; Pascoe 2007). 
Both the educational pipeline and concerted programmatic efforts have helped propel 
women into traditionally masculine STEM fields and other high-paying occupations 
since the 1970s (Mandel 2013; Padavic and Reskin 2002). Yet women’s involvement in 
some prominent fields (such as computer science) has actually declined in recent 
decades (Ashcraft and Blither 2010; Margolis and Fisher 2003), perhaps because the 
rising prominence and prestige of computer-centric industries causes women to be 
placed in a hiring queue behind male applicants (Reskin 1994). 
Gendered Movement Patterns within Productive Labor 
 Regardless of actual employment sector, there are generalized, gender-distinct 
paths through the career “pipeline” (Friedman 2015). Due to their reproductive labor 
attachments, women tend to “leak out” of the work force in pursuit of non-traditional 
(re: semi-committed) careers (Glass et al. 2013). Women also express lower 
“professional role confidence” (Cech et al. 2011), experience more glass ceiling effects 
(Maume 2004; Ridgeway 1997), and higher levels of discrimination and harassment 
(Bargh et al. 1995; Castilla 2008). Women tend to be perceived as less committed to 
work than men (Moss-Racusin et al. 2012; Ridgeway 1997) and to avoid using family-
friendly policies due to the professional stigma associated with doing so (Correll et al. 
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2007; Hochschild 1997). In other words, femininity is associated with lacking qualities 
intrinsic to desirable employment. By virtue of their presumed association with 
reproductive labor activity, women are systematically funneled into the roles culturally 
expected of them. Such roles are inherently antagonistic to prevailing definitions of the 
committed (re: exploitable) productive worker, so sex and gender statuses themselves 
become labor statuses by proxy—a disadvantageous coupling of femininity and 
reproductive labor. 
 By contrast, men tend to experience what is known as the “glass elevator” effect 
(Williams 1992). Men employed in traditionally female-dominated fields frequently 
receive a larger share of company resources, enjoy more privileges, and are paid higher 
relative to women in the same fields (Ridgeway 2011). Men also gravitate toward more 
stereotypically masculine specializations within these fields (Snyder and Green 2008), 
and they tend to move up and out of lower, more female-occupied positions more 
quickly (Barnett et al. 2000). In other words, the qualities associated with maleness and 
masculinity are qualities that bestow the perception of being more valuable, competent 
workers in productive labor. The coupling of masculine status with specific labor 
qualities propels men upward, regardless of their field of employment. 
 However, while men experience advantage within a given female-dominated 
field, they tend to face considerable stigma from outsiders and in the general cultural 
milieu for deviating from gender-prescriptive employment patterns. Men in traditionally 
feminized professions are culturally marginalized, their labor-role deviance “explained” 
through narratives assigning them essentialist gender-deviant qualities: male nurses are 
labeled homosexual (re: not masculine enough) or too unintelligent/unmotivated to 
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succeed in medical school and become a doctor; male elementary school teachers are 
labeled gay or seen as possible pedophiles and sexual predators, and so on (Barnett et 
al. 2000; Jacobs 1993; Williams 1992; Wooton 1997). In other words, the implicit 
challenge to the essentialist masculinity/labor pairing must be explained with a “reason” 
why a person would voluntarily become deviant and thereby accept a lower status. 
 Movement of men into traditionally female-dominated fields (that is, against the 
hegemonic grain) has been predictably spotty and slow (England 2010). What 
movement there has been validates more about gender-labor hegemonic couplings than 
it challenges. Influxes of male workers tend to be centered in fields of growing pay and 
prestige, such as nursing (Landivar 2013). Trends of male movement into positions of 
lower or declining pay and prestige, or into positions that are characterized by 
traditionally feminine work or submissive expectations (e.g., secretarial or service 
work), are very uncommon (Charles and Grusky 2004; Hegewisch et al. 2010; 
Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2006; Truss et al. 2013). In some cases, men will even drop 
out of the labor force altogether and accept unemployment benefits rather than take jobs 
whose service demands would require them to deviate too far from the characteristics of 
hegemonic masculinity (Nixon 2009). In short, feminine-typical characteristics in a 
career field, if they are not easily replaced with new scripts, often prove to be sufficient 
barriers to turn men away from that field. 
 When cultural shifts propel men into a hegemony-challenging field in ways and 
numbers that become impossible to ignore or explain away, new cultural stories 
coalesce to preserve the traditional gender-labor hierarchy. Ad campaigns spotlighting 
men in traditionally feminized fields typically emphasize the masculinity of those fields, 
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for example by emphasizing the physical aspects of the duties of a nurse and comparing 
them to those of an athlete or a soldier (Cottingham 2014). However, these 
transformational stories remain the exception and the neutralizing force, rather than the 
norm or the basis for revolution. The gender revolution still owes much of its stall to the 
inability or unwillingness of men to pursue traditionally feminine fields and social roles 
(that is, to validate femininity), as well as the cultural and structural barriers 
discouraging such cultural shift (England 2010). These same conditions are also largely 
responsible for motivating women to vacate and avoid these roles since, under the 
current system, they are disadvantageous to everyone. In other words, patterns in 
worker choice and trends in the broader labor market work (intentionally or otherwise) 
to keep the hegemonic statuses tightly coupled, since doing so represents the lowest risk 
path to material success. 
Gender in Reproductive Labor 
 The stalled revolution more broadly is fundamentally connected to the 
persistence of the stalled revolution at home (Friedman 2015). Societal acceptance of 
gender equity has focused mostly on acceptance of working mothers and gender 
egalitarianism in the productive labor force (Cotter et al. 2011; Thornton and Young-
DeMarco 2001). In other words, support has been mostly confined to women whose 
activities support the hegemony of productive labor via either total allegiance to paid 
labor or willingness to shoulder the burden of juggling both desirable and undesirable 
roles. Whichever of these choices a given woman makes, she neither challenges the 
superiority of paid over unpaid labor nor asserts the need for change in men’s labor 
roles. Such challenges as there have been to the gender-labor status quo have stalled or 
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in some cases backslidden since the mid-1990s (Coltrane 2004). Women, whether they 
choose to work or not, are still seen as being in charge of the majority of the 
reproductive labor (Bianchi et al. 2012; Hays 1997; Hochschild 1989; Lachance-Grzela 
and Bouchard 2010; Lincoln 2008; Pinto and Coltrane 2009).  
This cultural association magnifies and sustains the disadvantage of women 
relative to men. Reproductive labor’s fundamental antagonism with the prevailing 
employment model not only contributes to gendered discrimination in the work force 
but also informs women’s self-perceptions, including their tendencies to both revise 
their career goals downward and to leave the workforce altogether (Boushey 2005; Cha 
2013; Hewlett and Luce 2005; Stone 2007a; Stone 2007b). In contrast to women, men 
roundly benefit from their gender’s labor associations, even experiencing enhanced 
career outcomes for their presumed reproductive obligations (re: bringing home the 
bacon) as father and husband (Correll et al. 2007; Glauber 2008; Kilbourne et al. 1994). 
There are multiple reasons why fatherhood is likely to boost a man’s career trajectory. 
Having a family may make the individual man seem like a more dependable worker, 
since his responsibilities make him appear more stable than the stereotypical bachelor 
(Coltrane 2004). Fatherhood is also another box ticked on the checklist of hegemonic 
masculinity, and the fatherhood bonus is enhanced for each hegemonic attribute that the 
working father embodies, including whiteness, working a white-collar job, and being in 
a traditional, heterosexual union (Hodges and Budig 2010). 
A man’s ability to embody the hegemonic masculinity of an archetypal worker, 
therefore, appears to be positively correlated with his career trajectory. Women’s 
careers, however, suffer for their familial duties because employers and colleagues 
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perceive female workers as being naturally pulled away from the workforce by the 
family (Benard and Correll 2010; Coltrane 2004; Coltrane and Adams 2008; Mahaffy 
and Ward 2002; Roth 2006), yet it is clear that no such association is made between 
maleness and family. According to our hegemonic coupling model, it follows that 
men’s perceived “nature” as paid workers and not caregivers means that employers and 
colleagues see marriage as a relationship wherein a man outsources reproductive labor 
onto his (presumably female) spouse, freeing him up to be remain available as an 
employee. The fact that a traditional, heterosexual union is one of the bonus-enhancing 
statuses for men (Hodges and Budig 2010) only supports the outsourcing hypothesis, 
since two gay men in a relationship have no obvious female “outlet” to which they can 
outsource.  
In short, the reproductive-feminine essentialist fallacy means women’s 
attachment to roles such as homemaker, mother, and caregiver follows the narrative of 
cultural hegemony: a status quo that is framed as natural, inevitable, and beneficial (to 
men and the productive economy). This coupling is also, of course, framed as being in 
natural and inevitable conflict with a woman’s potential as a paid worker. In sharp 
contrast, the productive-masculine fallacy translates to a man’s reproductive role 
(breadwinner, father) being framed as enhancing his productive roles, since there’s “no 
possible way” reproductive labor would pull the man out of the paid labor force—that 
would too sharply violate dominant narratives of masculinity. This pattern supports the 
theory that hegemonic coupling is itself an independent force of attitudinal bias. 
Next we turn to arguably the most intensive reproductive labor role: 
childbearing. Parenthood only exacerbates the career-path divergence between men and 
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women. In fact, motherhood more strongly suppresses women’s careers than does 
marriage (Hook and Pettit 2016; Metz and Tharenou 2001; Misra and Strader 2013; 
Schneider and Waite 2005). Parenthood is not only a bigger commitment than marriage 
alone (to wit: it is a near-compulsory form of reproductive labor once the role is first 
adopted), but motherhood is even more tightly culturally coupled with femininity than 
is wifedom. Rindfuss et al. (1999) suggest that women’s widely recognized conflict 
between work and family is primarily a conflict between work and parenthood, which 
incorporates childbearing, domestic labor duties, and nurturing duties in a single role 
(Hays 1997; Hochschild 1989). Although attitudes in recent decades have shifted 
toward believing that women can be effective mothers and workers (Goldin 2006; 
Hollister and Smith 2014; Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001), and employment 
policies have become more family friendly (Farber 2009; Hollister and Smith 2014; 
Kelly and Dobbin 1999), these “progressive” trends still only support women who 
choose either paid work or the juggling of paid work with other roles and, 
unsurprisingly, have not translated into much measurable progress in men’s roles 
(Friedman 2015). 
As in the work force, men’s roles in the home remain largely consistent (and 
privileged) over time. Men do less household labor than do women, regardless of their 
own employment status or that of their partner (Hochschild 1989; Stone 2007a). In fact, 
research finds only minor progress in men’s engagement with any reproductive labor 
roles over the last several decades (Bianchi et al. 2000; Bianchi et al. 2006; Sayer 2005; 
Williams 1995). Moreover, there is substantial evidence that, even when the sexes cross 
gender boundaries, they still “do gender,” and engage with their labor in ways that 
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neutralize rather than condone gender deviance. Household work done by men still 
tends to take on distinctly masculine characteristics (Bianchi et al. 2000; Maume 2008; 
Raley et al. 2012). When men do take on the responsibilities of homemaking, it is 
typically for economic reasons rather than personal preference (Chesley 2011), 
indicating continued resistance to truly de-gendered divisions of labor. Women are 
complicit in this process as well, as when women who earn more than their husbands 
increase their own time spent doing housework (Brines 1994; Goldstein 2000). This 
type of gender neutralization could be considered a way of protecting traditional 
gender-labor narratives that are otherwise threatened by people’s pragmatic choices: 
preserving the hegemonic coupling that is the clearest path to success. 
An Important Note Concerning Labor Hegemony 
 It is both theoretically and ethically important to remember the central assertion 
from Marxist Feminist theory regarding gendered labor relations: reproductive labor is 
not inherently of lower value than productive labor. Rather, both types of labor are 
equally prerequisite to maintaining the conditions for life and society (Vogel 2013). 
Reproductive labor activities have been relatively devalued because of three major 
conflicts: their historical association with marginalized (re: feminine) gender 
characteristics, their historical-coincidental lack of measurability in a capitalist 
economic system, and the fact that they draw from the same pool of human time, 
energy, and material resources necessary to generate economically measurable 
outcomes such as market products, income, and profit. 
In the preceding sections, we have traced the key fronts waged by Western 
feminists toward gender equality. Summarily comparing these fronts yields an 
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important insight: achieving greater gender equality via the current epistemology seems 
to hinge on supporting traditional labor inequality. The most successful efforts to date 
have focused on generating equality in education and the paid work force, which only 
endorses cultural reverence for the same productive labor force that systematically 
marginalizes women. Other efforts have emphasized freeing women to choose their 
individual levels of engagement with each sphere of labor (saving men that dilemma). 
While this approach has seen moderate success, women are still unilaterally penalized 
for any involvement (voluntary or involuntary, real or perceived) with still-marginalized 
reproductive labor. Third, public policy initiatives have sought to offset and redistribute 
the burdens women face as a result of their essentialist ties to reproductive labor. 
However, since these policies seldom exhort men to change, they often serve to offset 
discontent with the status quo rather than challenge it. Finally, some cultural and policy 
initiatives have focused on pushing men into traditionally feminine fields or into taking 
on an equal share of reproductive labor, and those have met with little to no measurable 
success. In short, reproductive labor is still largely framed as a burden for the individual 
(of any gender, but mostly women) to juggle or avoid. This appears to be the natural 
consequence of a socioeconomic system that awards status and privilege based on 
economically measurable activity and cultural conformity. As we will discuss in the 
next section, advancing insight into the stalled gender revolution requires reframing our 
understandings of gender inequities as fundamentally embedded in cultural narratives of 
the value of labor. 
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The Problem of Understanding and Removing the Gender Revolution “Stall” 
Past Framings and Attempted Solutions 
 To understand and alleviate the stall in the gender revolution requires clarity on 
how and why past efforts have only been partially successful at fostering equity. As we 
have seen, norms for the most privileged gender constructs (masculinity) are intensely 
bound up with productive labor contributions (Friedman and Weissbrod 2005; Kivel 
2007; Sayer et al. 2004; Stone 2007b; Townsend 2002). The ideal worker model in 
contemporary, Western society is based on the archetypal image of a male full-time 
worker financially supporting a female stay-at-home caregiver who, in turn, supports 
the man’s commitment to productive labor (Acker 1990; Blair-Loy 2003; Williams 
2001). The ideal-typical woman model previously focused strictly on fulfilling the 
domestic worker roles but, due in large part to civil unrest over exclusion from the most 
desirable roles, has evolved over time into a hybrid or second-shift worker. Men, 
however, embody success in their domestic roles automatically so long as they are 
successful full-time workers and providers (Friedman 2015). Both cases affirm 
reproductive labor as the subordinate role (i.e., it is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
personal success). 
 Western feminism identified productive labor’s importance early on and, as 
scripts promoting equality spread, men’s and women’s expectations for dividing work 
and family labor by gender somewhat converged from the middle to near the end of the 
20th century, but the convergence trend halted thereafter (Thornton and Young-
DeMarco 2001). Convergence was concentrated in the acceptance of women’s rising 
involvement in historically masculine roles and activities (Friedman 2015). In other 
words, embodying traditionally masculine qualities and roles became an avenue to 
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legitimacy for women, and so popular support for traditionally masculine activities 
(supporting the productive economy) expanded substantially. Literature on this 
progressive trend has labeled it “egalitarian essentialism” (Charles and Grusky 2004), a 
cultural narrative that merges support for intensive mothering (Hays 1997) with rhetoric 
emphasizing personal “choice” and gender “equality” (Stone 2007b). This narrative 
encourages women to “lean in” to work (Sandberg 2013) which, while central to the 
progress women have made, has some unintended (or at least problematic) implications. 
At the individual level, the “lean in” narrative tacitly encourages women to work 
Hochschild’s (1989) “second shift” without offering alternative options or prescribing 
compensating cultural and structural changes for men. At the societal level, the 
narrative reinforces the hegemony of productive over reproductive labor, since it 
prescribes paid employment as the key to equality, as opposed to any efforts to balance 
the two labor arenas. In other words, the desegregation of productive labor alone neither 
challenges the hegemony of productive labor and masculinity, nor questions their 
“natural” connection. 
 While efforts to reduce discrimination and increase institutional support for 
working women and especially mothers are undoubtedly positive (Kelly et al. 2011), 
evidence suggests that the pursuit of gender equality will remain incomplete without 
redefinition of masculinity and the labor activities deemed appropriate for men 
(England 2010). Alleviating the male-driven side of the gender stall requires a special 
focus on removing the cultural (more than structural) barriers to men’s success in 
stereotypically feminine roles—in short, redefining and de-hegemonizing masculinity 
(Friedman 2015). Hegemonic gender norms set expectations about what is 
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“appropriate” for the genders (Connell 1987; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; West and 
Zimmerman 1987). Although the standard perception is that society confers more 
privilege on masculine roles than feminine ones (Cohen and Huffman 2003; Connell 
1987; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999), the natural side effect of masculine hegemony 
is increased consequences for males who deviate. The sociocultural constraints on 
hegemonic masculinity are much tighter, with definitions of ‘appropriate’ masculinity 
being much narrower, and sanctions upon men for violating them much steeper than 
those surrounding ‘appropriate’ femininity and conformity for women (Pascoe 2007).  
Though young men and women both tend to express desires for egalitarian work 
and home arrangements, both tend to prioritize traditionally masculine (productive 
labor) roles if egalitarianism fails (Gerson 2010). So while both men and women 
endorse fairness, both will pursue the more advantaged roles if compromise cannot be 
achieved. It is far more acceptable in general that women fail to conform to traditional 
femininity—that they exhibit masculine qualities, participate in masculine activities, 
and occupy masculine roles—than that men deviate from masculinity into (lower status) 
femininity (Kivel 1992; Pascoe 2007). This may be because men, who are expected by 
default to conform to high-status masculinity, challenge the presumed value of 
masculinity by deviating from it, while women who pursue traditionally masculine 
qualities tacitly endorse the greater value of those qualities. This finding validates our 
assertion that it is the hegemonic cultural arrangement—masculinity dominating 
femininity, productive labor dominating reproductive—rather than the physical 
domination of one sex by another, that is culturally more sacred in contemporary 
society. It logically follows that this arrangement would lead to (1) both men and 
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women avoiding the disadvantaged roles and (2) statistical disadvantage for women, 
who are circumstantially, culturally, and structurally more tied to those roles than are 
men. The traditional gender-labor arrangement, the current one, and the steps leading 
between them all support the conclusion that the gender-essentialization of labor is a 
potent force perpetuating inequality. 
Placing Gender and Labor in International Perspective 
 Approaching the problems of gender and labor hegemony from an international 
lens provides unique opportunities for insight into problems of hegemonic coupling 
because, while most states with available data have long traditions of 
masculine/productive labor hegemonies and feminist efforts to address them, the 
institutional and policy environments tend to vary much more widely between 
countries/administrations than between regions of a single country or sectors of its labor 
force. Further, there is substantial evidence (e.g., Artazcoz et al. 2016; Bambra et al. 
2009; Chung et al. 2013; Hallden et al. 2016; Misra and Strader 2013; Xavier et al. 
2014) that state-level contexts—and most especially the institutional arrangement of the 
welfare regime—have pronounced effects on the outcomes of male and female workers’ 
balancing of productive and reproductive labor responsibilities. There is even some 
evidence that citizens of particular nations may view generous welfare regimes less 
favorably than their otherwise-liberal gender norms would suggest (Bozendahl and 
Olafsfottir 2008). 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) work represents the current gold standard on 
classifying welfare regimes. The Esping-Andersen model classifies countries into three 
general clusters based on their dispositions toward labor and gender role conflict: 
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conservative, liberal, and social-democratic. Countries in each of the three archetypes 
feature distinct patterns of social policy and varying levels of gender equality (Mandle 
and Shalev 2009). Conservative countries such as Germany, Italy, and Japan have 
strong breadwinner/homemaker arrangements, lower rates of female labor force 
participation, and higher rates of female economic dependence. Liberal countries such 
as the United States feature looser gendered arrangements, a free-market ideology, and 
lower levels of state intervention, including interventions concerning parental leave and 
childcare (Mandel 2009). Social-democratic states, such as those of the Scandinavian 
peninsula, have extensive welfare systems and social policies, including those focusing 
on family leave, as well as comparatively low levels of gender inequality.  
Of interest, none of these institutional arrangements on its own appears to fully 
un-stall the gender revolution. Although some have more success than others, there 
appears to be no specific arrangement that reliably overrides the cultural inertia of the 
gender-labor hegemonic coupling. Even when policies and institutions such as paid 
parental leave are implemented or improved, without addressing cultural hegemonies, 
they can actually suppress women’s employment, career trajectories, wages, economic 
independence, and generally widen the gaps between men’s and women’s career 
trajectories (Budig et al. 2012; Hook 2010; Mandel 2009).  Further, these unintended 
consequences may be the worst for poorer women (Budig and Hodges 2010, 2014)1, 
who represent an even lower-hegemony group than women in general. Women living in 
these institutional regimes may end up temporarily or permanently exiting the labor 
force to address reproductive labor goals and obligations. They then stop accumulating 
                                                      
1 These conclusions are somewhat disputed in the literature (e.g., Killewald and Bearak 2014; England et 
al. 2016). 
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the human and social capital that their male counterparts continue accruing, employers 
develop statistical discrimination practices favoring men for their more predictable 
career paths, men reinforce employers’ expectations by avoiding the “mistakes” of 
women, and women become locked into lower-status careers that are compatible with 
their dual commitments (Mandel 2012; Mandel and Semyonov 2005; Mandel and 
Semyonov 2006). In other words, institutional arrangements designed to combat 
inequality may actually enhance it. Policies appear unable to override the cultural 
constructs tying women to reproductive labor (Deven and Moss 2002). Instead, if they 
fail to address hegemonic couplings directly, they tend to be coopted to reinforce the 
systematically stratified status quo (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Stier et al. 2001). 
On the other hand, policies that directly target and challenge cultural 
frameworks—such as those that are developed on the explicit premise of both sexes 
caring for children—prove substantially more successful in decoupling hegemonies 
(Haas 1992; Hook 2006). European policies vary widely in parental leave availability, 
usage, and regard for gender asymmetries (Deven 2011). Those that offer generic 
parental leave, such as in Denmark, France, Germany, and Poland, typically see it 
relegated to usage by women, with negative consequences and a perpetuated status quo. 
The old activist maxim that silence in the face of oppression is tacit support for the 
oppressor appears to apply here: a gender-neutral policy, interpreted through a 
hegemonic lens, tends to be perceived and employed in support of the status quo. To 
wit, generic parental leave is seen as being implemented to allow women to perform 
their “natural” reproductive labor while still pursuing paid employment. 
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States such as Iceland, Finland, Sweden, and Canadian province of Quebec have 
implemented policies that are deliberately asymmetrical (Deven 2011; Patnaik 2013). 
They challenge default cultural assumptions by targeting men: making a portion of 
parental leave only available to fathers, providing additional time if fathers take it, 
offering monetary incentives for leave shared equally between partners, and so on. 
These policies explicitly challenge hegemonic couplings by incentivizing deviance from 
those couplings. Such hegemony-challenging initiatives have profound potential for 
downstream effects. Fathers’ usage of parental leave is also associated with other 
hegemonic deviations, such as an increase in household labor hours and greater 
participation in childcare labor (Kotsadam and Finseraas 2011; Tanaka and Waldfogel 
2007). There is even some evidence that suggests that these structural changes, if given 
time to become normalized, feed into new cultural associations that normalize and 
destigmatize men’s roles as reproductive laborers: new, more equal, perhaps less 
hegemonic couplings (Rangecroft 2016).  
Importantly, there is reason to believe that some of these cultural changes may 
be a result of a trend toward postmaterialist values (Inglehart 1971, 1997, 2004). 
Evidence suggests (Dalton 2013; Inglehart 2008) that postmaterial scripts (which 
include gender egalitarianism both generally and in the labor force) may proliferate 
under conditions of greater wealth and equality: a “rising tide raises all boats” effect. 
However, wealth and development levels are relatively homogenous among many of the 
countries in this sample (with some exceptions), including among those from different 
welfare regime categories. While personal demographic factors likely play a role in 
egalitarian (re: postmaterialist) values, and are also connected to attitudes toward the 
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welfare state (Reingold and Smith 2012), the evidence discussed here strongly 
implicates the macro-level context of the welfare regime itself as a key variable and 
point of greatest leverage for inquiry. As such, I position an indicator of social welfare 
regime type at the center of the predictive model in Analysis 3. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
Setting Up the Hegemonic Coupling Framework 
Gaining Better Theoretical Vision on the Hegemonic Coupling 
 It is important to note that the success of a few countries’ policy regimes may 
seem idiosyncratic or coincidental at first glance. Indeed, in both popular and scholarly 
circles the relative gender egalitarianism found in the Scandinavian nations is often 
treated as the inscrutable or at least non-transferrable result of some perfect storm 
specific to those states (Borchorst and Siim 2008; Zahidi 2014). Our journey through 
these phenomena suggests that, to the contrary, there may be a clear theoretical thread 
connecting the relative success of the Scandinavian states with the comparative struggle 
in the rest of the developed world: policy regimes that explicitly challenge hegemonic 
couplings. If this assessment is accurate—if explicit challenge via carefully crafted 
policy is needed—then researchers and policy developers need better conceptual and 
empirical vision on these phenomena, their murky cultural definitions, and systematic 
interrelationships. 
Classical Marxist Thought on Labor, Class, and Gender 
 Marxist theories of gender and labor are especially germane to inquiry into 
pernicious inequalities because they are preeminent in their treatment of gender, labor, 
and class as interconnected constructs. The Marxist tradition is also the home of 
concepts of cultural and gendered hegemony, which form the basis of this project. Marx 
and Engels, in The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, assert that 
oppression based on sex began as far back as pre-agricultural societies with the sexual 
division of labor and the rise to prominence of productive labor (as farming, 
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pastoralism, and trading) as the dominant mode in society (Engels [1884] 1972). 
According to Engels ([1884] 1972), the emphasis on private ownership and material 
production as status vehicles led to practices that shaped the family into an institution 
for supporting the productive labor market: men could offset necessary but unprofitable 
duties onto women, and they could retain property accrued through labor by passing it 
along state-legitimated bloodlines. As production was the male sphere of activity, men 
were the recognized owners of property, granting them power over public and private 
matters. This primacy translated into ownership (both legal and cultural) of their own 
family members and those persons’ labor capacities. While the historical accuracy of 
some of these assertions has been a topic of considerable debate (Knight 2012), the 
tradition they began contributed prominently to much of early feminist thought and later 
schools of Marxist and Material Feminism. 
Contemporary Marxist Feminist Thought on Labor, Class, and Gender 
 The Marxist Feminist tradition takes the Marxist maxim that labor lies at the 
core of human social systems and expands upon it to divide labor into two connected 
yet distinct categories: productive labor, which generates the goods and services that 
circulate through society for profit, and reproductive labor, which encompasses the 
labor necessary to produce and sustain human life (Vogel 2013). The production system 
itself (specifically but not necessarily capitalism) and the gendered division of labor 
types are instrumental in both structural and cultural gender inequality. As much of 
what is traditionally regarded as women’s labor is not recognized in this economic 
system (Ferguson and Hennessy 2010), both the system that devalues said labor and the 
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fact that women are restricted to performing it (and performing it in conditions of 
cultural devaluation) are foundational pillars in a gender stratification system. 
 The Material Feminist tradition grew out of Marxist feminism to emphasize 
gender relations in regards to class struggle, while attempting to avoid the gender 
essentialist fallacies of the dominant feminist views from the previous era (Hennessy 
1993; 1997). Material feminism is rooted in the premise that, rather than essential 
differences between the sexes, a complex web of material, social, and psychological 
relationships (in which labor relations are instrumental) is at the root of gender 
inequality (Ferguson 1994). Feminists in this tradition have extended their scope into 
the realm of intersectional feminism, where the school’s focus tends to be on the 
intersection of statuses that make an individual more or less vulnerable to exploitation 
within the labor system (Mitchell 2013). The importance of the Marxist/Material 
feminist lineage is that it is a paradigm that frames gender and labor inequalities as co-
emergent, intersectional phenomena. The implication of recognizing these complex 
interrelationships is that, to truly understand them, we must correctly untangle each 
piece as well as its connections to the others. That implication directly motivates this 
project’s mode of inquiry. 
New Theoretical Model: Hegemonic Coupling 
 A hegemonic coupling (HC) is a pairing of two (or more) hegemonic statuses 
that reinforce, sustain, and amplify one another. As a rule, such statuses have typically 
been coupled so long that they are framed in popular cultural narratives as “naturally” 
paired: masculinity and paid employment, or femininity and caregiving, for example. 
The central hypothesis of this project is that hegemonic couplings contribute to 
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persistent, complex, and intersectional inequalities, independent of any other forces 
involved. Any negative consequences of a coupling, such as asymmetrical privilege or 
discrimination, cannot be dealt with by only addressing the privilege of one status (e.g., 
masculinity) without the other (e.g., paid labor). Any strategy that does so will simply 
shift the power imbalance without dismantling it. The quintessential example of this is 
the 20th century’s pattern of relatively upper-class, white women achieving substantial 
gains in labor equity while shifting the burdens they previously endured onto women of 
poorer means, women of color, immigrant women, and other disadvantaged groups.  
To dismantle a hegemonic coupling, hegemonies and the relationships between 
them must first be correctly identified, and then both/all dimensions of the power 
imbalance must be addressed in close proximity. The necessity of comprehensive 
reform is evidenced by the fact that gender equality was not simply achieved by pushing 
more women into adopting traditionally masculine roles. Instead, we find that there 
exists substantial need for men to move into traditionally feminine roles, as well as for 
women to not abandon them entirely (Aumann et al. 2011; Friedman 2015). These 
needs exist in the present because they are necessary to address oversights in gender and 
labor revolutions of decades past. Had those past revolutionary efforts been able to 
properly frame gender and labor inequalities in their relationships to one another, and 
thus identify how changes in one field would affect dynamics in the other, such needs 
may have been addressed in the natural course of social change. The fine resolution of 
hindsight, of course, is what makes this project possible. 
The gendered nature of the paid labor force can be characterized thus: standards 
of “success,” “value,” and “privilege” are culturally tied to productive labor 
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participation, they are characterized as inherently masculine, and they stand in 
antagonism to both femininity and reproductive labor involvement. I propose that all of 
these relationships are artifacts of the hegemonic coupling between multiple statuses 
advantaged in the economic system. The traditionally masculine, hegemonic labor-force 
status of wage earning has been sexually desegregated by women’s entry in the 20th 
century, but none of its actual hegemony has been attenuated. In other words, although 
people regardless of sex are mostly accepted as viable participants in the paid labor 
force, this is only so long as they conform to the “good worker” model that is based on 
hegemonic conceptions of masculinity. Meanwhile, scripts equating valuable labor with 
paid labor, success with employment, caregiving with femininity, femininity with low 
prestige, and family involvement with underemployment still predominate the cultural 
narrative. 
Because these constructs and their associated qualities are inherently culturally 
and psychologically muddled, social science research cannot reliably represent a 
person’s attitudes toward gender and labor equality as a monolithic disposition. An 
employer who is egalitarian toward men and women in the paid labor force may still 
hold considerable bias against parents, which represents an implicit discrimination 
toward women. Men who express egalitarian attitudes toward household labor duties 
may maintain those attitudes while subconsciously gravitating toward traditionally 
masculine activities and marginalizing “women’s work.” Women who espouse gender 
egalitarianism in all types of labor may still denigrate the stay-at-home dad for failing to 
exhibit hegemonic masculinity. In other words, any two people who appear equally 
gender egalitarian at face value or on a survey instrument may have wildly divergent 
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attitudes about facets of the gender-labor arena. The list of examples is almost infinite, 
but each hypothetical “contradiction” is readily tied back to subtle hegemonies that 
reinforce one another. 
Traditional survey instruments fail to treat measurement of gender and labor 
ideologies with appropriate nuance. Any two scale-based questions that may seem to 
both be measuring the progressiveness of a respondent’s values can easily conflate 
substantively distinct dimensions of the gender-labor coupling. 
• A measure asking whether women should be paid equally to men for equal work 
addresses attitudes about gender equity in the productive labor force, but it fails 
to properly account for the gendering and hegemony of productive labor. 
Productive labor is culturally masculinized and (partially as a result of this 
masculinity) assumed to be superior. Thus, the survey measure is effectively 
asking the respondent whether a woman’s claim to equal access to masculine 
privilege is legitimate or not. The measure indicates little about whether the 
respondent actually holds masculinity and femininity in equal esteem. 
• A measure asking whether men should do an equal share of housework when 
both they and their female partners are gainfully employed addresses attitudes 
about gender in reproductive labor but, again, fails to account for the gendering 
and hegemony of labor. Reproductive labor is culturally feminized and regarded 
as a burden compared to “naturally” superior masculine-productive work. Thus, 
the item measures whether the respondent sees a man’s gendered privilege of 
avoiding feminization (re: devaluation) as legitimate or not. Again, it indicates 
little about actual regard for gender constructs. 
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o In both of these two examples, questions that seem to be asking for 
information about people’s attitudes toward gendered labor equality are 
actually committing two essentialist fallacies: (1) tying particular types 
of labor to gendered identities, and (2) assuming the superiority of one 
labor-gender coupling over the other. The result is that each measure 
contributes to answering the question, “Do men and women deserve 
equal access to or protection from the natural superiority of productive 
over reproductive labor and masculinization over feminization?” 
• As a counter example, a more theoretically nuanced and useful measure might 
ask, “How equally should new mothers and fathers share paid parental leave?” 
The phrasing of this question directly addresses a gender-based division of 
productive and reproductive labor, but it leaves out hegemonic assumptions. It 
asks how the parents should distribute both types of labor, and it emphasizes that 
any hypothetical reproductive labor done would replace the more advantaged 
productive labor. Furthermore, because the measure asks about paid leave, it at 
least partially negates gender-stereotyped assumptions such as that the father’s 
leave from work would impact family income more than the mother’s leave. In 
short, this question much more narrowly measures the respondent’s attitudes 
about both the gendering and hegemony of labor involvement. 
The above are just examples of how measures that seem to target a single ideological 
stance (i.e., gender egalitarianism) may make assumptions that skew their validity and 
interpretability.  
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Because gender and labor constructs define one another, they inevitably skew 
respondents’ answers to seemingly straight-forward survey measures. People from 
wildly different walks of life may appear ideologically similar as a result. What is 
probably not as muddled are the relative prestige levels of various statuses and their 
alternatives: productive labor is regarded more highly than reproductive labor, 
masculine qualities more highly than feminine ones, breadwinning responsibilities more 
than caregiving ones, and so on. The hegemonic coupling model’s goal is to inform 
survey instruments and statistical models that accurately measure people’s gendered 
labor attitudes by isolating the nuanced couplings of gender, labor, and prestige. 
Investigations that respect these couplings are more properly positioned to identify 
which attitudinal constructs and demographic groups may be lagging behind and 
“stalling” continued efforts to achieve gender equality. 
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Chapter 4: Research Design, Methodology, and Data 
Data 
Data Set 
The data for this project come from the 2012 wave of the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP). The ISSP is a continuing annual programme (begun in 
1985) of cross-national collaboration on surveys covering topics important for social 
science research. It brings together pre-existing social science projects and coordinates 
research goals, thereby adding a cross-national, cross-cultural perspective to the 
individual national studies. The ISSP researchers especially concentrate on developing 
questions that are meaningful and relevant to all countries and can be expressed in an 
equivalent manner in all relevant languages (ISSP 2010). 
The 2012 wave consists principally of a “Family and Changing Gender Roles” 
module that is repeated every few years. The 2012 wave is the fourth repetition in the 
series, having been previously administered in 2002, 1994, and 1988. The raw data set 
contains data from 40 countries, with 60,753 unique cases and 413 variables. I have 
narrowed this sample to OECD countries and then divided those into theoretically 
distinct categories based on the Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) tripartite model of 
liberal, conservative, and social democratic welfare regimes. The current sample 
includes the following countries (listed here according to social welfare regime): 
1. Liberal Welfare Regime: Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, Unites States 
2. Conservative Welfare Regime: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, South Korea,   
3. Social Democratic Welfare Regime: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden 
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4. Non-Categorized2 States: Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, 
Latvia, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey 
This is the list of OECD countries in the data set with data available for this module and 
wave. 
Using a cutoff of OECD membership helps produce a sample that can most 
reliably answer the questions motivating this investigation. First, due to having more 
developed infrastructures and more stable governments/infrastructure, OECD countries 
are more robustly represented among the measures in the data set than are other 
countries. Further, the tripartite set of OECD membership criteria (OECD 2016) selects 
for labor markets that are most likely to demonstrate the types of subtle biases upon 
which the hegemonic coupling model is based: 
1. Democracy and respect for human rights: Countries that do not meet the 
OECD’s basic standards of participatory government and human equity are 
unlikely to have achieved a level of gender equity that would make looking 
for subtle and pernicious biases meaningful. In short, such countries often 
have a starkly gendered division of labor and often reject women’s full, 
basic participation in civil society. 
2. An open market economy: An open market economy is a foundational 
assumption of Hegemonic Coupling Theory in that the theory is based on the 
                                                      
2 This category catches OECD countries that have not been or cannot be typified in the Esping-Andersen 
framework. While Esping-Andersen (1999) has explored frameworks with more than three categories, he 
warns that the resolution gained from them may not be worth the parsimony sacrificed. As this project 
already pushes the boundaries to establish new theoretical frameworks, I have opted to use the most well-
established framework on welfare regimes as a stable base upon which to build my analyses. To simply 
omit the non-categorized countries from analysis would introduce non-random sample selection to the 
models, so I have created a catch-all category for them. Future analyses using hegemonic coupling could 
provide insight into where these countries might fall in the Esping-Andersen framework based on how 
they score relative to countries whose regime type is already established. 
49 
assumption of a long cultural history of privileging male wage-earners in the 
paid labor market. 
3. GDP per capita (PPP) at least as high as the poorest OECD member: While 
no specific level of GDP can be said to directly predict a corresponding level 
of gender equity—and in fact some research suggests that the causal arrow 
in fact runs in the direction of gender equity increasing GDP (McKindsey 
and Company 2016)—level of development does broadly correspond with 
an expansion of human rights (Barro 2001). Given that Hegemonic Coupling 
Theory specifically applies to the contexts of more highly developed states, 
the OECD cutoff represents a vetted, relatively non-arbitrary developmental 
boundary for our sample. 
Finally, in exploratory analysis, I have excluded all variables in the original data set that 
are not relevant to my theoretical model. I have also tested for and removed some 
missing data where appropriate. 
Demographics of the Sample 
 I present the sample (N = 37,632) demographics in tables 4.01-4.03, which can 
be found in the Appendix (p. 120). Respondents’ ages range from 15 to 102, with a 
mean age of 48.49 years, with a standard deviation of 17.40. Years of education range 
from 0 to 30, with a mean attainment of 12.63 years, with a standard deviation of 4.21. 
This means the average respondent has approximately completed a high school 
education, while one standard deviation lower correlates with completing junior high 
school and one standard deviation higher correlates with a university degree. Regarding 
sex, 54.5% of the sample is female, and 45.5% is male. Concerning marital status, 
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24.54% of sample respondents have never been married, 58.09% are currently married, 
and 17.37% have been married in the past but are not currently. Regarding employment 
status, 9.5% of the sample has never been gainfully employed, 33.92% of the sample 
has been employed previously but is not currently, and 56.59% of the sample is 
currently employed. The “Formerly Employed” status does not specify reason for 
dropping out of the work force (e.g., age, childbirth, disability, etc.), so it is likely a 
heterogeneous group. 
 Concerning residential status, 31.80% of the sample lives in a rural region or 
village, 26.80% of the sample lives in an area designated a town by nation’s relative 
standards, 15.77% of the sample lives in a suburban area, and 25.63% lives in a city. 
Regarding self-reported health status, 24.35% of sample respondents report their health 
being “Poor” to “Fair,” 36.56% report “Satisfactory” health, and 39.08% report their 
health being “Good” to “Excellent.” I created the measure containing data on 
respondents’ household incomes as a relative measure. Using STATA’s “xtile” 
command, I divided country-specific sub-samples into quintiles based on the earning 
range of that particular nation, and then I merged the country-level variables into a 
single international-level measure. This measure does not provide insight into the 
income distribution of the sample, and there was no country-level income data for 
Turkey. 
 Regarding frequency of religious attendance, 32.77% of the sample do not ever 
attend religious services. 41.17% of the sample attend religious services a few times per 
year or less, 9.37% attend at least once per month or more, and 16.69% attend at least 
once per week or more. Concerning the Esping-Andersen welfare regime typology, 
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16.02% of the sample falls into the “Liberal” regime category, 33.30% falls into the 
“Conservative” regime category, and 10.86% falls into the “Social Democratic” regime 
category. The distribution of this measure relates specifically to the fact that Esping-
Andersen’s (1990, 1999) typology does not seek to distribute countries evenly, and far 
more of the world falls into the Conservative category than the other two types. 
Moreover, this typology doesn’t account at all for many states in the developed world, 
which is why the “Non-Categorized” type composes so much of the sample (39.82%). 
 Note that Table 4.03 (p. 122) contains country-level distributions of the sample, 
which are not elaborated upon here. 
 
Measures 
Observed and Latent Measures for Analysis 
 This project uses twelve key measures as the focal point of its analysis. The 
twelve measures are grouped into three sets of four using confirmatory factor analysis, 
and then each set is used to construct one of three latent measures. Each latent measure 
represents a theoretically distinct facet of a person’s gender-labor ideology. Observed 
measures do not overlap across latent constructs. The makeup of the constructs is as 
follows. 
1) Latent Construct: De-Gendered Conception of Labor (DGCL): This measure 
explores the original question posed in this project by measuring the respondent’s 
views about how inherently gendered or gender-appropriate is a particular type of 
labor. It is coded such that higher scores represent gender-neutral conceptions of 
labor, while lower scores represent more traditional, gender-essentialist conceptions 
of labor. The usefulness of this measure serves as a direct indicator the hegemonic 
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coupling model’s applicability to the field of gender-labor research. This construct 
is composed of four observed measures: 
a) “If both [parents] are in a similar work situation and are eligible for paid leave, 
how should this paid leave period be divided between the mother and the 
father?” 
i) Possible answers: Mother entire, father not any; Mother most, father some; 
Mother and father half; Father most, mother some; Father entire, mother not 
any. Excluded responses: Can’t choose; No answer; Not applicable. 
b) “Consider a family with a child under school age. What, in your opinion, is the 
best way for them to organize their family and work life?” 
i) Possible answers: Mother at home, father full-time; Mother part-time, father 
full-time; Both mother and father full-time, Both mother and father part-
time; Father part-time, mother full-time; Father at home, mother full-time. 
Excluded responses: Can’t choose; No answer. 
c) “To what extent do you agree or disagree … ? A man’s job is to earn money; a 
woman’s job is to look after the home and family.” 
i) Possible answers: Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; 
Disagree; Strongly disagree. Excluded responses: Can’t choose; No answer. 
d) “To what extent do you agree or disagree … ? A job is all right, but what most 
women really want is a home and children.” 
i) Possible answers: Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; 
Disagree; Strongly disagree. Excluded responses: Can’t choose; No answer. 
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2) Latent construct: Gender Equality in Reproductive Labor (GERL): This measure 
addresses the critique set forth at the end of Chapter 3 by measuring how the 
respondent treats men’s claims to avoiding feminine-reproductive roles versus 
women’s obligations to them. It is coded such that higher scores indicate that a man 
spends more time engaged in reproductive labor relative to his female partner. It is 
composed of four observed measures3 interacted with the sex of the respondent: 
a) “In your household who does the following things … ? Who does the laundry?” 
i) Possible answers: Always wife; Usually wife; About equal or both together; 
Usually husband; Always husband. Excluded responses: No partner; Is done 
by a third person; Can’t choose; No answer. 
b) “In your household who does the following things … ? Cares for sick family 
members?” 
i) Possible answers: Always wife; Usually wife; About equal or both together; 
Usually husband; Always husband. Excluded responses: No partner; Is done 
by a third person; Can’t choose; No answer. 
c) In your household who does the following things … ? Does the household 
cleaning?” 
i) Possible answers: Always wife; Usually wife; About equal or both together; 
Usually husband; Always husband. Excluded responses: No partner; Is done 
by a third person; Can’t choose; No answer. 
                                                      
3 It is worth noting that the measures for the GERL construct are behavioral (account of division of labor) 
rather than attitudinal, and that responses to this question require that the respondent have a partner. 
While the possibility of conceptual heterogeneity exists, it is unlikely given the relatively homogenous 
loadings found in analysis 2 and the relatively predictable findings in analysis 3. Further, given that the 
ISSP 2012 Module exclusively focused on gender and family roles, the number or respondents who were 
partnerless was quite small, resulting in no substantial difference in sample sizes for any of the three 
latent measures. 
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d)  “In your household who does the following things … ? Prepares the meals?” 
i) Possible answers: Always wife; Usually wife; About equal or both together; 
Usually husband; Always husband. Excluded responses: No partner; Is done 
by a third person; Can’t choose; No answer. 
3) Latent construct: Gender Equality in Productive Labor (GEPL): This measure 
addresses the critique set forth at the end of Chapter 3 by measuring how the 
respondent sees women’s claim to avoiding traditionally feminine-reproductive 
roles and entering traditionally masculine ones. It is coded such that higher scores 
indicate more acceptance of a woman distancing herself from reproductive labor 
activity while entering into the paid labor force (a “progressive” view of the 
subject). It is composed of four observed measures: 
a) “Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time, part-time, or 
not at all under the following circumstances: when there is a child under school 
age?” 
i) Possible answers: Work full-time; Work part-time; Stay at home. Excluded 
responses: Can’t Choose; No answer. 
b) “Do you think that women should work outside the home full-time, part-time, or 
not at all under the following circumstances: after the youngest child starts 
school?” 
i) Possible answers: Work full-time; Work part-time; Stay at home. Excluded 
responses: Can’t Choose; No answer. 
c) “A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.” 
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i) Possible answers: Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; 
Disagree; Strongly disagree. Excluded responses: Can’t choose; No answer. 
d) “Family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.” 
i) Possible answers: Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; 
Disagree; Strongly disagree. Excluded responses: Can’t choose; No answer. 
In addition to the key latent constructs, the analytical models include controls 
for age, years of education, employment, marital status, rural/urban residence, self-
reported health, religious attendance, self-reported income, and Esping-Andersen 
welfare regime type. 
Research Design 
 This project produces three distinct but related empirical analyses. Each analysis 
focuses on uncovering meaningful information for the subsequent analysis to build on 
so, while each analysis constitutes a distinct chapter, the three empirical chapters tell a 
unified story.  
• Analysis 1 focuses on describing the characteristics of the data set, highlighting 
anomalous attitudinal distributions in the population in an effort to support the 
theoretical model’s face validity. If it is valid, we would expect to find 
anomalies most prevalent in the measures representing the DGCL latent 
concept. 
• Analysis 2 employs measures identified in Analysis 1, using structural equation 
modeling to construct three competing measurement models (and attempting a 
fourth) representing distinct theoretical interpretations of the subject of gender-
labor ideology. The model that (if best fit) supports the hegemonic coupling 
hypothesis is the 3-factor model (Model 2). 
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• Analysis 3 takes the best-fit measurement model identified by Analysis 2 and 
uses it to inform a structural model with predictors and controls. Predictive 
relationships identified by Analysis 3 provide insight into where the three facets 
of gender-labor ideology overlap and depart from one another. According to the 
hegemonic coupling hypothesis, we should expect a stronger social welfare 
regime, as well as some micro-level indicators related to postmaterial values 
(education, income, etc.), to correlate positively with gender egalitarianism on 
our latent attitudinal measures, though with some unpredictability surrounding 
the DGCL measure.  
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Chapter 5: Analysis 1 
Rationale and Methods 
Rationale for Analysis 1 
 The theoretical complexity of this project makes thorough understanding of the 
data set especially important. The first analysis focuses on describing the data set’s 
parameters, the distribution of key measures, and gives special attention to meaningful 
data patterns that I use to inform subsequent analyses. Of special importance in this 
section are findings related to skews in the gender attitude variables. Although answers 
to the attitudinal measures all exist on a scale of at least three-to-six points, some of the 
response distributions are dramatically skewed. For example, on the question asking “If 
both [parents] are in a similar work situation and are eligible for paid leave, how should 
this paid leave period be divided between the mother and the father?”, answers range 
from very traditional “Mother entire, father not any” to the exact inverse “Father entire, 
mother not any.” However, despite 30,228 unique respondents to this question, less than 
three percent of the sample answered that the father should take any more than half the 
responsibility for parenting. In some cases, despite multiple thousands of respondents 
representing a given country, the number of respondents from that country who said that 
the father should take any more than half the parenting duties was in the single digits or 
even zero. 
 Because the type of skew described above has direct implications for the 
theoretical foundation of this project, it is worth spending significant time investigating 
descriptive distributions within the data. In some cases, findings are surprising and raise 
new questions, while in others distributions are quite in the realm of expectation. In the 
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survey measure described above, respondents from the more conservative country of 
Japan actually indicated that men should take on more parenting responsibilities than 
did respondents from ostensibly more liberal United States. Although neither country’s 
respondents tended toward truly egalitarian labor distribution, this finding goes against 
conventional wisdom for the countries and bears further inquiry. Despite some 
interesting and meaningful anomalies, the distributions of responses across country and 
across welfare regime type form a recognizable pattern that helps confirm the 
applicability of Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) typology of conservative, liberal, and 
social-democratic countries for analyses that follow. The anomalies, however, point to 
some unexpected findings in the structural models used later in Analysis 3. 
Methods for Analysis 1 
 For the first analysis, I begin by examining percentage distribution of answers to 
the twelve substantive questions in the data set in sets of four based on their theoretical 
categories: those concerning a de-gendered conception of labor, those concerning 
distribution of household labor, and those concerning acceptance of women’s 
involvement in the paid labor force. I observe some interesting patterns (and absence of 
patterns) in these data, and then I connect them to patterns observed at the level of the 
social welfare regime. Finally, I present the mean answer for each question by welfare 
regime as a means of distilling the insights gained from answer distributions. I also 
provide a comparison of sex-based distributions of answers. The tables for this section 
are presented in the Appendix (p. 123). 
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Findings 
Results for Analysis 1: De-Gendered Conception of Labor 
 The first four factors I discuss in this section are those which represent the most 
theoretically novel of the three latent variables. They represent the degree to which 
respondents’ conceptions of labor roles are inherently gendered. That is: whether they 
see a particular labor activity (e.g., working for pay outside the home, taking care of 
one’s own children, etc.) as having an innately masculine or feminine character, how 
appropriate/desirable it is for a person of a particular gender identity to conform to, or 
deviate from, the type of labor traditionally ascribed to their normative gender roles, 
and so on. These tables are rather large and unwieldy, so I present them with countries 
sorted in descending order on a category I deem as the most progressive of available 
answers. This sorting is a tool used for parsimony and does not carry with it theoretical 
implications of its own. 
 Question 1.1 asks respondents “If both [parents] are in a similar work situation 
and are eligible for paid leave, how should this paid leave period be divided between the 
mother and the father?” This question represents perhaps the most theoretically useful 
item in the entire data set thanks to its particular verbiage. By holding the work 
situations of each parent equivalent and specifying that the parental leave is paid, the 
question effectively isolates gender as the factor upon which the respondent’s answer 
hinges. 
 The most striking country-level pattern in the data for this measure (Table 5.01, 
p. 123) is the extreme skew in respondents across all countries. In most countries, less 
than one percent of all respondents felt that the father should take more than half of the 
parenting responsibilities, despite the leave being paid and the mother’s working 
60 
situation being ostensibly equal. This pattern remains true even in the most notoriously 
progressive countries, which don’t look substantively different from the most 
conservative states. Where the country-level pattern begins to emerge is in the 
distribution of the first three answer categories. Respondents from famously progressive 
countries (and social democratic welfare regimes) appear to far more frequently believe 
that the new parents should share the paid leave equally and to less frequently believe 
that women ought to be responsible for most or all of the new child’s care. 
 A second pattern of interest emerges when we look at the answer category that 
suggests that the new mother ought to take most of the parental leave but that the father 
ought to take some. While respondents from more gender-progressive countries still 
frequently select this response category, there are some anomalous rankings. 
Respondents from Japan, famously traditional where gender is concerned, chose this 
answer more frequently than any other country in the sample. South Korean and 
Chilean respondents also chose this answer with surprising frequency: approximately 
equal to that of Danish and Canadian respondents. By contrast, respondents from the 
United States, France, and Sweden chose this answer approximately as often as those 
from Poland and Turkey. However, unlike French and Swedish respondents (who far 
more often responded that leave should be divided equally), American respondents were 
as likely to feel that a women should take all of the leave and her husband none as were 
respondents from Poland and Spain. Some other countries present similar patterns of 
partially gendered labor distribution, including those in the United Kingdom, Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Switzerland, and even Finland and Norway. 
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 The distribution of answers across welfare regime typology (Table 5.02, p. 124) 
reveals some interesting patterns, as well. While respondents from social democratic 
regimes predictably favor more equality than the other types, the most frequent 
response from that sub-population was “Mother most, Father some.” Likewise, less than 
one percent of respondents from this type felt that fathers should take any more than 
half of the paid leave. Comparing respondents from liberal regimes to conservative 
regimes, we find that those from liberal regimes actually appear more traditionally 
minded on this measure. Liberal-regime respondents more frequently answered “Mother 
All” and “Mother Most,” and less frequently responded “Equal.” Respondents from 
non-categorized regimes also appeared strongly conservative. This may be because 
countries not included in the Esping-Andersen typology tend (with a few exceptions, 
such as Iceland) to be less developed, but it is difficult to make any concrete claims to 
that effect. 
 The sex-based answer distribution for this question (Table 5.03, p. 124) mirrors 
the country-level distribution, meaning that less than one percent of either men or 
women were likely to respond that men should take more than half of paid leave. 
Women responded slightly more frequently than men that the leave should be shared 
equally, though they less frequently said men should take more than have of paid leave. 
 Question 1.2 asks “Consider a family with a child under school age. What, in 
your opinion, is the best way for them to organize their family and work life?” This 
question describes the same labor tradeoff that was so useful in Question 1.1, but it does 
not have the same verbiage expressing neutrality of circumstances, so it is slightly less 
useful in that way. I have ordered this table (Table 5.04, p. 125) in descending order 
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based on the frequency that respondents answered that both parents should work part 
time. This answer category is the most progressive because it suggests both an even 
distribution of care and also that both parents are deviating somewhat from their 
prescribed labor norms. 
 We can see here the same answer skew as in Question 1.1: seldom do more than 
one percent of all respondents from a particular country answer that the father should 
take any more than half of the parenting responsibilities. Likewise, respondents from 
the same notoriously progressive countries most often gave gender-equitable answers 
(though a few, such as Spain, scored unexpectedly progressive on this question). While 
respondents from famously traditionalist countries such as those of East Asia and 
Eastern Europe predictably favored prescribed gender roles more often, respondents 
from countries such as Australia, Canada, the United States, and Great Britain also 
seemed to favor a significantly traditional division of the labor described by this 
question. Again we see a pattern that suggests some otherwise culturally distinct nations 
clustering quite closely at the traditional end of the response spectrum. 
 The welfare regime distribution for this question (Table 5.05, p. 125) is also 
similar to that of Question 1.1. Respondents from social democratic regimes most 
commonly of all regime types responded with one of the “Both” categories that 
describes mother and father adopting the same employment pattern, though the most 
common answer within this regime type was “Mother most, Father some.” Again, 
however, respondents from liberal regimes were more likely to give gender-
traditionalist answers than were respondents from any of Esping-Andersen’s other 
63 
regime types. Respondents from non-categorized regimes again favored traditionalist 
answers. 
 The sex-based distribution of this question (Table 5.06, p. 125) follows the same 
pattern: less than one percent of respondents answered that men should be primary 
caregivers, and slightly fewer women than men felt that way. Women more often than 
men favored the wife working part time while the husband worked either full or part 
time, while men favored full-time employment for fathers and lower levels for mothers. 
 Question 1.3 asks, “To what extent do you agree or disagree … ? A man’s job is 
to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family.” This question is 
quite similar to Question 1.2 in that it expressly addresses gender normative labor 
expectations but fails to use verbiage that sets a tone of neutrality for the respondent. I 
have ordered the table (Table 5.07, p. 126) for this question in descending order by 
those who strongly disagreed with the prescribed gender roles described. However, 
there is a limitation to these answer categories, since there is no way of telling which 
part of the prescription the respondent disagreed with, nor what he or she would 
substitute in its place. 
 Notably, this question does not see the same response-category skew as 
Questions 1.1 and 1.2. Answers are relatively evenly distributed, and the “Strongly 
Agree” category is actually the least represented across most countries. The same 
famously progressive countries cluster as most progressive on this measure, while the 
more conservative Asian and Eastern European countries cluster on the opposite end. 
Exceptions to this pattern include Japan, whose respondents strongly disagreed with the 
prescribed gender roles almost forty percent of the time, and Great Britain and the 
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United States, whose respondents strongly disagreed with them only around twenty 
percent of the time. It is worth pointing out, however, that respondents from these 
nations did “Disagree” with the prescription roughly forty percent of the time. The 
pattern here is less pronounced than previously, but still present: some of the more 
developed, Westernized countries look pronouncedly traditional depending on how we 
assess the data. 
 Regarding welfare regime distribution (Table 5.08, p. 127), we see a slight trend 
reversal from the previous two questions. While respondents from social democratic 
regimes most strongly disagreed with the prescriptive statement, respondents from 
liberal regimes more often felt neutral or disagreed than did their conservative-regime 
counterparts. However, this was not a complete trend shift, since respondents from 
conservative regimes more often “Strongly” disagreed and less often agreed. 
Respondents from non-categorized regimes were fairly evenly distributed on this 
measure, with a slight majority of them favoring the “Disagree” category. 
 The sex-based distribution of question 1.3 (Table 5.09, p. 127) follows a 
predictable pattern, with men more often agreeing and women more often disagreeing 
with the prescribed gender roles, though both men and women tended to either disagree 
or strongly disagree relative to any other category. 
Finally, question 1.4 asks, “To what extent do you agree or disagree … ? A job 
is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children,” and I have again 
ordered the table (Table 5.10, p. 128) by percent of a country’s respondents answering 
that they strongly disagreed with the prescribed gender role. This question is the most 
limited of the four in this category because it neither mentions men nor specifies what 
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the respondent would substitute in place of the prescription. However, it does address 
the reproductive labor role as inherently gendered and implies a tradeoff with the 
productive labor role. 
Distribution of responses to this question is similar to that found in question 1.3, 
with a relatively even distribution that veers away from the “Strongly Agree” category. 
Again, Many progressive countries sit at the progressive end of this list, while 
traditionalist countries tend to cluster toward the traditional end. Japan again looks 
perhaps uncharacteristically progressive on this list, while the United States and Great 
Britain appear more traditional than one might expect. Both East and West Germany 
also appear higher on this list than those of previous questions, while Switzerland 
appears lower. 
Regarding welfare regime (Table 5.11, p. 129), again respondents from social 
democratic regimes were most likely to strongly disagree with the gender-prescriptive 
statement, while being the least likely to agree at all. Respondents from conservative 
regimes were more likely to strongly agree than those from liberal regimes, but they 
were also more likely to strongly disagree. Respondents from non-categorized regimes 
leaned towards agreement and overall indicated traditionalist views. 
The sex-based distribution of question 1.4 (Table 5.12, p. 129) tended to cluster 
toward the center, with fewer respondents either strongly agreeing or strongly 
disagreeing. Men tended to agree more while women tended to disagree more, though a 
substantial portion of respondents felt neutral about this prescription, which is difficult 
to interpret given that “Neutral” could mean indifference, a view that it should be up to 
the individual woman, or any of a number of other possibilities. 
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Results for Analysis 1: Distribution of Household Labor 
 The following four survey items differ both conceptually and substantively from 
the previous four or the four that follow in the next section. Conceptually, these four 
specifically refer to the sphere of household/reproductive labor traditionally ascribed to 
women. They do not describe any tradeoff of labor roles but rather the tradeoff of one 
role between the sexes. They also do not address attitudes, but rather are a measure of 
actual (self-reported) time spent in household labor relative to that of one’s spouse. I 
created these measures by interacting the respondent’s sex with their response to the 
survey item, thus creating separate response variables for men and for women. I then 
reverse coded one of these two variables and merged it with the other. The end result is 
that lowest answer categories represent the wife doing a greater share of household 
labor, while the higher numbers represent the husband doing a greater share. While this 
does not speak directly to gender-labor ideology, it does reflect a person’s implicit 
ideology based on his or her actions. As response distributions on the Questions 2.1 
through 2.4 were more uniform and in line with expectations, I will discuss them as a 
whole, rather than separately, and point out anomalies between questions at the end. I 
have ordered the tables (Tables 5.13-5.24, pp. 130-137) in descending order based on 
the “Equal” household labor distribution response category. 
 Questions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 ask spouses in heterosexual relationships how 
large a share of the laundry, sick care, cleaning, and cooking (respectively) they do 
relative to their opposite-sex partner. Response distribution across all four measures 
forms somewhat predictable patterns. Respondents from famously progressive countries 
such as those of Northern and Western Europe (as well as Canada) tend to share each of 
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these tasks most equally of the countries represented in the data. East Asian and Eastern 
European countries tend to see women taking on most of the domestic labor activities. 
Much of continental Europe (as well as the United States) makes up the middle of the 
spectrum where women do most of said labor but men still do a substantial portion. 
 Anomalies in this pattern include the fact that couples in the United States tend 
to more equally share the tasks of doing the laundry and cooking than they do the tasks 
of sick care and household cleaning. Meanwhile, couples in Belgium share the laundry 
task less equitably than they do any other tasks. Couples in Eastern Europe (Slovenia, 
Poland, East Germany, Latvia) appear to share care for sick family members more 
equitably than they do other tasks. As a whole, though, country-level findings in this 
section reinforce rather than challenge conventional conceptions of how equitable 
households in various states tend to be relative to one another. 
 As far as welfare regime typology, respondents from social democratic and from 
liberal regimes both tended to favor more equal response categories than did members 
of conservative regimes. However, the preferred response category for both liberal and 
social democratic regime members was that the wife usually but not always performed 
the household tasks. Members of liberal regimes, however, indicated that women did 
“All” of the labor substantially more frequently than those of social democratic regimes. 
Respondents from conservative regimes leaned characteristically traditionalist, with 
women most often doing all or most of the household labor. Members of non-
categorized regimes responded in a similar pattern. 
 Regarding sex distribution, both sexes seem to agree that men do the least sick 
care of all tasks, while they do the most cooking, with cleaning and laundry falling 
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somewhere in between. However, respondents of both sexes also report that women do 
the least sick care of all tasks, while they do the most laundry, with cleaning and 
cooking falling somewhere in the middle. Both sexes agree that sick care tends to be the 
task distributed most equally. Aside from these patterns, the most obvious point of 
interest is that, across all tasks, both men and women tend to report doing a greater 
share of the labor than their spouses report that they do. This means that either 
respondents of both sexes tend to over-report how much they themselves do, or they 
tend to under-report how much their spouses do, or both. 
Results for Analysis 1: Attitudes toward Women in Paid Labor  
 I have grouped the following four items based on the theme of attitudes toward 
women’s engagement with productive labor and as juxtaposed with their traditional 
roles in family labor. The items do not make mention of men’s roles or tradeoffs 
between partners, nor do they directly address gender ideology. Instead, they point to 
the respondent’s belief about whether there may be material/social consequences to a 
woman’s traditional domains of child and family if she is to deviate from her prescribed 
roles. This group of measures serves as a proxy for the traditional feminist concern for 
equality between the sexes in freedom to access the paid labor force and avoid the 
stigma of “abandoning” the home. These measures, combined with those in the previous 
group (concerning distribution of household labor), represent the traditional ways of 
thinking about gender-labor scholarship. Together, they are intended to serve as a 
counterpoint to the more novel concepts represented by the questions in group 1. I have 
structured the tables for this section in descending order based on the percent of a 
country’s population that reports that a woman’s attachment to the paid labor force is 
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acceptable and free from consequence. A limitation of these questions is that they fail to 
distinguish institutional environment from ideology. In other words, if a respondent (for 
example) feels that a child may suffer if his or her mother works, the verbiage of these 
questions does not allow us to distinguish whether the respondent feels this suffering 
comes from the absence of a caregiver whose identity is “mother” or simply because the 
society in question lacks the social infrastructure to adequately provide for that child’s 
care in the absence of a dedicated family member. 
 Question 3.1 asks, “Do you think that women should work outside the home 
full-time, part-time, or not at all under the following circumstances: when there is a 
child under school age?” while question 3.2 asks the same question but under the 
circumstances that the woman’s youngest child is in school. I have structured the tables 
for this question (Tables 5.25-5.30, pp. 138-141) in descending order based on the 
percentage of a country’s respondents who answered that they thought a woman should 
work full time, since this represents the furthest departure from her traditionally 
prescribed gender role. Responses to this question represent the respondent’s belief 
about how much a woman (and only a woman) should be available (at the cost of her 
professional career) during a child’s most dependent and vulnerable period and then 
during a period of relatively lower dependence. 
 Results for both of these questions are relatively similar, with the most 
progressive countries answering in the least traditional ways (excepting Slovenia and 
Poland, which appear unexpectedly progressive, perhaps due to a history of socialist 
childcare provided under Communism). One exception to this pattern is that 
respondents from Australia, North America, and several Germanic countries seem to be 
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more flexible about their attitudes toward a woman’s caretaker responsibilities when her 
youngest child has entered school. Along the lines of welfare regime type, almost all 
respondents from social democratic regimes answered that a woman should work at 
least part-time or more regardless of her child’s age. Members of conservative regimes 
most often indicated that a woman should work part time regardless of her child’s age. 
Members of liberal regimes also most often prescribed part-time employment, though 
they more often prescribed unemployment for mothers of young children and full-time 
employment to mothers of school-age children than did their conservative counterparts. 
Likewise, the sex-based distribution of answers is relatively symmetrical. Both men and 
women appear more comfortable with a woman working who has no very young 
dependents. However, in all situations men more frequently respond that women should 
stay home, while women more often respond that women should work part-time. 
 Question 3.3 asks how strongly respondents agree or disagree with the statement 
that “A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.” I have structured 
the response table (Tables 5.31-5.33, pp.137-138) in descending order on the “Strongly 
Disagree” response category for reasons explained previously. This question differs 
only slightly from question 3.2 in that it asks specifically about the consequences to a 
school-age child if a mother works, rather than simply asking the respondent if a mother 
to such a child “should” work. However, there is still no way to parse out what the 
cause of said child’s suffering might be. 
 The response pattern on this measure mirrors others in the sense that progressive 
countries tend to most often disagree with the statement. However, there are some 
interesting anomalies relative to the other measures in this group. First, several 
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relatively gender-traditional countries (East Germany, Japan, Czech Republic, Slovakia) 
have a large portion of respondents who strongly disagree with the statement. 
Conversely, exactly zero of the respondents from the United States strongly disagree 
with the statement. It’s possible that this is because of the lack of institutional support 
for young children in the United States. Across welfare regime type, respondents from 
social democratic regimes most often strongly disagreed with the prescriptive statement 
and least often agreed with it. Members of liberal regimes clustered toward neutral or 
less extreme responses and most often said they “Disagree” with the statement. 
Responses from members of conservative regimes were fairly evenly distributed and 
tended toward disagreement (and stronger disagreement than their liberal counterparts). 
Members of non-categorized regimes leaned towards agreement and traditionalism. The 
sex-based distribution of answers, as with previous questions, clusters toward the 
center, with fewer people of either sex answer that they strongly agreed or disagreed 
with the statement. In general (and expectedly), more men agree while more women 
disagree. 
 Question 3.4 (Table 5.34-5.36, pp. 144-145) asks how strongly respondents 
agree or disagree with the statement that “Family life suffers when the woman has a 
full-time job.” As with other measures, I have structured this table in descending order 
based on the “Strongly Disagree” category. The main difference between this measure 
and previous questions in this group is that it generalizes to “family life” rather than 
focusing exclusively on children. Response pattern, however, is similar, with mostly 
respondents from progressive countries disagreeing and those from mostly conservative 
countries agreeing. As with Question 3.3, East Germany and Japan seem anomalous in 
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how many respondents strongly disagreed. However, unlike the previous question, 
respondents from the United States fell somewhere in the middle of the range, rather 
than on the conservative end. Across regime type, respondents from social democratic 
regimes clearly came across as most progressive, with over forty percent strongly 
disagreeing with the prescriptive statement. Members of liberal regimes most often 
disagreed, though with about one-quarter agreeing. Members of conservative regimes 
agreed slightly more often than they disagreed, and more often than did their liberal 
counterparts. Members of non-categorized regimes clustered toward the middle 
categories, though approximately one-third agreed with the statement. The sex-based 
distribution of responses is unsurprising and clusters toward the middle response 
categories for both sexes. As with Question 3.3, more women disagree and more men 
agree with the statement though, surprisingly, the most frequent response category for 
both sexes was “Agree,” while the least frequent was “Strongly Agree.” 
Synthesizing Results for Analysis 1 
The descriptive tables in this sample, numerous though they are, paint a fairly 
consistent picture of the data, and it is a picture borne out by a look at the mean 
response to each question grouped by latent variable and regime type (Table 5.37, pp. 
146). On questions that address traditional understandings of sex-based divisions of 
labor (divided up into reproductive and productive labor), response patterns within and 
across nations, welfare regimes, and the sexes are relatively consistent with the extant 
literature. Progressive states tend to contain citizens that express more gender-
egalitarian attitudes and habits than do their more traditionalist counterparts. They also 
tend to contain citizens who are less prescriptive/condemning of a woman’s 
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involvement in the paid labor force. While respondents from social democratic states 
exhibit the greatest egalitarianism, members of conservative regimes predictably exhibit 
the most traditionalism, with liberal regime members falling somewhere in the middle. 
However, question group 1 represents a departure from the traditional ways that 
gender and labor are conceptualized in scholarly and popular writing, and the response 
patterns across state and regime type represent a similar break from form. While 
respondents from social democratic regimes predictably give the most progressive (re: 
de-gendered answers), responses from conservative regime members tend to be similar 
to or more progressive than their liberal counterparts. They are about as likely as 
members of liberal regimes to support the equal sharing of paid leave and parenting 
responsibilities, and more likely to reject the traditional breadwinner-homemaker model 
of the family. This observation supports the nation-level anomalous findings that 
countries such as the United States, Great Britain, and Australia (liberal regimes, 
according to Esping-Andersen 1990) sometimes scored surprisingly more traditionalist 
than conservative regime states such as Japan, South Korea, Spain, and Mexico. 
We found a similar pattern of predictability and surprise among the sexes. On 
the measures from groups 2 and 3, men and women behaved rather predictably: men did 
less household labor than did women and were less friendly to women’s activity in the 
paid labor force regardless of reason. Perhaps least surprising of all, both men and 
women indicated that they did more of the household labor than they were given credit 
for by their opposite-sex partners. However, across group 1 we found some surprising 
results. No substantial percentage of men nor women saw taking paid leave from work 
and adopting childrearing as primarily a man’s responsibility and, of the tiny margin 
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that did, more were men than were women. Likewise, more women than men felt it was 
appropriate for women to reduce their involvement in the labor force to care for a child. 
While it is difficult from these data alone to distill a clear picture or pattern, it is clear 
that there are substantial differences between the three concepts that these groups of 
measures represent—both at the macro level and between the sexes. In addition to the 
inter-state and inter-sex differences, it is clear that the concepts represented by question 
group 1 behave in ways that are distinct from either of the more conventional questions 
from groups 2 and 3. 
The next chapter uses structural equation modeling to try to clarify the 
relationships between the concepts represented by each group of questions, as well as to 
identify their relationships to sex. 
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Chapter 6: Analysis 2 
Orientation and Design 
Rationale and Methods for Analysis 2 
 For the second analysis, I employ structural equation modeling to confirm that 
the proposed theoretical model is appropriate for predictive analysis of men’s and 
women’s gender-labor attitudes. The first step in this endeavor is to validate each of the 
three latent constructs as appropriate for multiple groups analysis for men and women. 
The next step is to establish a best-fit measurement model to test the assertions set forth 
at the beginning of this project. The theoretical proposition for this analysis can be 
operationalized in the following statement: gendered labor attitudes are more accurately 
measured when attitudes toward productive labor, reproductive labor, and gender 
essentialism are treated as distinct than they can when they are treated as either partially 
overlapping or entirely uniform. I test this assertion by comparing the following 
measurement models (depicted graphically in Figures 1-4, pp. 153-156). 
1. Model 1: Model 1 treats all twelve observed measures (discussed in Analysis 1) 
as indicators of a single value set we might label as a person’s level of “Gender 
Egalitarianism.” This model represents both the substantive and statistical 
baseline for comparison. It reflects the argument that one’s gender attitudes 
regarding both productive and reproductive labor, as well as one’s conception of 
labor as gendered in general, are all facets of a single value set that vary 
relatively uniformly. It is also the most statistically parsimonious model, 
meaning that any more complex models must provide a significantly superior fit 
than does this one if we are to employ them for predictive purposes. 
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2. Model 2: Model 2 (dubbed the 3-Factor Model) treats the twelve observed 
measures as loading in discrete groups of four onto three latent constructs 
(DGCL, GERL, and GEPL) that are functionally distinct but covarying. This 
model represents the central thesis for this project: that studying gender-labor 
attitudes requires properly nuancing gender’s relationship with the hegemony of 
both masculinity and productive labor. 
3. Model 3: Model 3 is a hierarchical SEM model. All three latent constructs 
(DGCL, GERL, and GEPL) are treated as covarying, but all three are also used 
to produce a second-level construct that represents the gestalt “gender 
egalitarianism” concept. This model suggests that, while there are distinct facets 
of gendered labor attitudes that deserve attention, they all exist within a 
relatively homogenous umbrella of a respondent’s gender ideology. Note that 
this model proposes a stronger relationship between the three concepts than in 
Model 2, which hypothesizes only that they covary. 
4. Model 4: Model 4 is a bifactor SEM model. The three latent constructs are 
generated, but then all twelve observed measures are also used to construct a 
latent measure of gender ideology that exists separately from the previous three 
latent dimensions. This model suggests that measures that I assert are measuring 
distinct ideological constructs can in fact be treated as parts of the same gestalt 
value system while also independently composing the three latent facets that are 
at the core of this project. While this model has conceptual promise, the data 
used here proved to be insufficient to successfully estimate such a bifactor 
model, so I mention it here only as a fertile avenue for future research. 
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Model 1 represents the baseline of conventional thought on the subject of gender-
labor attitudes, model 2 most fully supports the theoretical basis of this project, while 
Model 3 partially supports that basis. As we will see below, Model 2 produces fit 
statistics (e.g., χ2, SBIC) that are superior to the other two. 
 Analysis 2: Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
 The first step in establishing the appropriate methods and models for this 
analysis is to determine the validity of the three latent constructs using confirmatory 
factor analysis. As we see from table 6.01 (p. 147), factor loadings are all within 
acceptable ranges. While the eigenvalue for the DGCL factor is on the low side, it is 
above the 1.0 minimum threshold (Matsunaga 2011), and the “proportion explained” for 
this factor is the highest of the three. 
 The second step is to assess both how applicable each latent measure is to 
respondents of each sex and also whether or not it is appropriate to compare the models 
for each group. To do this, I generate a single-factor measurement model separately for 
each of the three latent measures and employ multiple groups analysis to compare two 
models. The first model is a baseline in which I allow all values to vary freely between 
the groups of male and female. As we see on the left side of tables 6.02 (p. 148), fit 
statistics for all three measures are within acceptable bounds. RMSEA values are below 
0.05 except in the case of DGCL, which is still below 1.0. CFI and TLI are also all 
equal to or above 0.95. While again the fit for DGCL is a bit below the others, I 
hypothesize that this is due to it being the most experimental measure, measuring a 
concept not intentionally sought after by the designers of the survey instrument. 
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 Analysis 2: Assessing the Appropriateness of Multiple Groups Analysis 
Next I compare the above model to a model in which I constrain the 
measurement coefficients across sex (seen on the right side of table 6.02, p. 148). While 
the fit statistics are also acceptable in this model, the SBIC value is higher (indicating 
poorer fit) for both DGCL and GEPL models and, while slightly smaller for the GERL 
measure, not the 10-point difference required to be significant (Jeffreys 1961; Raftery 
1995). However, the χ2 value rises (indicating poorer fit) for all three measures when 
moving to the model that constrains measurement loadings, and the likelihood-ratio test 
of the χ2 values for both models suggests a significantly worse fit when going from an 
unconstrained to a measurement-constrained model.4 Therefore, I conclude that the best 
fitting model is one that does not try to equate the loadings for men with the loadings 
for women. 
In simplest terms, the analysis suggests that the underlying meanings of the 
observed measures differ for men and for women. To perform multiple groups analysis 
in this case would therefore be inappropriate. In effect, we are comparing apples and 
oranges, and so we must construct separate models for men and for women and 
interpret them independently. The fact that we find that the same gendered attitudinal 
measures from a survey are understood in fundamentally different ways depending on 
the sex of the respondent is itself a substantial finding independent of any findings from 
either gender-specific model. 
                                                      




 Analysis 2: Male Measurement Model Results 
 Using similar methods to those above, I test and compare the fit statistics for 
males only across single-factor (baseline), 3-factor (hypothesized), and hierarchical 
measurement models. As can be seen on the left side of table 6.03 (p. 149), the SBIC5 
value decreases from 5645.35 for the single-factor model to -29.52 for the 3-factor 
model. Likewise, the χ2 drops from 6054.54 for the single-factor model to 353.55 for 
the 3-factor model, and the likelihood-ratio test is significant. However, as can be seen 
on the right side of table 6.03 (p. 149), the SBIC value rises again to 1111.72 for the 
hierarchical model, and the χ2 value rises to 1564.45, and again the likelihood-ratio test 
is significant. The caveat to this second comparison is that STATA was unable to 
estimate the hierarchical model for men once I introduced the full set of error 
covariances to the model, so the accuracy of this test is limited (though supported by the 
female model comparisons performed in the next section). In sum, I conclude that the 
hypothesized 3-factor model is the best fit for males in this sample. 
 The results of the male 3-factor model are presented in table 6.04 (p. 150). All 
factors (each of which I originally coded positively in the directly of gender 
egalitarianism) load positively and significantly onto their respective latent measures. 
Loadings are strongest on the GERL measure, most likely because it is a concrete 
measure of time allotment composed of factors measured in a uniform way. Loadings 
tend to be slightly lower on the DGCL measure, which I attribute to its more ambiguous 
and exploratory nature. Fit statistics for this model (Table 6.05, p. 150) are quite strong, 
                                                      
5 Smaller SBIC values indicate better fit. Negative values are best because they favor the maintained 
model over the saturated model. 
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with an RMSEA of 0.03, a CFI value of 0.99, a TLI value of 0.98, and an SBIC value of 
-29.53. Overall, the 3-factor model seems to be a strong fit for the male sub-sample. 
 Analysis 2: Female Measurement Model Results 
 In this section, I test and compare the fit statistics for females only across single-
factor (baseline), 3-factor (hypothesized), and hierarchical measurement models.6 As 
can be seen on the left side of table 6.06 (p. 151), the SBIC value decreases from 
4686.12 for the single-factor model to -12.59 for the 3-factor model. Likewise, the χ2 
value drops from 5102.86 for the single-factor model to 368.68 for the 3-factor model, 
and the likelihood-ratio test is significant. However, as can be seen on the right side of 
table 6.06 (p. 151), the SBIC value rises again to 8.06 for the hierarchical model, and 
the χ2 value rises to 407.07, and again the likelihood-ratio test is significant. Unlike for 
males, the female hierarchical model estimated with the full set of error covariances 
included in the model, meaning this is a comprehensive comparison between 3-factor 
and hierarchical models. While the 3-factor model remains the best fit, the hierarchical 
model fit is not poor, per se. While it is impossible to substantiate with these data, it 
may be that the hierarchical configuration is more salient to the views of women than 
those of men. Nonetheless, I conclude that the hypothesized 3-factor model is the best 
fit for females in this sample, as well. 
 The results of the female 3-factor measurement model are presented in table 
6.07 (p. 152). As with the male model, all factors load positively and significantly onto 
their respective latent measures. Loadings are strongest on the GERL measure, while 
loadings tend to be slightly lower on the DGCL measure. Fit statistics for this model 
                                                      
6 For all measurement and structural models, I composed an a priori list of theoretically informed error 
covariates and systematically added them to each model, excluding those that did not significantly 
improve model fit. 
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(Table 6.08, p. 152) are also quite strong and very similar to those for men, with an 
RMSEA of 0.03, a CFI value of 0.99, a TLI value of 0.98, and an SBIC value of -12.59. 
Overall, the 3-factor model seems to be a strong fit for the female sub-sample, as well. 
However, the SBIC value is 16.94 points lower for males than for females, indicating 
that this measurement model fits slightly but significantly better for males. 
 Synthesizing Results for Analysis 2 
 In this chapter, we have validated the three latent constructs hypothesized at the 
beginning of this project. We have also established that the hypothesized 3-factor model 
is in fact the best-fit model for both males and females. However, we have established 
that the three factors in question do not measure exactly the same attitudes in men that 
they do in women. However, all factors load in the same direction and at a similar 
magnitude for both sexes, indicating at least some symmetry. Finally, we have 
established that, while the observed factors load more strongly onto the conventional 
measures of gender-labor attitudes (GERL and GEPL), factors do load acceptably onto 
the exploratory factor representing a De-Gendered Conception of Labor. Having 
validated my measurement hypotheses, I use the best fit models to construct the 
structural analyses conducted in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Analysis 3 
Orientation and Design 
Methods for Analysis 3 
 The third and final analysis consists of separate 3-factor structural models 
divided by sex. It estimates relationships between a key predictor, controls, and the 
best-fit 3-factor models of latent measures identified in Chapter 6. The key predictor 
consists of three dummy variables, one for each of Esping-Andersen’s tripartite model 
of social welfare regimes: Liberal, Conservative, and Social Democratic. Liberal is 
excluded to serve as the reference category because the descriptive analyses from 
Chapter 5 suggest that there may be some unexpected differences between liberal-
regime states and those from the other two types. Controls include age, years of 
education, employment status, marital status, rural/urban residence, self-reported health, 
frequency of attendance at religious services, and relative income level in quintiles. I 
also offer a comparison of the results across the two sex-segregated models, though this 
is necessarily speculative in nature. Though it is impossible to directly equate 
coefficients from two separate models, the differences and similarities between the two 
models may offer clues as to why and how the three latent measures do not measure 
identical concepts for men and women. 
My theoretical model predicts the following findings. 
• Because policy regimes are so influential in the gender-labor relationship, 
national context will be an important predictor of scores on the dependent 
measures. If the Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) model proves appropriate, then 
social-democratic countries should score as the most gender egalitarian, with 
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liberal countries following, and conservative countries scoring as least 
egalitarian. However, the descriptive analyses from chapter 5 suggest that liberal 
countries may be more traditional than expected—particularly on the DGCL 
measure. 
• Because men’s resistance to changing labor force roles and perspectives is 
heavily implicated in the equality stall, I expect men to be more resistant to 
labor egalitarianism than are women. Specifically, men should be more often 
influenced toward traditional views and less often toward progressive views than 
are women—especially on the DGCL measure, which represents a lynchpin in 
the equality stall. 
• Because values concerning productive and reproductive labor involvement do 
not necessarily reflect actual gender egalitarianism, I do not expect patterns of 
predictive relationships on GERL and GEPL measures to be very similar to 
patterns seen on the DGCL measure.78 
Findings 
 Analysis 3: Male Structural Model Results 
Due to their unwieldy length, I have broken the structural model results down 
into separate sub-tables. The structural model for males (Tables 7.01-7.05, pp. 157-160) 
presents us with both expected and some surprising findings. We find that our key 
welfare regime measure behaves somewhat predictably in relation to both the GERL 
(Table 7.02, p. 158) and GEPL (Table 7.03, p. 159) measures, with the effect of living 
                                                      
7 For all predictors in all structural models, positive coefficients indicate more gender-
egalitarian/progressive attitudes, while negative coefficients indicate more traditional, gender-segregated 
attitudes. 
8 All coefficients have been standardized, meaning they represent standard deviation units. 
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in a conservative regime being significantly negative compared to that of living in a 
liberal regime, and the effect of living in a social democratic regime being significantly 
positive. This creates the standard Conservative -> Liberal -> Social Democratic order 
of increasing progressiveness and egalitarianism predicted by the Esping-Andersen 
(1990, 1999) model. However, on the DGCL measure (Table 7.01, p. 157), the effect of 
living in a conservative regime is significantly positive as compared with that of a 
liberal regime, suggesting that respondents from conservative regimes see labor as 
inherently less gendered than do those from liberal regimes. 
 The magnitude of effect of welfare regime both within and across latent 
measures is also worth evaluating. The effect of social democratic regime status is 
always positive and significant for males. It is also the largest effect of all three regime 
types (0.26) for both the DGCL and GEPL measures. However, it is much smaller 
(0.07) for the GERL measure, suggesting less inter-regime difference. The effect of 
conservative regime status is most powerfully negative on the GEPL measure, 
indicating men in conservative regimes are most traditional regarding women’s 
engagement in the productive labor force. Note that the effect of living in a non-
categorized regime is always significantly negative compared to the liberal regime 
control group, suggesting a meaningful but ambiguous difference between the two. 
As for controls, only years of education (in addition to social democratic regime 
status above) has a significantly positive effect for men across all three latent measures, 
and the effect size is largest for the DGCL measure, followed by GEPL and then GERL. 
Better health is significantly positive for both DGCL and GERL measures, while higher 
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relative income is significantly positive for both DGCL and GEPL measures. More 
urban residence is significantly positive only for the GERL measure. 
 On the other hand, both age and being currently married have significantly 
negative effects for men on all three measures, though the effect size is largest on GEPL 
and smallest on DGCL. More frequent religious attendance is significantly negative on 
both DGCL and GEPL measures but not on the GERL measure. Being unemployed 
(relative to never having been employed) does not significantly predict men’s attitudes 
on any of the three latent measures. Neither more urban residential status nor higher 
levels of employment seem to significantly predict men’s attitudes on DGCL or GEPL 
measures, which is somewhat surprising. Likewise, neither more frequent attendance at 
religious services nor higher income significantly predict men’s attitudes on the GERL 
measure. Finally, better health does not significantly predict men’s attitudes on the 
GEPL measure. While some of these non-relationships may be unexpected given the 
conventional literature, there is little obvious pattern of non-significant relationships for 
men. 
 Table 7.04 (p. 160) presents the measurement component of the male structural 
model. We can see that it changes little from the measurement model presented in 
chapter 6. All factors still load significantly positively onto their respective measures, 
and the loadings are quite close to what they were previously. Fit statistics (Table 7.05, 
p. 160) for this model are also quite similar. The RMSEA is the same (0.03) and, while 
the CFI (0.95) and TLI (0.93) drop slightly, the SBIC value (-863.04) is much better 
and an overall good fit. 
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 Analysis 3: Female Structural Model Results 
 As with the male structural model, I have broken the female structural model 
results down into separate sub-tables. The structural model for females (Tables 7.06-
7.10, pp. 161-164) both aligns with and departs from the male model in key ways. The 
key welfare regime measure behaves similarly for women as it does for men. Both the 
GERL (Table 7.07, p. 162) and GEPL (Table 7.08, p. 163) relationships follow the 
standard Conservative -> Liberal -> Social Democratic order of increasing 
progressiveness and egalitarianism predicted by the Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) 
model. However, as with men, women in conservative regimes appear more progressive 
on the DGCL measure (Table 7.06, p. 161) as compared with their liberal regime 
counterparts. This corroborates our finding that members of conservative regimes—
regardless of sex—see labor as inherently less gendered than do those from liberal 
regimes. 
 Regarding the magnitude of effect of welfare regime within and across latent 
measures, the effect of social democratic regime status is always positive and 
significant for females as well. It is also the largest effect of all three regime types (0.26 
SD units) for the DGCL measure, followed by the GEPL measure, and finally the 
GERL measure (a similar but not identical pattern existed for men). The effect of 
conservative regime status is most powerfully negative on the GEPL measure (as with 
men), indicating women in conservative regimes are most traditional regarding 
women’s engagement in the productive labor force. Note that the effect of living in a 
non-categorized regime is only significantly negative (compared to the liberal regime 
control group) for DGCL and GEPL measures, and more powerfully so for the DGCL 
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measure. This stands in contrast to men, for whom the relationship was always 
significantly negative. The non-categorized regime status is significantly related to only 
DGCL and GEPL measures for women, suggesting a slight difference from men (for 
whom it was universally negative). 
 Regarding the control measures, years of education is again significantly 
positively related to all three measures for women across all three latent measures. The 
effect size is (again) largest for the DGCL measure, followed by GEPL and then GERL. 
Unlike men, however, being currently employed is also significantly positive for 
women across all three measures, though the effect size this time is largest on the GEPL 
measure. Contrary to men (and expectation), age is significantly positively related to 
both DGCL and GEPL measures for women. Having formerly worked, being in better 
health, and having higher relative income are all significantly positively related to both 
DGCL and GEPL measures but not to the GERL measure. As with men, more urban 
residence is significantly positive only for the GERL measure. 
 On the other hand, only being currently married has a significantly negative 
effect for women on all three measures, and again the effect size is smallest on DGCL. 
Similar to men, more frequent religious attendance is significantly negative on both 
DGCL and GEPL measures but not on the GERL measure. Living in the suburbs has a 
negative relationship for women on only the GEPL measure, while being in satisfactory 
(relative to poor) health significantly negatively predicts a woman’s score on the GERL 
measure. In general, women have fewer negative predictor relationships than do men. 
On the other hand, there is very little obvious pattern of non-significant relationships for 
women. More urban residence does not significantly predict a woman’s score on the 
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DGCL measure. Neither age, good health, religious attendance, nor higher relative 
wealth significantly predict a woman’s score on the GERL measure. Higher relative 
wealth also does not significantly predict a woman’s score on the GEPL measure except 
in the richest quintile. 
 Table 7.09 (p. 164) presents the measurement component of the female 
structural model. As with men, it changes little from the measurement model presented 
in chapter 6. All factors still load significantly positively onto their respective measures, 
and the loadings are quite close to what they were previously. Fit statistics (Table 7.10, 
p. 164) for this model are also quite similar. The RMSEA is the same (0.03) and, while 
the CFI (0.95) and TLI (0.93) drop slightly, the SBIC value (-842.57) is much better 
and an overall good fit. However, it is still slightly but significantly worse than the male 
model’s SBIC score of -863.04, suggesting a slightly poorer fit. 
 Synthesizing Results for Analysis 3 
 The structural model results overall provide substantial insight into the questions 
that motivated this project. Most importantly, the anomalous pattern of the DGCL 
measure (i.e., making liberal regimes appear more traditional than conservative 
regimes) validates three key suspicions: (1) that it is appropriate to parse out the 
gendered conception of labor from more conventional measures of gender-labor 
attitudes; (2) that parsing that dimension out from the others shows that some 
populations (specifically those living in liberal welfare regimes) are less gender-
egalitarian than they appear otherwise, and (3) that this effect occurs in both male and 
female populations (Figures 5-12, pp. 165-167). We also find that respondents from 
social democratic regimes appear broadly more egalitarian, including across this novel 
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measure (Tables 7.01 and 7.06, p. 157 and 161). When we compare the traditional 
measures (GERL and GEPL), we find that across both sexes there is less egalitarianism 
towards women in the work force and more towards distribution of household labor 
tasks (Figures11 and 12, pp. 166-167). In the same figures, we also see a general pattern 
across sex of respondents from non-categorized regime states being more traditional 
and less egalitarian. 
 Regarding our control variables, a broad pattern appears to emerge across sex 
and latent measure. Years of education proves to be the only control with a universally 
positive (progressive) effect (Figure 5, p. 165), while currently married status is the only 
control with a universally negative (traditionalist) effect (same figure). Better health and 
higher relative income generally prove to be positive predictors, while marriage and 
more frequent religious attendance prove to be broadly negative (Figures 6-10, p. 165). 
Level of urban residence proves surprisingly positively significant only for the GERL 
measure, while not having much relationship to either of the others (Figure 9, p. 165). 
As expected, women tend to have more positive and fewer negative predictor 
relationships than do men, though this is not universally true (Figures 11 and 12, pp. 
166-167). Age proves to be a predictor of traditional attitudes for men (Figure 11, p. 
166) but (surprisingly) of progressive attitudes for women (Figure 12, p. 167). Income 
seems to be a stronger predictor of progressivism for men than for women, while work 
status occupies this role for women more than men (same figures). There is no measure 
in the data that is universally non-significant across all combinations of sex and latent 
measure (Figure 5, p. 165). 
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In the next chapter, I discuss the substantive implications of these findings in 
light of the theoretical context that informs this project. 
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Chapter 8: Discussion, Conclusion, and Future Directions 
Discussion 
 Synthesizing Analyses 1, 2, and 3 
This project set forth to assess the following broad questions: 
1. Are gender egalitarian scripts concerning labor roles asymmetrically distributed 
across parts of the developed world? If so, do patterns exist? 
2. Can social science improve its understanding of gender-labor attitudes by 
parsing attitudes into distinctly behaving dimensions? If so, is the hegemonic 
coupling model a useful improvement? 
3. If the above dimensions are conceptually distinct from one another, what macro- 
and micro-level asymmetries exist between them? 
This project’s analyses offer relevant and novel insights on all of the above and, in 
particular, provide three lynchpin findings that weave together a single story.  
First, asymmetry of gender egalitarian scripts does indeed exist at international, 
national, and personal levels. For example, while a large number of countries and 
people of both sexes are relatively accepting of women’s participation in the work 
force, people regardless of nationality or sex appear to be profoundly resistant to seeing 
men as primary reproductive laborers even when the material circumstances of the 
hypothetical man and his female partner are held equal. This finding and the others like 
it support our premise (and that set forth in the literature) that men’s resistance to 
moving into reproductive labor roles is a powerful and pervasive source of cultural lag 
against achieving gender egalitarianism. However, of note in our findings is that both 
sexes perpetuate this narrative, rather than only men doing so. In fact, the women in our 
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sample appeared to more often perpetuate this narrative than did the men. In other 
words, our findings point to a common thread underlying men’s and women’s common 
biases in this area. That this pattern also existed overwhelmingly at the levels of the 
nation state and the social welfare regime suggests a common factor that transcends 
region or border. 
The above pattern of asymmetry (described in detail in Chapter 5) hints at the 
second lynchpin finding of the project: gender egalitarianism is demonstrably not a 
gestalt value set in any sense of the term, and it is inappropriate for social research to 
assess it as such. We identified at least three distinct facets of gender-labor ideology in 
this sample: two conventional measures of egalitarianism in the spheres of productive 
and reproductive labor, and a novel measure that represents to what degree a person’s 
conception of labor roles is inherently gendered. We could find no model treating these 
dimensions as either uniform or parts of a common whole. Instead, supporting our 
theoretical construct, we found that a model assessing the dimensions separately was 
significantly superior.  
Our third lynchpin finding relates to one particular dimension of the above model: 
the coupling of gender with labor roles remains a powerfully distinct social fact that 
exists and operates independently of more conventionally recognized gender attitudes. 
In other words, a person or population may still see labor roles as inherently gendered 
(complete with gender-based biases) no matter how progressive or egalitarian that 
person or population otherwise appears to be. In general, our findings strongly implicate 
macro-level context in the gender egalitarianism scripts of the population. That is: states 
with more progressive welfare regimes are generally and predictably associated with 
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more egalitarian attitudes. However, there is a non-linear relationship between 
progressiveness of the welfare regime and scripts that gender-essentialize labor. It 
appears that members of liberal regime states, while mid-level egalitarian about 
distribution of labor activities, still see labor roles as more inherently gendered than 
members of either other regime category. Lag in this dimension likely plays a powerful 
role in the notorious two-decade ‘stall out’ (England 2010; Friedman 2015; Hochschild 
1989) on the journey towards gender-labor equality in these (and possibly other) states. 
Note that this macro-level pattern exists in the presence of a robust set of demographic 
controls, and reflects a logical extension of Bolzendahl and Olafsdottir’s (2008) 
findings. 
Examining those demographics yields further insights, the most obvious of which is 
that labor roles remain inherently gendered social constructs for both men and women. 
Supporting this is our finding that both sexes (across nationality) continue to treat 
women as primarily responsible for domestic labor duties. While both men and women 
tend to believe that they do more household labor than do their partners, both broadly 
agree that women do more than do men. They also both tend to be less friendly toward 
wives’ and mothers’ equal participation in the work force. Further, the pattern and 
degree of asymmetries suggests an inordinate bias specifically against men deviating 
from traditionally masculine roles and into feminine ones, which is what we would 
expect from the literature. Men and women remain in relative lockstep on the above 
patterns, with the biggest departure being women’s relative friendliness to mothers and 
wives participating in the paid labor force (which, again, is unsurprising). It seems 
likely that both men and women retaining biases in favor of traditional gendered 
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divisions of labor (regardless of the fact that women tend to be relatively more 
egalitarian compared to men) is a direct result of their persistent views that labor is an 
inherently gendered construct. However, it is difficult to support that hypothesis with 
these data alone. 
Descending below the levels of regime or state, two patterns relating to gender 
egalitarianism tend to emerge. First, a somewhat positive pattern emerges where 
education, health, and wealth/employment generally predict more egalitarian scores. 
This pattern is indicative of a post-materialist trend (Inglehart 1971, 1977; Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005), where individuals whose basic needs are securely met undergo a value 
shift toward prioritizing autonomy, inclusiveness, and self-expression. A (partially) 
competing hypothesis would be that script sharing as a result of institutional 
isomorphism is occurring across developed economies and causing homogenization of 
cultural values (Meyer et al. 1997). A second pattern—that of religious involvement and 
engagement in traditional relationship structures (e.g., marriage) predicting less 
egalitarian attitudes—also emerges from our controls. Cultural lag seems the most 
parsimonious explanation for this pattern. Urban residence proves surprisingly non-
relevant either the post-materialist or cultural lag patterns, though this may be the result 
of the measure’s effect being swamped by obvious covariates such as wealth, health, 
and education.  
In sum, our substantive findings paint a picture of a pernicious and under-studied 
facet of gender-labor ideology: the cultural coupling of labor roles with implicit gender 
characteristics, regardless of the sex of the person presently occupying that role. The 
literature cited at the beginning of this work pointed us in the direction of identifying 
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this measure, and our results validate both its existence and its salience to the problem 
under investigation. We find that this ideological facet pervades both micro- and the 
macro-level contexts. We also find that it behaves in ways that the extant literature 
might fail to predict. Employing it as a metric makes some ostensibly progressive states 
look more traditional, and some notoriously traditional states appear more progressive. 
In short, it calls into question the ways these societies are conceptually positioned 
relative to one another and, therefore, requires we reassess our conceptual models. 
Finally, although the data are presently insufficient to validate this assertion, reason and 
parsimony implicate the rogue ideological dimension as an underlying source of stall in 
the progress toward more egalitarian attitudes and behaviors among people across 
regional, socioeconomic, and other demographic statuses.  
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Conclusion 
 Limitations and Future Directions 
This project draws from a wide and interdisciplinary swath of social scholarship. 
It attempts to draw somewhat expansive conclusions from comparatively limited, cross-
sectional data. The cross-sectional limitations of this data make it impossible to draw 
and difficult to infer temporal relationships between effects. Moreover, several models 
proposed in the original project design could not be estimated from the available data 
for unknown reasons. Further, because the three distinct latent measures proved to not 
represent the same concepts for men as for women, it was difficult to compare the 
attitudes of men to those of women. I was thus mostly limited to identifying meaningful 
patterns within sex and speculating about between-sex differences. The implication here 
is that we may have as many as six distinct concepts, if all three concepts mean 
different things for men than they do for women. However, attitudinal measures do all 
point in the same directions for both men and women (i.e., progressive means 
progressive, and traditional means traditional), suggesting some substantive overlap 
across sex. 
All told, creating such complex models from a single wave of a single data set, 
no matter how detailed or far-reaching it may be, presents considerable challenge. 
However, the limitations of these data actually validate the need for such a project. 
When searching for data to use for this project, the ISSP was the only data set available 
with measures that could even begin to approximate the conceptual model. Further, 
several survey measures that lay at the core of these analyses existed only in the latest 
(2012) wave of the survey. Eschewing them in an attempt to create a longitudinal model 
both violated the core theoretical premises and caused the models to fail to estimate. 
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The limitations of this data set, and more so those of the broader body of available 
sociological data, form the basis for the primary scholarly recommendation that 
emerges from this project.  
As of this writing, there is a profound gap among surveying institutions in the 
construction and implementation of gender measures that will help researchers achieve 
more nuanced vision on pernicious problems of gender inequality. The need lies in 
measures that deliberately challenge status-quo assumptions based in gender 
essentialism. Such measures include those that, like Q1.1, Q1.2, and Q1.3, ask the 
respondent to prescribe behavior for men and women in relation to one another (e.g., 
which combination of mother and father involvement is the best care option for a child). 
Such measures also include those that, like Q1.1, use verbiage that compares men and 
women in equal material situations (e.g., both are equally employed and eligible for 
paid leave). Finally, such measures include those that ask prescriptive and proscriptive 
questions related to men’s behavior, and not only related to women’s behavior (e.g., 
whether or not a man should work full time if he has a young child at home). I could 
find no such questions of this last type in this or any other survey instrument I was able 
to obtain. Even if researchers are able to distance themselves from the gendered 
assumptions this project seeks to expose (which, to be fair, they must if our vision on 
such problems is to continue to improve), a rigorously minded researcher is still limited 
by his or her available tool set. 
 Theoretical Implications 
 We have now identified and taken steps to validate the theoretical model 
established at the outset of this project. The model’s veracity is validated by both its 
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predictable and unpredictable results. On the constructs that serve as proxies for 
conventional understandings of productive and reproductive labor, our sample and 
measures behave predictably, suggesting conformity with the existing literature. 
However, our key construct—the one representing hegemonic coupling between gender 
and labor constructs—proves an anomaly. It behaves erratically by conventional 
understanding, yet quite in line with our theory that vestigial gender ascriptions 
continue to marginalize entire fields of labor.  
The hegemonic coupling model, therefore, appears quite germane to inquiry into 
attitudes, biases, and relationships between gender and labor constructs. Furthermore, 
applying the hegemonic coupling framework to such inquiries provides us with insights 
we would otherwise miss. So-called “Liberal” welfare states present with higher levels 
of discriminatory bias than we might expect, and those biases seem eerily relevant to 
the hallmarks of the gender revolution’s stall out. Furthermore, while we have found a 
distinctly post-materialist attitudinal trend across the sexes, there are key differences in 
what influences the attitudes of men versus those of women. We have also identified a 
very short list of statuses that relate the same to all three facets of gender-labor attitudes, 
regardless of sex. However, as hypothesized, the hegemonic coupling indicator does 
exist and function independently of more conventional measures. It thus represents a 
novel contribution to the canon of research on this topic. 
Preconditions for Un-stalling the Gender Revolution 
Hegemonic status functions by requiring all other statuses in a cultural category 
(e.g., gender, labor, etc.) to define themselves in relation to it (Connell 1987). Labeling 
a status “hegemonic” denotes its position at the top of a cultural (and likely material) 
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power gradient, which confers descending degrees of power downward based on how 
well subordinate statuses mimic, ally with, reinforce, or otherwise support the 
hegemony. As we have discussed previously, the current peak of this power gradient is 
occupied by a suite of constructs embodying the ideal masculine individual dedicated to 
productive employment. The logical implication follows naturally: labor, if gender-
coupled, will be devalued when associated with a gender construct that is of lower 
status. Further, devalued labor will be avoided by those with the privilege to avoid it 
(most obviously cisgendered, white men) and relegated to those already of lower 
privilege (typically women, people of color, and so on). The statuses of low-privilege 
persons will continue to be culturally associated with low-status labor, and the coupling 
of low-hegemony statuses will perpetuate and compound disadvantage for both.  
While women in the developed world have made great strides toward accessing 
this suite of privileged constructs, the hegemonic gradient remains firmly in place. The 
net effect of the current system is to leave no incentive for anyone who can avoid doing 
reproductive labor to do so. Further, since women are historically, culturally, and 
biologically less able to avoid such labor, the current system also perpetuates the 
systematic marginalization of women, as well as the young, elderly, and infirmed, who 
depend upon reproductive labor. Though not often framed as such, this status quo 
represents what conventional scholarship calls the “stall” in gender equality: a two-
decade languishing of these feminine-associated statuses and activities at the bottom of 
the sociocultural hierarchy. 
As we have seen, however, these statuses and activities are only tied to cultural 
constructions of femininity: they are not actually restricted to women. A person of any 
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gender identity may occupy them, and current scholarship suggests that men failing to 
occupy them in numbers that compensate for women’s exit has been a lynchpin in the 
equality stall (England 2010; England and Li 2006; Ridgeway 2011). A new gender-
labor paradigm is therefore required in the policy sphere to unstall the gender revolution 
and begin addressing stall-associated problems, just as a new paradigm is required in 
the academic sphere to properly investigate the important role hegemonic coupling 
plays in attitudinal configurations. The old paradigm conflates gender and labor, failing 
to recognize the inherent contradiction in espousing equality while framing masculine-
productive employment as the sole land of opportunity. In such a labor system, groups 
of people and statuses will invariably pursue the most advantageous labor types 
available to them, outsourcing the less desirable responsibilities onto lower status 
groups. If the groups in conflict are gender groups, then there is no reason to think that 
true gender equality is achievable in such a system. 
A new paradigm oriented towards true equality would neutralize the potential 
for inequality in the system. It would expand on the work that Western feminist 
traditions have done so far in decoupling a person’s sex (male/female) and gender 
identities (man/woman) from their participation in labor. It would decouple gendered 
constructs such as masculinity and femininity from labor. It would also address the 
hegemonic power gradients that privilege masculine qualities over feminine ones and 
productive labor involvement over involvement in reproductive labor. Such a paradigm 
would redefine the relationships between cultural constructions of masculinity, 
femininity, and the valuation of reproductive labor such that hegemony is not 
essentialized to identities. 
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Put in simple, tangible terms, addressing the hegemonic masculine-productive 
coupling requires at least three fundamental preconditions be achieved: 
1. Women must no longer be penalized in productive labor roles for their 
association with or participation in reproductive labor activities. 
2. Men must voluntarily participate in reproductive labor, and do so without 
experiencing substantial structural or cultural penalties. 
3. Neither productive nor reproductive labor can be fundamentally attributed to a 
particular gender construct. 
The crux of all of three preconditions lies in removing the hegemony (cultural and 
structural power advantage) of productive labor over reproductive labor, since such a 
change will axiomatically remove labor’s power to confer hegemonic status to a 
particular individual or gender identity. 
Countries such as Sweden, Iceland, and Finland have had some success pairing 
reproductive labor participation with positive consequences for the laborer by rewarding 
men specifically for their involvement (Deven 2011, Patnaik 2013). Doing so has 
produced positive ripples along multiple avenues. In addition to freeing women up to 
remain more engaged in paid employment, men’s changes have reduced the motivations 
for employers to discriminate by gender because both men and women are likely to 
need time away from the work place for family involvement at one time or another. 
More importantly than these material consequences, this new paradigm has over time 
permeated cultural constructions surrounding gender and work (Rangecroft 2016). The 
ideal man may now be one who has significant reproductive labor responsibilities—
even those that may remove him from the paid labor force. Because masculinity has 
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previously shaped definitions of the ideal worker, the ideal worker therefore becomes 
someone whose commitment to paid employment exists in plurality with other 
activities. These changes make men and women look substantially more alike as 
employees than they once did, further weakening the incentive to discriminate. 
Moreover, these changes narrow the value gap between productive and reproductive 
labor, since more people than ever are likely to participate in both. In other words, these 
are all steps toward decoupling masculinity and productive labor and neutralizing the 
hegemonic advantage of each of those statuses, making alternative couplings both 
materially and culturally viable. These relatively small changes represent a substantive 
basis for theorizing about dismantling the system of gendered labor stratification. 
De-coupling Hegemonies 
 The logical corollary to hegemonic coupling has become obvious: if coupling of 
devalued statuses compounds disadvantage, then pursuing equality means pursuing their 
decoupling. Decoupling femininity from care labor should over time allow both to gain 
a more egalitarian standing in the cultural imagination. Femininity, decoupled from 
low-status, low- or no-wage labor, might be a less stigmatized suite of characteristics 
for people of all gender identities to embody. Some evidence suggests this trend is 
already occurring among members of the Millennial generation (Wong 2015). Care 
labor, on the other hand, if freed from its stigma as being of ‘lower’ (re: feminine) 
value, might see a rise in the participation of men and other non-feminine identifying 
persons. I suggest that this is precisely what has happened in the case of Sweden’s 
surging success in participatory fatherhood (Deven 2011; Haas 1992; Patnaik 2013). In 
short, freed from the well of their collective gravity, two historically devalued statuses 
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may over time begin to orbit independently, coupled and re-coupled with other statuses 
more arbitrarily. I expect this to be a simple, painless, and relatively quick transition 
with no foreseeable hiccups.9 
 
  




Acker, J. 1990. ‘Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations.’ 
Gender & Society 4(2): 139–158. 
 
American Association of University Women (AAUW). 2014. The Simple Truth about 
the Gender Pay Gap (2014). Washington, D.C.: AAUW. 
 
Artazcoz, L., I. Cortes, F. G. Benavides, V. Escriba-Aguir, X. Bartoll, H. Vargas, and 
C. Borrell. 2016. ‘Long Working Hours and Health in Europe: Gender and 
Welfare State Differences in a Context of Economic Crisis.’ Health & Place 
40(1): 161-168. 
 
Ashcraft, C., and S. Blithe. 2010. Women in IT: The Facts. Boulder, CO: National 
Center for Women & Information Technology (NCWIT). 
 
Association for Women in Science. 2014. http://www.awis.org. 
 
Aumann, K., E. Galinsky and K. Matos. 2011. The New Male Mystique. New York: 
Families and Work Institute: National Study of the Changing Workforce. 
 
Babcock, L., and S. Laschever. 2007. Women Don’t Ask: The High Cost of Avoiding 
Negotiation-- and Positive Strategies for Change. New York: Bantam Books. 
 
Bambra, C., D. Pope, V. Swami, D. Stanistreet, A. Roskam, A. Kunst, and A. Scott-
Samuel. ‘Gender, Health Inequalities and Welfare State Regimes: A Cross-
National Study of 13 European Countries.’ Journal of Epidemiology and 
Community Health 63(1): 38-44. 
 
Bargh, J. A., P. Raymond, J. B. Pryor and F. Strack. 1995. ‘Attractiveness of the 
Underling: An Automatic Power --> Sex Association and its Consequences for 
Sexual Harassment and Aggression.’ Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 68: 768–781. 
 
Barnett, W. P., J. N. Baron and T. E. Stuart. 2000. ‘Avenues of Attainment: 
Occupational Demography and Organizational Careers in the California Civil 
Service.’ American Journal of Sociology 106(1): 88–144. 
 
Barro, J. 2001. ‘Human Capital and Growth.’ The American Economic Review 91(2): 
12-17. 
 
Bartoll, X., I. Cortes and L. Artazcoz. 2014. ‘Full- and Part-Time Work: Gender and 
Welfare-Type Differences in European Working Conditions, Job Satisfaction, 
Health Status, and Psychosocial Issues.’ Scandinavian Journal of Work, 
Environment & Health 40(4): 370-9. 
 
105 
Belkin, L. 2003. The Opt-Out Revolution. New York Times Magazine, October 26. 
 
Benard, S., and S. J. Correll. 2010. Normative Discrimination and the Motherhood 
Penalty. Gender & Society 24(5): 616–646. 
 
Bertrand, M. and S. Mullainathan. 2004. ‘Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than 
Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination.’ The 
American Economic Review 94(4): 991-1013. 
 
Bianchi, S., M. A.Milkie, L. C. Sayer and J. P. Robinson. 2000. ‘Is Anyone Doing the 
Housework? Trends in the Gender Division of Household Labor.’ Social Forces 
79(1): 191–228. 
 
Bianchi, S., J. P. Robinson and M. A. Milkie. 2006. Changing Rhythms of American 
Family Life. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Bianchi, M. L. C. Sayer, M. A. Milkie and J. P. Robinson. 2012. ‘Housework: Who 
Did, Does or Will Do It, and How Much Does It Matter?’ Social Forces 91(1): 
55-63. 
 
Blair-Loy, M. 2003. Competing Devotions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Blau, F. D. and L. M. Kahn. 2006. ‘The U.S. Gender Pay Gap in the 1990s: Slowing 
Convergence.’ Industrial and Labor Relations Review 60(1): 45–66. 
 
Bolzendahl, C. and S. Olafsdottir. 2008. ‘Gender Group Interest or Gender Ideology? 
Understanding U.S. Support for Family Policy within the Liberal Welfare 
Regime.’ Sociological Perspectives 51(2): 281-304. 
 
Boushey, H. 2005. Are Women Opting Out? Debunking the Myth. Executive Summary. 
Washington, D.C.: Center for Economic and Policy Research. 
 
Boushey, H. 2008. ‘“Opting Out”? The Effect of Children on Women’s Employment in 
the United States.’ Feminist Economics 14(1): 1–36. 
 
Bowles, H. R., L. Babcock and L. Lai. 2007. ‘Social Incentives for Gender Differences 
in the Propensity to Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes it Does Hurt to Ask.’ 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 103(1): 84–103. 
 
Borchorst, A. and B. Siim. 2008. ‘Woman-Friendly Policies and State Feminism: 
Theorizing Scandinavian Gender Equality.’ Feminist Theory 9(2): 207-224. 
 
Brewster, K. and I. Padavic. 2000. ‘Change in Gender-Ideology, 1977–1996: The 
Contributions of Intracohort Change and Population Turnover.’ Journal of 
Marriage and Family 62(2): 477–487. 
 
106 
Brines, J. 1994. ‘Economic Dependency, Gender, and the Division of Labor at Home.’ 
The American Journal of Sociology 100(3): 652-688. 
 
Buchmann, C. and T. A. DiPrete. 2006. ‘The Growing Female Advantage in College 
Completion: The Role of Family Background and Academic Achievement.’ 
Sociological Review 71(4): 515–541. 
 
Budig, M. J. and M. J. Hodges. 2010. ‘Differences in Disadvantage: Variation in the 
Motherhood Penalty Across White Women’s Earnings Distribution.’ American 
Sociological Review 75(5): 705-24. 
 
Budig, M. J. and M. J. Hodges. 2014. ‘Statistical Models and Empirical Evidence for 
Differences in the Motherhood Penalty Across the Earnings Distribution.’ 
American Sociological Review 79(2): 358-364. 
 
Budig, M. J., J.Misra and I. Boeckmann. 2012. ‘The Motherhood Penalty in Cross-
National Perspective: The Importance of Work–Family Policies and Cultural 
Attitudes.’ Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society 
19(2): 163–193. 
 
Bullock, A. and S. Trombley (eds.). 1999. The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern 
Thought (3rd Ed.). NY: Harper Collins. 
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), U. S. D. of L. 2013. Employment Status of the 
Civilian Population by Sex and Age. 
 
Byron, R. A. and V. J. Roscigno. 2014. ‘Relational Power, Legitimation, and Pregnancy 
Discrimination.’ Gender & Society 28(3): 435–462. 
 
Campbell, C. and J. Pearlman. 2013. ‘Period Effects, Cohort Effects, and the Narrowing 
Gender Wage Gap.’ Social Science Research 42(6): 1693–1711. 
 
Casper, L. M., and S. Bianchi. 2002. Continuity and Change in the American Family. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Castilla, E. J. 2008. ‘Gender, Race, and Meritocracy in Organizational Careers.’ 
American Journal of Sociology 113(6): 1479–1526. 
 
Catalyst, Inc. 2006. 2005 Catalyst Census of Women Corporate Officers and Top 
Earners of the Fortune 500. New York: Catalyst, Inc. 
 
Cech, E. A. and M. Blair-Loy. 2010. ‘Perceiving Glass Ceilings? Meritocratic versus 
Structural Explanations of Gender Inequality among Women in Science and 
Technology.’ Social Problems 57(3): 371–397. 
 
107 
Cech, E. A. and M. Blair-Loy. 2014. ‘Consequences of Flexibility Stigma among 
Academic Scientists and Engineers.’ Work and Occupations 41(1): 86–110. 
 
Cech, E., B. Rubineau, S. Silbey and C. Seron. 2011. ‘Professional Role Confidence 
and Gendered Persistence in Engineering.’ American Sociological Review 
76(5): 641–666. 
 
Cha, Y. 2010. ‘Reinforcing Separate Spheres the Effect of Spousal Overwork on Men’s 
and Women’s Employment in Dual-Earner Households.’ American Sociological 
Review 75(2): 303–329. 
 
Cha, Y. 2013. ‘Overwork and the Persistence of Gender Segregation in Occupations.’ 
Gender & Society 27(2): 158–184. 
 
Charles, M. and D. B. Grusky. 2004. Occupational Ghettos: The Worldwide 
Segregation of Women and Men. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Chesley, N. 2011. ‘Stay-at-Home Fathers and Breadwinning Mothers: Gender, Couple 
Dynamics, and Social Change.’ Gender & Society 25(5): 642–664. 
 
Chung, H., E. Ng, S. Ibrahim, B. Karlsson, J. Benach, A. Espelt, and C. Muntaner. 
2013. ‘Welfare State Regimes, Gender, and Depression: A Multilevel Analysis 
of Middle and High Income Countries.’ International Journal of Environmental 
Research and Public Health 10(4): 1324-1341. 
 
Cognard-Black, A. J. 2004. ‘Will They Stay, or Will They Go? Sex-Atypical Work 
among Token Men Who Teach.’ The Sociological Quarterly 45(1): 113–139. 
 
Cohany, S. R. and E. Sok. 2007. ‘Trends in Labor Force Participation of Married 
Mothers of Infants.’ Monthly Labor Review February: 9–16. 
 
Cohen, P. N. and M. L. Huffman. 2003. ‘Individuals, Jobs, and Labor Markets: The 
Devaluation of Women’s Work.’ American Sociological Review 68(3): 443–
463. 
 
Cohen, P. N., M. L. Huffman and S. Knauer. 2009. ‘Stalled Progress? Gender 
Segregation and Wage Inequality among American Managers, 1980–2000.’ 
Work and Occupations 36: 318–342. 
 
Coltrane, S. 2004. ‘Elite Careers and Family Commitment: It’s (Still) about Gender.’ 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 596: 214–220. 
 
Coltrane, S. and M. Adams. 2008. Gender and Families. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
 
Connell, R. W. 1987. Gender and Power. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
108 
 
Connell, R. W. 1995. Masculinities. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press. 
 
Connell, C. 2012. ‘Dangerous Disclosures.’ Sexuality Research and Social Policy 9(2): 
168–177. 
 
Connell, R. W. and J. W. Messerschmidt. 2005. ‘Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking 
the Concept.’ Gender and Society 19(6): 829-859. 
 
Correll, S. J., S. Benard and I. Paik. 2007. ‘Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood 
Penalty?’ American Journal of Sociology 112(5): 1297–1339. 
 
Cotter, D. A., J. M. Hermsen and R. Vanneman. 2004. Gender Inequality at Work. New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Cotter, D. A., J.M. Hermsen and P. England. 2008. ‘Moms and Jobs: Trends in 
Mothers’ Employment and Which Mothers Stay Home.’ Pp. 379–386 in 
American Families: A Multicultural Reader, 2nd ed., edited by S. Coontz, M. 
Parson and G. Raley. New York: Routledge. 
 
Cotter, D. A., J. M. Hermsen and R. Vanneman. 2011. ‘The End of the Gender 
Revolution? Gender Role Attitudes from 1977 to 2008.’ American Journal of 
Sociology 117(1): 259–289. 
 
Cottingham, M. 2014. ‘Recruiting Men, Constructing Manhood: How Health Care 
Organizations Mobilize Masculinities as Nursing Recruitment Strategy.’ Gender 
& Society 28(1): 133–156. 
 
Crittenden, A. 2001. The Price of Motherhood: Why the Most Important Job in the 
World is Still the Least Valued. New York: Metropolitan Books. 
 
Cuddy, A. J. C., S. T. Fiske and P. Glick. 2004. ‘When Professionals Become Mothers, 
Warmth Doesn’t Cut the Ice.’ Journal of Social Issues 60(4): 701–718. 
 
Dalton, R. J. 2013. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies. CA: Cq Press. 
 
Deven, F. 2011. Leave Arrangements in Europe: Major Trends, Challenges, and Policy 
Issues. In European Expert Group Meeting: “Confronting Family Poverty and 
Social Exclusion; Ensuring Work-Family Balance; Advancing Social Integration 
and Intergenerational Solidarity in Europe.” 
 
Deven, F. and P.Moss. 2002. ‘Leave Arrangements for Parents: Overview and Future 
Outlook.’ Community, Work & Family 5(3): 237–255. 
 
109 
Duckworth, A. and M. Seligman. 2006. ‘Self-Discipline Gives Girls the Edge: Gender 
and Self-Discipline.’ Grades, and Achievement Test Scores 98(1): 198–208. 
 
Dunkle, J. and P. Francis. 1990. ‘The role of facial masculinity/femininity in the 
attribution of homosexuality.’ Sex Roles 23(3): 157-167. 
 
Engels, Friederich. 1884. 2000. ‘The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the 
State.’ Marx/Engels Internet Archive. http:// 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1884/origin-family/index.htm. 
 
England, P. 2010. ‘The Gender Revolution Uneven and Stalled.’ Gender & Society 
24(2): 149–166. 
 
England, P. 2011. ‘Reassessing the Uneven Gender Revolution and its Slowdown.’ 
Gender & Society 25(1): 113–123. 
 
England, P., J. Bearak, M. J. Budig and M. J. Hodges. 2016. ‘Do Highly Paid, Highly 
Skilled Women Experience the Largest Motherhood Penalty?’ American 
Sociological Review 81(6): 1161-1189. 
 
England, P. and S. Li. 2006. ‘Desegregation Stalled: The Changing Gender 
Composition of College Majors, 1971–2002.’ Gender & Society 20(5): 657–
677. 
 
Esping-Andersen, G. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Esping-Andersen, G. 1999. Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Families and Work Institute. 2012. 2012 National Study of Employers. 
 
Farber, H. S. 2009. Job Loss and the Decline of Job Security in the United States. 
Working Paper No. 520, Industrial Relations Section. Princeton University, 
Princeton, NJ. 
 
Fenstermaker, S. and West, C. 2002. Doing Gender, Doing Difference: Inequality, 
Power, and Institutional Change. New York: Routledge. 
 
Ferguson, M. 1994. Feminism and Postmodernism. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press. 
 
Ferguson, A. and R. Hennessy. 2010. Feminist Perspectives on Class and Work. 




Freeman, C. 2004. Trends in Educational Equity for Girls and Women. Washington, 
DC: National Center for Education Statistics. 
 
Friedman, S. 2012. Having it All? The Relationship between Gender, Family Outcomes, 
and Young Adults’ Achievement of Non-Traditional Occupational Goals. In 
Southern Sociological Society Annual Meeting. New Orleans, LA. 
 
Friedman, S. and J. H. Greenhaus. 2000.Work and Family: Allies or Enemies? What 
Happens when Business Professionals Confront Life Choices? New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Friedman, S. and C. Weissbrod. 2005. ‘Work and Family Commitment and Decision-
Making Status among Emerging Adults.’ Sex Roles 53(5): 317–325. 
 
Gerson, K. 2010. The Unfinished Revolution: How a New Generation Is Reshaping 
Family, Work, and Gender in America. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Girls Who Code. 2014. http://girlswhocode.com/. 
 
Glass, J. 2004. ‘Blessing or Curse? Work-Family Policies and Mother’s Wage Growth 
Over Time.’ Work and Occupations 31(3): 367–394. 
Glass, J. L., S. Sassler, Y. Levitte, K. M. Michelmore. 2013. ‘What’s So Special about 
STEM? A Comparison of Women’s Retention in STEM and Professional 
Occupations.’ Social Forces 92(2): 723–756. 
 
Glauber, R. 2008. ‘Race and Gender in Families and at Work: The Fatherhood Wage 
Premium.’ Gender & Society 22(1): 8–30. 
 
Goldieblox. 2014. http://www.goldieblox.com. 
 
Goldin, C. 2006. The Quiet Revolution that Transformed Women’s Employment, 
Education, and Family. American Economic Review 96(2): 1–21. 
 
Gornick, J. and M. Meyers. 2003. Families that Work: Policies for Reconciling 
Parenthood and Employment. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Graff, E. J. 2007. The Opt-Out Myth. Columbia Journalism Review 45(6): 51. 
 
Haas, L. 1992. Equal Parenthood and Social Policy: A Study of Parental Leave in 
Sweden. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
 
Hallden, K., A. Levanon and T. Kricheli-Katz. 2016. ‘Does the Motherhood Wage 
Penalty Differ by Individual Skill and Country Family Policy? A Longitudinal 
Study of Ten European Countries. Social Politics: International Studies in 
Gender, State & Society 23(3): 363-388. 
 
111 
Hartmann, H. 1981. ‘The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class, and Political Struggle: 
The Example of Housework.’ Journal of Women in Culture and Society 6(3): 
366-394. 
 
Hays, S. 1997. The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
 
Hegewisch, A. and H. Hartmann. 2014. Occupational Segregation and the Gender Wage 
Gap: A Job Half Done. Institute for Women’s Policy Research Briefing Paper 
IWPR C419. 
 
Hegewisch, A., H. Liepmann, J. Hayes and H. Hartmann. 2010. Separate and Not 
Equal? Gender Segregation in the Labor Market and the Gender Wage Gap. 
Institute for Women’s Policy Research Briefing Paper IWPR C377. 
 
Hennessy, R. 1993. Materialist Feminism and the Politics of Discourse. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Hennessy, R. 1997. Materialist Feminism: A Reader in Class, Difference, and Women’s 
Lives. New York: Routledge. 
 
Hewlett, S. A. and C. B. Luce. 2005. ‘Off-Ramps and On-Ramps: Keeping Talented 
Women on the Road to Success.’ Harvard Business Review 83(3): 43–6, 48, 50–
4 passim. 
 
Hewlett, S. A., L. Sherbin, F. Dieudonne, C. Fargnoli and C. Fredman. 2014. Athena 
Factor 2.0: Accelerating Female Talent in Science, Engineering, and 
Technology. New York: Center for Talent Innovation. 
 
Hill, C., C. Corbett, and A. St. Rose. 2010. Why So Few? Women in Science, 
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics. Washington, DC: AAUW. 
 
Hochschild, A. R. 1989. The Second Shift: Working Parents and the Revolution at 
Home. New York: Viking Penguin. 
 
Hochschild, A. R. 1997. The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Home and Home 
Becomes Work. New York: Metropolitan Books. 
 
Hodges,M. J. and M. J. Budig. 2010. ‘Who Gets the Daddy Bonus? Organizational 
Hegemonic Masculinity and the Impact of Fatherhood on Earnings.’ Gender & 
Society 24(6): 717–745. 
 
Hollister,M. N. and K. E. Smith. 2014. ‘Unmasking the Conflicting Trends in Job 
Tenure by Gender in the United States, 1983–2008.’ American Sociological 
Review 79(1): 159–181. 
 
112 
Hook, J. L. 2006. ‘Care in Context: Men’s Unpaid Work in 20 Countries, 1965–2003.’ 
American Sociological Review 71(4): 639–660. 
 
Hook, J.L. 2010. ‘Gender Inequality in the Welfare State: Sex Segregation in 
Housework, 1965-2003.’ American Journal of Sociology 115(5): 14480-1523. 
 
Hook, J. L. and B. Pettit. 2016. ‘Reproducing Occupational Inequality: Motherhood and 
Occupational Segregation.’ Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, 
State and Society 23(3): 329-362. 
 
Inglehart, R. 1971. ‘The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-
Industrial Societies.’ The American Political Science Review 65(4): 991-1017. 
 
Inglehart, R. 1977. The Silent Revolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Inglehart, R. 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Inglehart, R. and C. Welzel.  2004. Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: 
The Human Development Sequence. NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Inglehart, R. 2008. ‘Changing Values Among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006.’ 
West European Politics 31(1-2): 130-146. 
 
ISSP. 2012. International Social Survey Programme. 
http://www.issp.org/page.php?pageId=4. 
 
Jacobs, J. A. 1993. ‘Men in Female-Dominated Fields: Trends and Turnover.’ Pp. 49–
63 in Doing “Women’s Work”: Men in Nontraditional Occupations, edited by 
C. L. Williams. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Jacobs, J. A. and K. Gerson. 2004. The Time Divide: Work, Family, and Gender 
Inequality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Jeffries, H. 1961. Theory of Probability. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Kelly, E. and F. Dobbin. 1999. ‘Civil Rights Law at Work: Sex Discrimination and the 
Rise of Maternity Leave Policies.’ American Journal of Sociology 105(2): 455–
492. 
 
Kelly, K. and L. Grant. 2012. ‘Penalties and Premiums: The Impact of Gender, 
Marriage, and Parenthood on Faculty Salaries in Science, Engineering, and 




Kelly, E. L., P.Moen and E. Tranby. 2011. ‘Changing Workplaces to Reduce Work-
Family Conflict: Schedule Control in a White-Collar Organization.’ American 
Sociological Review 76(2): 265–290. 
 
Kilbourne, B., P. England and K. Beron. 1994. ‘Effects of Individual, Occupational, and 
Industrial Characteristics on Earnings: Intersections of Race and Gender.’ Social 
Forces 72(4): 1149–1176. 
 
Killewald, A. and J. Bearak. 2014. ‘Is the Motherhood Penalty Larger for Low-Wage 
Women? A Comment on Quantile Regression.’ American Sociological Review 
79(2): 350-357. 
 
Kimmel, M. 1996. Manhood in America: A Cultural History. New York: Free Press. 
 
Kivel, P. 1992. Men’s Work: How to Stop the Violence that Tears Our Lives Apart. 
Hazelden: Ballantine. 
 
Kivel, P. 2007. ‘The Act-Like-A-Man Box.’ Pp. 83–85 in Men’s Lives, 7th ed., edited 
by M. Kimmel and M. Messner. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
 
Knight, C. 2008. ‘Early Human Kinship Was Matrilineal’ in Allen, N. J., H. Callan, R. 
Dunbar and W. James (eds.), Early Human Kinship. Oxford: Blackwell. pp.61-
82. 
 
Koedel, C., R. Darolia, P. Martorell, K. Wilson and F. Perez-Arce. 2014. ‘Race and 
Gender Effects on Employer Interest in Job Applicants: New Evidence from a 
Resume Field Experiment.’ Applied Economics Letters 23(12): 853-856. 
 
Kotsadam, A. and H. Finseraas. 2011. ‘The State Intervenes in the Battle of the Sexes: 
Causal Effects of Paternity Leave.’ Social Science Research 40(6): 1611–1622. 
 
Lachance-Grzela, M. and G. Bouchard. 2010. ‘Why Do Women Do the Lion’s Share of 
Housework? A Decade of Research.’ Sex Roles 63(11–1): 767–780. 
Landivar, L. C. 2013. Men in Nursing Occupations: American Community Survey 
Highlight Report. U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
Lang, M.M., and B. J. Risman. 2007. A “Stalled” Revolution or a Still-Unfolding One? 
The Continuing Convergence of Men’s and Women’s Roles. In Council on 
Contemporary Families. University of Chicago. 
 
Leibbrandt, A. and J. A. List. 2012. Do Women Avoid Salary Negotiations? Evidence 
from a Large Scale Natural Field Experiment. Working Paper. National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
 
Lincoln, A. E. 2008. ‘Gender, Productivity, and the Marital Wage Premium.’ Journal of 
Marriage & Family 70(3): 806–814. 
114 
 
Lips, H.M. 2013. ‘The Gender Pay Gap: Challenging the Rationalizations. Perceived 
Equity, Discrimination, and the Limits of Human Capital Models.’ Sex Roles 
68(3–4): 169–185. 
 
Mahaffy, K. A. and S. K. Ward. 2002. ‘The Gendering of Adolescents’ Childbearing 
and Educational Plans: Reciprocal Effects and the Influence of Social Context.’ 
Sex Roles 46(11/12): 403–417. 
 
Mandel, H. 2009. ‘Configurations of Gender Inequality: The Consequences of Ideology 
and Public Policy.’ British Journal of Sociology 60(4): 693–719. 
 
Mandel, H. 2012. ‘Winners and Losers: The Consequences of Welfare State Policies for 
Gender Wage Inequality.’ European Sociological Review 28(2): 241–262. 
 
Mandel, H. 2013. ‘Up the Down Staircase: Women’s Upward Mobility and the Wage 
Penalty for Occupational Feminization, 1970–2007.’ Social Forces 91(4): 1183–
1207. 
 
Mandel, H. and M. Semyonov. 2005. ‘Family Policies, Wage Structures, and Gender 
Gaps: Sources of Earnings Inequality in 20 Countries.’ American Sociological 
Review 70(6): 949–967. 
 
Mandel, H. and Semyonov, M. 2006. ‘A Welfare State Paradox: State Interventions and 
Women’s Employment Opportunities in 22 Countries.’ American Journal of 
Sociology 111(6): 1910–1949. 
 
Mandel, H. and Shalev, M. 2009. ‘How Welfare States Shape the Gender Pay Gap: A 
Theoretical and Comparative Analysis.’ Social Forces 87(4): 1873–1911. 
 
Margolis, J. and A. Fisher. 2003. Unlocking the Clubhouse: Women in Computing. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Mason, M. A. and M. Goulden. 2004. ‘Marriage and Baby Blues: Redefining Gender 
Equity in the Academy.’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 596: 86–103. 
 
Maume, D. J. 2004. ‘Is the Glass Ceiling a Unique Form of Inequality? Evidence from a 
Random-Effects Model of Managerial Attainment.’ Work and Occupations 
31(2): 250–274. 
Maume, D. J. 2008. ‘Gender Differences in Providing Urgent Childcare among Dual-
earner Parents.’ Social Forces 87(1): 273–297. 
 
Matsunaga, M. 2010. ‘How to Factor-Analyze Your Data Right: Do’s, Don’ts, and 
How-To’s.’ International Journal of Psychological Research 3(1): 97-110. 
 
115 
McKinsey Global Institute. 2015. ‘The Power of Parity: How Advancing Women’s 




Metz, I. and P. Tharenou. 2001. ‘Women’s Career Advancement.’ Group and 
Organization Management 26(3): 312–343. 
 
Meyer, O. W., J. Boli, G. M. Thomas and F. O. Ramirez. 1997. ‘World Society and the 
Nation-State.’ The American Journal of Sociology 103(1): 144-181. 
 
Milkie, M. A., S. B. Raley, and S. M. Bianchi. 2009. ‘Taking on the Second Shift: Time 
Allocations and Time Pressures of U.S. Parents with Preschoolers.’ Social 
Forces 88(2): 487-517. 
 
Milne-Tyte, A. 2014. Why Women Don’t Ask for More Money. NPR.org. 
 
Misra, J. and E. Strader. 2013. ‘Gender Pay Equity in Advanced Countries: The Role of 
Parenthood and Policies. Journal of International Affairs 67(1): 27-XIX. 
 
Mitchell, E. 2013. ‘I am a Woman and a Human: A Marxist Feminist Critique of 
Intersectionality Theory. Libcom.org. http://libcom.org/library/i-am-woman-
human-marxist-feminist-critique-intersectionality-theory-eve-mitchell. 
 
Moss-Racusin, C. A., J. F. Dovidio, V. L. Brescoll, M. J. Graham and J. Handelsman. 
2012. Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, pp. 201211286. 
 
Munsch, C. L., C. L. Ridgeway and J. C. Williams. 2014. ‘Pluralistic Ignorance and the 
Flexibility Bias: Understanding and Mitigating Flextime and Flexplace Bias at 
Work.’ Work and Occupations 41(1): 40–62. 
 
Nash, M. A. and L. S. Romero. 2012. ‘”Citizenship for the College Girl”: Challenges 
and Opportunities in Higher Education for Women in the United States in the 
1930s.’ Teachers College Record 114(020305): 1-35. 
 
National Center for Women & Information Technology. 2014. http://www.ncwit.org. 
 
Nixon, D. 2009. ‘”I Can’t Put a Smiley Face On”: Working-Class Masculinity, 
Emotional Labour and Service Work in the “New Economy.”’ Gender, Work & 
Organization 16(3): 300-322. 
 
Noonan, M. C. and M. E. Corcoran. 2004. ‘The Mommy Track and Partnership: 
Temporary Delay or Dead End?’ Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 596: 130–150. 
 
116 
Noonan, M. C., and J. L. Glass. 2012. The Hard Truth about Telecommuting. Monthly 
Labor Review 135(6): 38–45. 
 
OECD. 2016. ‘OECD and Enlargement.’ OECD.org.  
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/enlargement.htm 
 
Offer, S. and B. Schneider. 2011. ‘Revisiting the Gender Gap in Time-Use Patterns: 
Multitasking and Well-Being among Mothers and Fathers in Dual-Earner 
Families.’ American Sociological Review 76(6): 809–833. 
 
Padavic, I. and B. F. Reskin. 2002. Women and Men at Work. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Pine Forge. 
 
Pascoe, C. J. 2007. Dude, You’re a Fag: Masculinity and Sexuality in High School. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Patnaik, A. 2013. Making Leave Easier: Better Compensation and Daddy Only 
Entitlements. In New Orleans, LA. 
 
Percheski, C. 2008. ‘Opting Out? Cohort Differences in Professional Women’s 
Employment Rates from 1960 to 2005.’ American Sociological Review 73(3): 
497–517. 
 
Perkins, R., B. Kleiner, S. Roey and J. Brown. 2004. The High School Transcript Study: 
A Decade of Change in Curricula and Achievement, 1990–2000. Washington, 
DC: National Center for Education Statistics. 
 
Pinto, K. and S. Coltrane. 2009. ‘Divisions of Labor in Mexican Origin and Anglo 
Families: Structure and Culture.’ Sex Roles 60(7/8): 482–495. 
 
Raftery, E. 1995. ‘Bayesian Model Selection in Social Research.’ Sociological 
Methodology 25(1995): 111-163. 
 
Raley, S., S. M. Bianchi and W. Wang. 2012. ‘When Do Fathers Care? Mothers’ 
Economic Contribution and Fathers’ Involvement in Child Care.’ American 
Journal of Sociology 117(5): 1422–1459. 
 
Rangecroft, A. 2016. ‘Where New Dads Are Encouraged to Take Months Off Work.’ 
BBC News. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-35225982. 
 
Reingold, B. and A. R. Smith. 2011. ‘Welfare Policymaking and Intersections of Race, 
Ethnicity, and Gender in U.S. State Legislatures.’ American Journal of Political 
Science 56(1): 131-147. 
 
Ridgeway, C. L. 1997. ‘Interaction and the Conservation of Gender Inequality: 
Considering Employment.’ American Sociological Review 62(2): 218–235. 
117 
 
Ridgeway, C. L. 2011. Framed by Gender: How Gender Inequality Persists in the 
Modern World. Oxford University Press. 
 
Ridgeway, C. L. and S. J. Correll. 2004. ‘Unpacking the Gender System: A Theoretical 
Perspective on Gender Beliefs and Social Relations.’ Gender & Society 18(4): 
510–531. 
 
Ridgeway, C. L. and L. Smith-Lovin. 1999. ‘The Gender System and Interaction.’ 
Annual Review of Sociology 25: 191–216. 
 
Rindfuss, R. R., E. C. Cooksey and R. L. Sutterlin. 1999. ‘Young Adult Occupational 
Achievement: Early Expectations versus Behavioral Reality.’ Work and 
Occupations 26: 220–263. 
 
Roth, L. M. 2006. Selling Women Short: Gender and Money on Wall Street. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Sandberg, S. 2013. Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead. 1 edition. New York: 
Knopf. 
 
Sayer, L. C. 2005. ‘Gender, Time and Inequality: Trends in Women’s and Men’s Paid 
Work, Unpaid Work and Free Time.’ Social Forces 84(1): 285–303. 
 
Sayer, L. C., P. N. Cohen and L. Casper. 2004. Women, Men, and Work: The American 
People Census 2000. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Schneider, Barbara and Linda J. Waite (eds) 2005. Being Together, Working Apart: 
Dual-Career Families and the Work-Life Balance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Siebel, J. 2011. Miss Representation. Documentary. Girls’ Club Entertainment. 
 
Slaughter, A.-M. 2012. Why Women Still Can’t Have It All. The Atlantic, August. 
 
Smith, K. E., B. Downs and M. O’Connell. 2001. Maternity Leave and Employment 
Patterns: 1961–1995. Current Population Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
 
Snyder, T. and S. Dillow. 2007. Digest of Educational Statistics. Washington, DC: 
National Center for Education Statistics. 
 
Snyder, K. A. and A. I. Green. 2008. ‘Revisiting the Glass Escalator: The Case of 




Stier, H., N. Lewin-Epstein and M. Braun. 2001. ‘Welfare Regimes, Family-Supportive 
Policies, and Women’s Employment along the Life-Course.’ American Journal 
of Sociology 106(6): 1731–1760. 
 
Stone, P. 2007a. Opting Out? Why Women Really Quit Careers and Head Home. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Stone, P. 2007b. ‘The Rhetoric and Reality of “Opting Out”.’ Contexts: Understanding 
People in Their Social Worlds 6(4): 14–19. 
 
Stone, P., and M. Lovejoy. 2004. ‘Fast-Track Women and the “Choice” to Stay Home.’ 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 596: 62–
83. 
 
Tanaka, S. and J. Waldfogel. 2007. ‘Effects of Parental Leave and Work Hours on 
Fathers’ Involvement with Their Babies.’ Community, Work & Family 10(4): 
409–426. 
 
The Scientista Foundation. http://www.scientistafoundation.com. 
 
Thébaud, Sarah. 2010. ‘Masculinity, Bargaining, and Breadwinning: Understanding 
Men’s Housework in the Cultural Context of Paid Work.’ Gender & Society 
24(3): 330–354. 
 
Thornton, A. and L. Young-DeMarco. 2001. ‘Four Decades of Trends in Attitudes 
Toward Family Issues in the United States: The 1960s Through the 1990s.’ 
Journal of Marriage & Family 63(4): 1009. 
 
Tomaskovic-Devey, D., C. Zimmer, K. Stainback, C. Robinson, T. Taylor and T. 
McTague. 2006. ‘Documenting Desegregation: Segregation in American 
Workplaces by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, 1966–2003.’ American Sociological 
Review 71(4): 565–588. 
 
Townsend, N. W. 2002. The Package Deal: Marriage, Work, and Fatherhood in Men’s 
Lives. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
 
Truss, C., K. Alfes, A. Shantz and A. Rosewarne. 2013. ‘Still in the Ghetto? 
Experiences of Secretarial Work in the 21st Century.’ Gender, Work and 
Organization 20(4): 349–363. 
 
Valentova, J., G. Rieger, J. Havlicek, J. Linsenmeier and J. Bailey. 2011. ‘Judgments of 
Sexual Orientation and Masculinity-Femininity Based on Thin Slices of 




Vogel, L. 2013. Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory. 
Chicago: Harmarket Books. 
 
West, C. and D. H. Zimmerman. 1987. ‘Doing Gender.’ Gender & Society 1(2): 125–
151. 
 
Williams, C. L. 1992. ‘The Glass Escalator: Hidden Advantages for Men in the 
“Female” Professions.’ Social Problems 39(3): 253–267. 
 
Williams, C. L. 1995. Still a Man’s World: Men Who Do “Women’s Work’. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press. 
 
Williams, J. C. 2001. Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to 
Do About It. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Williams, C. L. 2013. ‘The Glass Escalator, Revisited Gender Inequality in Neoliberal 
Times, SWS Feminist Lecturer.’ Gender & Society 27(5): 609–629. 
 
Williams, J. and R. Dempsey. 2014. What Works for Women at Work: Four Patterns 
Working Women Need to Know. 
 
Wingfield, A. H. 2009. ‘Racializing the Glass Escalator: Reconsidering Men’s 
Experiences with Women’s Work.’ Gender & Society 23(1): 5–26. 
 
Wong, C. M. 2016. ’50 Percent of Millennials Believe Gender is a Spectrum, Fusion’s 




Wooton, B. H. 1997. ‘Gender Differences in Occupational Employment.’ Monthly 
Labor Review 120(4): 15–24. 
 
Xie, Y. and K. A. Schauman. 2003. Women in Science: Career Processes and 
Outcomes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Zahidi, S. 2014. ‘What Makes the Nordic Countries Gender Equality Winners?’ 





Appendix 1: Tables for Chapter 4 
 
Table 4.01. Sample statistics for continuous variables. 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 37492 48.49 17.40 15 102
Years of Education 36536 12.63 4.21 0 30
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Table 4.02. Sample statistics for categorical variables. 
 
Sex Freq. Percent
   Male 17,100 45.50%
   Female 20,482 54.50%
   Total 37,582 100%
Marital Status
   Never married 9,134 24.54%
   Currently married 21,624 58.09%
   Post married 6,467 17.37%
   Total 37,225 100%
Work Status
   Never 3,572 9.50%
   Formerly 12,759 33.92%
   Currently 21,288 56.59%
   Total 37,619 100%
Residence Status
   Rural 11,884 31.80%
   Town 10,015 26.80%
   Suburbs 5,894 15.77%
   City 9,577 25.63%
   Total 37,370 100%
Self-Reported Health
   Poor to Fair 9,073 24.35%
   Satisfactory 13,621 36.56%
   Good to Excellent 14,560 39.08%
   Total 37,254 100%
Income Quintiles
   Lowest 6,058 22.92%
   Second Lowest 5,727 21.67%
   Middle 4,946 18.71%
   Second Highest 5,222 19.76%
   Highest 4,479 16.95%
   Total 26,432 100%
Frequency of Attendance at Religious Services
   Never 11,369 32.77%
   Few times per year or less 14,286 41.17%
   1+ times per month 3,251 9.37%
   1+ times per week 5,790 16.69%
   Total 34,696 100%
Esping-Andersen Welfare Regime Typology
   Liberal (e.g., US) 5,603 16.02%
   Conservative (e.g., Germany) 11,644 33.30%
   Social Democratic (e.g., Sweden) 3,798 10.86%
   Non-Categorized 13,922 39.82%
   Total 34,967 100.00%
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United States 1,294 3.44%
Total 37,632 100%
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Appendix 2: Tables for Chapter 5 
Table 5.01. How should mother and father divide paid leave? 
 
*Ordered by percent answering “Equal”. 
 
  
Country Mom All Mom Most Equal Dad Most Dad All Total
Sweden 1.13% 28.73% 69.76% 0.38% 0.00% 2.64%
France 13.65% 36.08% 50.07% 0.13% 0.07% 4.94%
Germany-West 16.42% 33.05% 50.00% 0.43% 0.11% 3.08%
Netherlands 11.70% 40.08% 47.57% 0.53% 0.13% 2.52%
Iceland 2.94% 49.36% 47.50% 0.20% 0.00% 3.38%
Germany-East 14.35% 38.61% 45.99% 1.05% 0.00% 1.57%
Denmark 5.29% 47.50% 45.94% 0.88% 0.39% 3.38%
Belgium-Flanders 13.51% 40.97% 45.37% 0.15% 0.00% 2.25%
Belgium-Wallonia 15.47% 40.61% 43.92% 0.00% 0.00% 1.20%
Finland 3.17% 52.84% 43.78% 0.00% 0.22% 3.03%
Norway 4.07% 52.54% 43.20% 0.19% 0.00% 3.58%
Belgium-Brussels 16.18% 41.64% 41.91% 0.00% 0.27% 1.25%
Switzerland 19.68% 41.25% 37.97% 1.09% 0.00% 3.33%
United States 32.51% 30.25% 36.68% 0.34% 0.23% 2.93%
Poland 33.40% 32.90% 33.30% 0.30% 0.10% 3.29%
Spain 33.99% 33.37% 32.31% 0.24% 0.10% 6.91%
Mexico 47.81% 15.81% 31.62% 3.73% 1.03% 2.57%
Canada 22.74% 45.66% 31.42% 0.17% 0.00% 1.91%
South Korea 22.00% 47.13% 30.46% 0.41% 0.00% 4.03%
Ireland 17.82% 53.06% 28.86% 0.13% 0.13% 2.49%
Australia 21.43% 51.76% 26.58% 0.23% 0.00% 2.83%
Chile 33.96% 41.49% 24.25% 0.30% 0.00% 4.39%
Great Britain 21.73% 54.49% 23.46% 0.16% 0.16% 2.10%
Austria 39.13% 38.90% 21.62% 0.23% 0.11% 2.89%
Israel 56.65% 22.09% 20.42% 0.84% 0.00% 3.16%
Japan 18.84% 61.66% 19.28% 0.11% 0.11% 3.02%
Slovenia 41.71% 42.86% 15.43% 0.00% 0.00% 2.59%
Latvia 60.00% 25.76% 14.12% 0.00% 0.11% 2.93%
Turkey 60.63% 26.32% 12.76% 0.15% 0.15% 4.51%
Hungary 67.92% 22.52% 9.20% 0.24% 0.12% 2.73%
Czech Republic 69.40% 21.32% 8.77% 0.45% 0.06% 5.17%
Slovakia 72.19% 19.96% 7.36% 0.39% 0.10% 3.41%
Total 30.51% 37.56% 31.40% 0.41% 0.11% 100.00%
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Table 5.02. How should mother and father divide paid leave? 
 
 




Welfare Regime Mom All Mom Most Equal Dad Most Dad All Total
Liberal 23.60% 46.39% 29.68% 0.22% 0.11% 13.29%
Conservative 18.73% 41.90% 38.91% 0.38% 0.07% 32.62%
Social Democratic 4.21% 50.93% 44.30% 0.36% 0.20% 10.83%
Non-Categorized 45.01% 30.92% 23.44% 0.49% 0.13% 43.26%
Total 29.18% 38.73% 31.58% 0.41% 0.11% 100.00%
Sex Mom All Mom Most Equal Dad Most Dad All Total
Male 32.59% 37.21% 29.54% 0.51% 0.14% 44.61%
Female 28.85% 37.83% 32.92% 0.32% 0.08% 55.39%
Total 30.52% 37.55% 31.41% 0.41% 0.11% 100.00%
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Table 5.04. What is the best care option for a young child? 
 
*Ordered by percent answering “Both part-time”. 
 
Table 5.05. What is the best care option for a young child? 
 
 




Country Mom home, Dad ft Mom pt, Dad ft Both ft Both pt Dad pt, Mom ft Dad home, Mom ft Total
Netherlands 19.75% 32.06% 2.83% 44.91% 0.27% 0.18% 3.73%
Sweden 9.81% 31.45% 16.48% 40.63% 1.38% 0.25% 2.63%
Switzerland 26.03% 40.15% 3.25% 29.79% 0.34% 0.43% 3.86%
Iceland 6.55% 45.45% 20.43% 26.78% 0.68% 0.10% 3.38%
Norway 8.93% 41.85% 26.69% 21.66% 0.78% 0.09% 3.82%
Spain 25.82% 41.81% 12.36% 19.09% 0.93% 0.00% 7.47%
Belgium-Brussels 23.08% 43.03% 14.90% 18.51% 0.48% 0.00% 1.38%
Belgium-Wallonia 18.29% 52.20% 12.20% 17.07% 0.24% 0.00% 1.36%
Germany-West 29.29% 50.74% 2.58% 16.58% 0.50% 0.30% 3.33%
Mexico 50.56% 24.07% 6.49% 16.02% 1.56% 1.30% 3.82%
Denmark 5.41% 47.54% 30.41% 15.49% 0.82% 0.33% 4.04%
France 20.53% 48.76% 15.47% 14.55% 0.46% 0.23% 5.75%
Finland 19.83% 43.58% 23.33% 12.73% 0.32% 0.21% 3.12%
Belgium-Flanders 20.72% 52.63% 14.58% 11.73% 0.33% 0.00% 3.02%
Germany-East 9.57% 49.69% 28.51% 11.41% 0.81% 0.00% 1.62%
Ireland 28.18% 52.09% 8.00% 11.05% 0.56% 0.11% 2.93%
Australia 41.18% 45.76% 2.00% 10.57% 0.33% 0.17% 3.98%
Austria 47.18% 39.09% 2.77% 10.30% 0.11% 0.55% 2.99%
Chile 33.14% 49.71% 7.51% 8.69% 0.59% 0.37% 4.49%
Canada 35.42% 39.54% 18.29% 6.10% 0.16% 0.49% 2.01%
United States 38.97% 42.58% 11.55% 5.98% 0.21% 0.72% 3.21%
Great Britain 41.71% 47.99% 4.95% 5.21% 0.00% 0.13% 2.47%
South Korea 42.62% 42.55% 9.16% 4.81% 0.70% 0.16% 4.26%
Israel 27.51% 52.61% 13.96% 4.42% 0.90% 0.60% 3.29%
Slovenia 22.79% 41.92% 30.93% 3.89% 0.11% 0.34% 2.89%
Turkey 71.68% 19.70% 4.99% 2.94% 0.14% 0.55% 4.84%
Poland 45.83% 31.60% 19.33% 2.65% 0.39% 0.20% 3.37%
Latvia 59.18% 30.35% 7.13% 2.59% 0.22% 0.54% 3.06%
Czech Republic 59.00% 28.25% 9.22% 1.99% 0.83% 0.70% 5.16%
Hungary 54.43% 33.05% 10.91% 1.40% 0.00% 0.22% 3.06%
Japan 57.77% 37.23% 3.96% 1.04% 0.00% 0.00% 3.17%
Slovakia 57.02% 29.42% 11.94% 0.86% 0.00% 0.76% 3.46%
Total 30.51% 37.56% 31.40% 0.41% 0.11% 0.00% 100.00%
Welfare Regime Mom home, Dad ft Mom pt, Dad ft Both ft Both pt Dad pt, Mom ft Dad home, Mom ft Total
Liberal 37.38% 45.85% 8.04% 8.13% 0.27% 0.32% 14.15%
Conservative 29.89% 43.80% 8.93% 16.79% 0.38% 0.20% 33.41%
Social Democratic 10.73% 44.44% 27.10% 16.85% 0.66% 0.21% 10.63%
Non-Categorized 40.80% 36.47% 12.54% 9.22% 0.55% 0.42% 41.81%
Total 33.47% 41.10% 12.25% 12.41% 0.47% 0.31% 100.00%
Sex Mom home, Dad ft Mom pt, Dad ft Both ft Both pt Dad pt, Mom ft Dad home, Mom ft Total
Male 37.39% 37.67% 12.74% 11.32% 0.51% 0.37% 45.48%
Female 31.34% 42.42% 11.79% 13.65% 0.50% 0.30% 54.52%
Total 34.09% 40.26% 12.22% 12.59% 0.51% 0.33% 100.00%
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Table 5.07. It’s the man’s job to earn money, the woman’s to keep the home. 
 






Country S. Agree Agree Neutral Disagree S. Disagree Total
Denmark 2.22% 4.44% 8.67% 11.33% 73.33% 3.90%
Sweden 1.40% 3.44% 11.51% 25.59% 58.06% 2.69%
France 3.24% 7.51% 12.76% 20.23% 56.26% 5.88%
Belgium-Wallonia 8.11% 8.78% 15.09% 22.52% 45.50% 1.28%
Norway 1.40% 3.50% 11.12% 39.11% 44.87% 3.71%
Belgium-Brussels 7.30% 10.30% 14.81% 22.75% 44.85% 1.35%
Germany-East 3.32% 6.27% 10.70% 35.24% 44.46% 1.57%
Iceland 0.81% 5.69% 8.57% 43.14% 41.79% 3.20%
Japan 7.37% 16.67% 24.49% 12.98% 38.49% 3.14%
Finland 2.10% 6.75% 15.05% 38.59% 37.50% 3.17%
Canada 1.89% 9.19% 16.25% 37.28% 35.39% 2.29%
Germany-West 8.77% 11.23% 11.32% 35.79% 32.89% 3.29%
Ireland 3.68% 7.92% 14.33% 41.85% 32.23% 3.06%
Netherlands 2.83% 9.48% 19.20% 37.07% 31.42% 3.47%
Belgium-Flanders 4.84% 11.71% 19.17% 35.52% 28.76% 2.86%
Australia 2.82% 12.92% 19.59% 37.39% 27.29% 4.20%
Slovenia 2.73% 18.20% 18.60% 36.30% 24.17% 2.86%
Switzerland 5.19% 19.60% 15.73% 37.73% 21.75% 3.51%
Israel 5.76% 15.56% 17.81% 39.30% 21.58% 3.21%
Great Britain 3.41% 11.32% 21.87% 42.31% 21.10% 2.63%
Austria 11.04% 23.28% 24.28% 20.80% 20.60% 0.00%
United States 4.96% 17.65% 17.57% 42.00% 17.81% 3.67%
South Korea 14.32% 24.20% 18.52% 27.63% 15.33% 3.71%
Turkey 22.34% 21.25% 21.46% 23.43% 11.51% 4.24%
Czech Republic 18.85% 28.78% 24.05% 18.09% 10.22% 4.89%
Chile 5.40% 25.00% 24.43% 36.86% 8.31% 4.07%
Mexico 18.58% 29.65% 14.02% 29.98% 7.77% 3.42%
Poland 16.05% 29.06% 16.05% 31.83% 7.01% 3.13%
Hungary 17.46% 26.29% 32.39% 17.35% 6.52% 2.75%
Slovakia 22.99% 30.95% 26.79% 13.76% 5.52% 3.19%
Latvia 23.66% 29.21% 23.56% 20.10% 3.46% 2.76%
Total 8.41% 16.13% 17.84% 29.89% 27.74% 100.00%
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Table 5.08. It’s the man’s job to earn money, the woman’s to keep the home. 
 
 








Welfare Regime S. Agree Agree Neutral Disagree S. Disagree Total
Liberal 3.44% 12.24% 18.00% 40.12% 26.20% 17.15%
Conservative 6.78% 13.98% 17.02% 27.85% 34.36% 35.67%
Social Democratic 1.90% 4.80% 11.39% 28.91% 53.00% 11.66%
Non-Categorized 13.59% 23.03% 20.28% 29.44% 13.66% 35.51%
Total 8.06% 15.83% 17.69% 30.64% 27.78% 100.00%
Sex S. Agree Agree Neutral Disagree S. Disagree Total
Male 9.27% 18.24% 19.02% 30.46% 23.01% 45.23%
Female 7.71% 14.39% 16.85% 29.39% 31.66% 54.77%
Total 8.41% 16.13% 17.83% 29.88% 27.75% 100.00%
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Table 5.10. What a woman really wants is a family and children. 
 
*Ordered by percent answering “Strongly disagree”. 
  
Country S. Agree Agree Neutral Disagree S. Disagree Total
Denmark 5.12% 11.86% 15.43% 23.10% 44.50% 3.86%
Germany-East 4.21% 12.43% 13.19% 31.93% 38.24% 1.56%
Sweden 3.76% 15.53% 25.53% 23.53% 31.65% 2.54%
Netherlands 1.29% 14.04% 18.69% 37.12% 28.85% 3.47%
Belgium-Brussels 11.31% 18.55% 22.40% 20.81% 26.92% 1.32%
Germany-West 7.27% 17.09% 12.64% 36.09% 26.91% 3.29%
Norway 2.07% 12.84% 20.38% 38.36% 26.35% 3.61%
France 10.35% 23.10% 21.72% 20.60% 24.22% 5.86%
Canada 3.35% 13.92% 27.96% 32.99% 21.78% 2.32%
Iceland 2.76% 21.14% 21.42% 33.09% 21.60% 3.25%
Ireland 4.91% 19.92% 21.75% 32.34% 21.08% 3.11%
Belgium-Wallonia 14.08% 22.77% 20.66% 21.83% 20.66% 1.27%
Japan 15.17% 18.26% 33.14% 13.33% 20.10% 3.10%
Austria 9.09% 22.83% 23.68% 24.42% 19.98% 2.83%
Belgium-Flanders 5.71% 18.53% 24.89% 33.19% 17.67% 2.78%
Finland 5.53% 25.63% 23.42% 28.74% 16.68% 2.98%
Australia 5.58% 21.14% 24.91% 32.17% 16.19% 4.29%
Great Britain 5.36% 23.55% 25.89% 31.81% 13.39% 2.68%
South Korea 18.95% 24.41% 19.89% 24.73% 12.01% 3.83%
Slovenia 7.06% 33.09% 23.92% 25.92% 10.01% 2.84%
United States 6.68% 29.32% 24.27% 29.97% 9.77% 3.67%
Switzerland 7.08% 27.83% 23.58% 32.92% 8.58% 3.59%
Israel 11.91% 29.17% 26.83% 25.70% 6.38% 3.19%
Czech Republic 17.54% 31.07% 32.37% 13.09% 5.93% 4.84%
Poland 10.12% 31.71% 19.46% 33.66% 5.06% 3.07%
Hungary 21.75% 33.48% 31.24% 9.38% 4.16% 2.81%
Latvia 16.88% 33.65% 25.32% 20.30% 3.85% 2.80%
Mexico 21.25% 35.24% 15.02% 24.91% 3.58% 3.50%
Turkey 32.99% 31.41% 19.89% 12.28% 3.43% 4.36%
Slovakia 24.32% 38.63% 28.06% 7.48% 1.50% 3.20%
Chile 6.87% 42.88% 29.85% 19.11% 1.29% 4.18%
Total 10.70% 24.98% 23.27% 25.30% 15.75% 100.00%
129 
Table 5.11. What a woman really wants is a family and children. 
 
 
Table 5.12. What a woman really wants is a family and children. 
 
  
Welfare Regime S. Agree Agree Neutral Disagree S. Disagree Total
Liberal 5.34% 22.13% 24.76% 31.76% 16.01% 17.35%
Conservative 9.58% 20.65% 21.57% 27.02% 21.18% 35.53%
Social Democratic 4.18% 16.12% 19.42% 29.98% 30.30% 11.28%
Non-Categorized 16.00% 33.27% 23.95% 20.92% 5.86% 35.85%
Total 10.54% 24.92% 22.74% 25.99% 15.82% 100.00%
Sex S. Agree Agree Neutral Disagree S. Disagree Total
Male 10.39% 26.68% 25.51% 24.33% 13.09% 44.47%
Female 10.96% 23.61% 21.50% 26.04% 17.88% 55.53%
Total 10.71% 24.98% 23.28% 25.28% 15.75% 100.00%
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Table 5.13. Division of household work: doing the laundry. 
 
*Ordered by percent answering “Equal”. 
  
Country All Wife Us. Wife Equal Us. Husb All Husb Total
United States 35.31% 27.79% 27.35% 5.35% 4.20% 2.82%
Belgium-Brussels 50.97% 20.62% 21.40% 3.50% 3.50% 1.05%
Denmark 40.84% 31.73% 20.69% 4.50% 2.25% 3.81%
Canada 39.35% 31.62% 20.62% 5.50% 2.92% 2.38%
Sweden 34.86% 35.62% 20.40% 5.94% 3.20% 2.68%
Australia 38.55% 34.45% 18.42% 6.20% 2.39% 4.28%
Spain 55.30% 22.09% 17.70% 2.39% 2.52% 6.33%
Finland 35.68% 42.20% 17.14% 3.84% 1.15% 3.20%
Iceland 36.23% 38.50% 17.11% 6.28% 1.87% 3.06%
Norway 36.92% 39.34% 17.03% 4.62% 2.09% 3.72%
Ireland 43.50% 32.76% 16.84% 4.91% 1.99% 3.08%
Mexico 39.55% 31.00% 16.83% 3.09% 9.54% 2.91%
Israel 56.30% 19.16% 16.40% 3.54% 4.59% 3.11%
Turkey 55.54% 20.98% 16.10% 3.48% 3.90% 5.86%
Chile 59.22% 19.00% 15.95% 3.61% 2.22% 2.95%
Switzerland 56.43% 23.99% 15.42% 1.71% 2.45% 3.34%
Latvia 41.62% 36.99% 14.84% 4.05% 2.50% 2.12%
France 63.86% 18.00% 13.68% 2.48% 1.98% 5.77%
Netherlands 53.37% 27.75% 12.70% 2.58% 3.60% 3.64%
Germany-West 55.33% 27.25% 12.45% 3.04% 1.94% 2.95%
Germany-East 55.11% 29.55% 12.22% 1.42% 1.70% 1.44%
Austria 29.30% 16.89% 11.59% 12.91% 29.30% 2.47%
South Korea 56.94% 25.35% 10.91% 3.82% 2.97% 2.88%
Hungary 63.07% 19.56% 10.78% 2.59% 3.99% 2.05%
Belgium-Flanders 59.89% 25.69% 10.71% 2.34% 1.37% 2.97%
Slovenia 62.26% 25.79% 10.06% 0.16% 1.73% 2.60%
Poland 71.49% 17.11% 9.94% 1.02% 0.44% 2.80%
Belgium-Wallonia 70.77% 14.44% 9.86% 1.06% 3.87% 1.16%
Japan 64.11% 21.56% 7.81% 3.62% 2.89% 2.82%
Slovakia 58.38% 33.52% 5.73% 1.12% 1.26% 2.93%
Czech Republic 71.27% 21.04% 3.75% 1.28% 2.65% 4.47%
Total 51.33% 26.88% 14.80% 3.57% 3.43% 100.00%
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Table 5.14. Division of household work: doing the laundry. 
 
 
Table 5.15. Division of household work: doing the laundry. 
 
  
Welfare Regime All Wife Us. Wife Equal Us. Husb All Husb Total
Liberal 39.41% 32.16% 20.27% 5.18% 2.99% 16.07%
Conservative 56.56% 22.90% 12.42% 3.46% 4.66% 32.84%
Social Democratic 37.94% 37.49% 18.36% 4.34% 1.87% 11.55%
Non-Categorized 54.51% 25.00% 14.44% 2.88% 3.16% 39.53%
Total 50.84% 26.90% 15.17% 3.61% 3.48% 100.00%
Sex All Wife Us. Wife Equal Us. Husb All Husb Total
Male 42.23% 31.66% 16.59% 4.53% 4.98% 47.48%
Female 59.55% 22.55% 13.17% 2.70% 2.03% 52.52%
Total 51.33% 26.88% 14.80% 3.57% 3.43% 100.00%
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Table 5.16. Division of household work: care for sick family members. 
 
*Ordered by percent answering “Equal”.  
Country All Wife Us. Wife Equal Us. Husb All Husb Total
Sweden 7.89% 28.85% 58.24% 3.05% 1.97% 2.63%
Slovenia 15.21% 24.52% 58.17% 1.33% 0.76% 2.48%
Finland 8.78% 29.93% 57.41% 3.17% 0.72% 3.28%
Norway 9.47% 30.00% 57.11% 2.37% 1.05% 3.59%
Denmark 10.19% 28.55% 56.48% 2.77% 2.01% 3.75%
Spain 23.30% 16.08% 56.47% 2.25% 1.91% 6.93%
Iceland 9.09% 33.62% 54.69% 1.88% 0.72% 3.27%
Poland 24.28% 17.88% 54.53% 1.32% 1.99% 2.14%
Belgium-Brussels 21.40% 15.72% 54.15% 3.93% 4.80% 1.08%
Germany-East 16.91% 27.21% 50.37% 1.47% 4.04% 1.28%
Israel 21.41% 21.27% 49.58% 4.65% 3.10% 3.35%
Latvia 16.67% 31.08% 47.97% 2.48% 1.80% 2.10%
France 26.47% 23.05% 45.57% 2.45% 2.45% 5.38%
Belgium-Wallonia 31.02% 19.18% 45.31% 1.22% 3.27% 1.16%
Canada 12.42% 36.25% 45.21% 4.68% 1.43% 2.32%
Ireland 21.61% 28.61% 44.90% 3.35% 1.52% 3.10%
United States 23.11% 25.41% 44.75% 3.61% 3.11% 2.88%
Belgium-Flanders 20.03% 31.20% 44.01% 2.63% 2.13% 2.87%
Netherlands 17.44% 33.79% 43.60% 2.45% 2.72% 3.46%
Austria 19.38% 35.46% 41.24% 3.09% 0.82% 2.29%
Switzerland 25.64% 28.37% 41.12% 2.29% 2.58% 3.29%
Germany-West 20.72% 34.84% 39.74% 2.45% 2.26% 2.51%
Hungary 30.41% 25.12% 38.71% 3.69% 2.07% 2.05%
Turkey 30.39% 21.71% 38.16% 5.48% 4.27% 6.20%
Mexico 25.66% 24.20% 38.05% 4.81% 7.29% 3.24%
Australia 19.06% 39.51% 36.51% 3.10% 1.82% 4.41%
Slovakia 18.59% 41.78% 35.33% 2.46% 1.84% 3.07%
South Korea 32.18% 27.16% 33.75% 4.24% 2.67% 3.01%
Czech Republic 26.10% 37.89% 29.96% 4.59% 1.46% 4.52%
Chile 45.74% 19.38% 28.68% 2.48% 3.72% 3.04%
Japan 36.61% 32.98% 22.09% 5.45% 2.87% 3.12%
Total 21.80% 28.03% 44.57% 3.17% 2.43% 100.00%
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Table 5.17. Division of household work: care for sick family members. 
 
 
Table 5.18. Division of household work: care for sick family members. 
 
  
Welfare Regime All Wife Us. Wife Equal Us. Husb All Husb Total
Liberal 19.46% 32.39% 42.45% 3.39% 2.31% 16.07%
Conservative 24.88% 28.90% 40.68% 2.96% 2.58% 31.72%
Social Democratic 9.51% 29.47% 56.98% 2.76% 1.29% 11.44%
Non-Categorized 24.23% 23.99% 45.76% 3.19% 2.83% 40.78%
Total 21.99% 27.53% 44.90% 3.10% 2.49% 100.00%
Sex All Wife Us. Wife Equal Us. Husb All Husb Total
Male 14.03% 27.13% 51.24% 3.94% 3.66% 47.16%
Female 28.74% 28.83% 38.63% 2.47% 1.33% 52.84%
Total 21.80% 28.03% 44.57% 3.17% 2.43% 100.00%
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Table 5.19. Division of household work: household cleaning. 
 
*Ordered by percent answering “Equal”.  
Country All Wife Us. Wife Equal Us. Husb All Husb Total
Finland 14.52% 38.56% 40.87% 5.14% 0.90% 3.17%
Sweden 12.80% 38.41% 39.18% 7.01% 2.59% 2.68%
Belgium-Flanders 28.51% 28.51% 38.71% 3.17% 1.10% 2.96%
Denmark 15.47% 38.78% 38.45% 5.69% 1.61% 3.80%
Iceland 13.92% 41.77% 38.42% 5.49% 0.40% 3.05%
Canada 15.05% 40.31% 36.85% 6.40% 1.38% 2.36%
Netherlands 25.20% 32.73% 36.45% 2.70% 2.92% 3.63%
Belgium-Brussels 29.57% 26.07% 35.80% 2.33% 6.23% 1.05%
Israel 37.30% 22.12% 34.69% 3.80% 2.09% 3.12%
Germany-East 22.91% 38.81% 33.96% 1.89% 2.43% 1.51%
United States 28.47% 30.49% 33.82% 4.05% 3.18% 2.82%
Norway 15.29% 43.67% 33.44% 5.94% 1.65% 3.71%
Spain 35.14% 27.60% 32.62% 2.90% 1.74% 6.32%
Germany-West 29.00% 35.50% 31.60% 2.60% 1.30% 3.14%
Australia 25.84% 36.84% 31.39% 4.78% 1.15% 4.26%
Ireland 26.26% 37.53% 30.77% 4.24% 1.19% 3.07%
Austria 24.17% 42.67% 29.50% 2.50% 1.17% 2.45%
Belgium-Wallonia 38.95% 23.51% 28.77% 4.91% 3.86% 1.16%
France 36.08% 31.32% 28.69% 2.49% 1.42% 5.74%
Slovenia 33.96% 35.53% 27.83% 1.57% 1.10% 2.59%
Poland 41.19% 27.95% 27.22% 2.91% 0.73% 2.80%
Switzerland 32.92% 35.87% 27.15% 2.46% 1.60% 3.32%
Chile 46.67% 21.11% 26.11% 3.75% 2.36% 2.94%
Mexico 35.25% 28.09% 25.28% 2.39% 8.99% 2.90%
Hungary 43.71% 27.74% 22.95% 2.99% 2.59% 2.04%
Latvia 31.73% 40.96% 22.50% 3.27% 1.54% 2.12%
South Korea 40.65% 29.60% 20.82% 6.52% 2.41% 2.88%
Slovakia 28.35% 50.28% 18.99% 1.54% 0.84% 2.92%
Czech Republic 35.66% 41.29% 18.06% 3.27% 1.72% 4.49%
Turkey 50.84% 25.77% 16.41% 3.35% 3.63% 5.84%
Japan 47.91% 31.31% 14.43% 4.76% 1.59% 2.83%
Total 30.84% 33.87% 29.43% 3.76% 2.11% 100.00%
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Table 5.20. Division of household work: household cleaning. 
 
 
Table 5.21. Division of household work: household cleaning. 
 
  
Welfare Regime All Wife Us. Wife Equal Us. Husb All Husb Total
Liberal 24.43% 36.12% 32.67% 4.64% 2.14% 16.00%
Conservative 32.80% 32.77% 29.22% 3.23% 1.97% 33.02%
Social Democratic 15.13% 40.41% 37.43% 5.61% 1.41% 11.50%
Non-Categorized 37.11% 30.71% 26.63% 3.12% 2.43% 39.47%
Total 31.13% 33.38% 29.69% 3.69% 2.11% 100.00%
Sex All Wife Us. Wife Equal Us. Husb All Husb Total
Male 22.56% 36.08% 33.16% 4.89% 3.31% 47.60%
Female 38.37% 31.85% 26.03% 2.72% 1.02% 52.40%
Total 30.84% 33.87% 29.43% 3.76% 2.11% 100.00%
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Table 5.22. Division of household work: preparing meals. 
 
*Ordered by percent answering “Equal”. 
  
Country All Wife Us. Wife Equal Us. Husb All Husb Total
Norway 13.96% 37.47% 33.96% 12.64% 1.98% 3.71%
United States 29.52% 28.80% 29.23% 7.96% 4.49% 2.82%
Denmark 17.58% 32.48% 28.72% 15.65% 5.57% 3.80%
Sweden 17.66% 36.07% 28.61% 13.24% 4.41% 2.68%
Iceland 15.80% 39.76% 27.31% 14.06% 3.08% 3.05%
Australia 25.82% 35.12% 27.06% 8.83% 3.17% 4.25%
Finland 17.59% 43.26% 25.80% 11.30% 2.05% 3.18%
Canada 18.79% 41.55% 25.69% 11.21% 2.76% 2.36%
Belgium-Flanders 31.51% 30.27% 25.62% 8.49% 4.11% 2.98%
Switzerland 29.53% 34.44% 25.37% 7.72% 2.94% 3.33%
Netherlands 27.28% 32.58% 25.37% 9.36% 5.41% 3.62%
Spain 40.94% 24.37% 23.79% 6.06% 4.84% 6.32%
Germany-East 33.15% 32.08% 23.45% 7.82% 3.50% 1.51%
France 37.07% 26.79% 23.25% 8.65% 4.25% 5.75%
Ireland 26.92% 36.74% 23.21% 9.02% 4.11% 3.07%
Belgium-Wallonia 43.86% 22.46% 22.46% 5.96% 5.26% 1.16%
Slovenia 37.64% 34.80% 22.36% 2.36% 2.83% 2.59%
Germany-West 37.86% 32.25% 22.19% 4.44% 3.26% 3.12%
Poland 47.74% 25.91% 21.54% 3.64% 1.16% 2.80%
Austria 34.89% 38.90% 21.20% 3.17% 1.84% 2.44%
Latvia 32.69% 38.85% 21.15% 5.58% 1.73% 2.12%
Belgium-Brussels 39.69% 26.07% 19.84% 9.73% 4.67% 1.05%
Hungary 48.50% 25.15% 19.56% 3.79% 2.99% 2.04%
Israel 48.16% 24.54% 18.90% 5.25% 3.15% 3.11%
Mexico 38.54% 29.82% 18.42% 4.08% 9.14% 2.90%
Turkey 52.86% 23.32% 16.62% 3.35% 3.84% 5.84%
Chile 56.94% 20.00% 16.53% 4.03% 2.50% 2.94%
Slovakia 38.41% 44.69% 14.25% 1.54% 1.12% 2.92%
Czech Republic 42.03% 37.77% 13.77% 4.08% 2.36% 4.50%
South Korea 54.96% 30.17% 10.62% 2.55% 1.70% 2.88%
Japan 59.68% 28.32% 8.96% 1.73% 1.30% 2.82%
Total 35.22% 31.89% 22.26% 7.11% 3.51% 100.00%
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Table 5.23. Division of household work: preparing meals. 
 
 
Table 5.24. Division of household work: preparing meals. 
 
  
Welfare Regime All Wife Us. Wife Equal Us. Husb All Husb Total
Liberal 25.49% 35.16% 26.17% 9.23% 3.95% 15.99%
Conservative 38.38% 30.69% 21.05% 6.44% 3.44% 33.03%
Social Democratic 16.32% 37.41% 29.67% 13.31% 3.28% 11.52%
Non-Categorized 42.48% 28.94% 20.10% 4.94% 3.54% 39.46%
Total 35.40% 31.49% 22.49% 7.09% 3.54% 100.00%
Sex All Wife Us. Wife Equal Us. Husb All Husb Total
Male 27.44% 34.55% 24.04% 8.74% 5.23% 47.59%
Female 42.28% 29.48% 20.64% 5.64% 1.96% 52.41%
Total 35.22% 31.89% 22.26% 7.11% 3.51% 100.00%
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Table 5.25. Should women work: youngest child under school age. 
 
*Ordered by percent answering “Work full-time”. 
  
Country Stay home Work pt Work ft Total
Denmark 5.50% 56.03% 38.47% 3.62%
Iceland 7.11% 59.09% 33.81% 2.92%
Norway 11.56% 54.93% 33.50% 3.49%
Slovenia 18.75% 48.20% 33.05% 2.80%
Germany-East 6.83% 60.24% 32.93% 1.48%
Finland 16.77% 50.42% 32.81% 2.85%
Sweden 11.29% 61.72% 26.99% 2.42%
Belgium-Flanders 21.04% 56.33% 22.62% 2.62%
Slovakia 36.35% 41.97% 21.67% 3.01%
Belgium-Brussels 26.75% 51.81% 21.45% 1.23%
Canada 34.84% 46.72% 18.44% 1.90%
Israel 8.75% 73.66% 17.59% 3.05%
United States 34.01% 48.78% 17.21% 2.91%
Hungary 34.86% 48.46% 16.68% 2.79%
Czech Republic 40.10% 44.12% 15.78% 4.72%
Belgium-Wallonia 25.66% 58.75% 15.59% 1.24%
France 25.54% 59.92% 14.54% 5.37%
Spain 26.26% 59.61% 14.13% 6.65%
Poland 59.00% 27.63% 13.37% 3.02%
Ireland 30.57% 56.25% 13.18% 2.61%
Latvia 42.99% 46.58% 10.43% 2.82%
South Korea 45.78% 44.42% 9.80% 3.69%
Turkey 57.05% 33.68% 9.26% 4.23%
Mexico 39.07% 52.96% 7.97% 3.46%
Great Britain 41.54% 52.18% 6.28% 2.31%
Chile 32.91% 60.81% 6.28% 4.16%
Japan 68.51% 25.40% 6.09% 2.58%
Netherlands 28.67% 65.28% 6.04% 3.29%
Germany-West 26.24% 68.98% 4.77% 2.86%
Switzerland 24.72% 71.51% 3.76% 3.47%
Australia 44.35% 51.99% 3.66% 3.65%
Austria 53.88% 44.42% 1.70% 2.79%
Total 31.40% 52.75% 15.85% 100.00%
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Table 5.26. Should women work: youngest child under school age. 
 
 
Table 5.27. Should women work: youngest child under school age. 
  
Welfare Regime Stay home Work pt Work ft Total
Liberal 37.58% 51.41% 11.01% 14.42%
Conservative 33.26% 55.80% 10.94% 32.97%
Social Democratic 10.85% 54.04% 35.11% 10.72%
Non-Categorized 33.25% 50.98% 15.77% 41.90%
Total 31.48% 52.96% 15.56% 100.00%
Sex Stay home Work pt Work ft Total
Male 35.27% 48.85% 15.88% 45.24%
Female 28.20% 55.96% 15.84% 54.76%
Total 31.39% 52.74% 15.86% 100.00%
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Table 5.28. Should women work: youngest child in school. 
 
*Ordered by percent answering “Work full-time”. 
  
Country Stay home Work pt Work ft Total
Slovenia 2.93% 18.93% 78.14% 2.84%
Denmark 0.41% 27.93% 71.66% 3.62%
Norway 1.36% 30.96% 67.68% 3.50%
Finland 2.52% 34.61% 62.88% 2.95%
Slovakia 9.69% 31.88% 58.43% 3.06%
Iceland 1.91% 39.92% 58.17% 2.96%
Sweden 1.10% 43.41% 55.49% 2.43%
Poland 13.99% 31.20% 54.81% 3.05%
United States 4.58% 40.70% 54.72% 3.05%
Canada 4.23% 41.63% 54.15% 1.90%
Spain 4.56% 41.36% 54.07% 6.70%
Germany-East 2.65% 43.67% 53.67% 1.45%
France 1.80% 44.97% 53.23% 5.28%
Belgium-Flanders 3.12% 44.28% 52.60% 2.57%
Israel 3.31% 44.74% 51.95% 3.04%
Belgium-Brussels 2.70% 50.37% 46.93% 1.21%
Latvia 7.40% 46.89% 45.71% 2.76%
Hungary 11.38% 47.13% 41.49% 2.79%
Czech Republic 12.95% 45.99% 41.05% 4.74%
Ireland 2.29% 59.63% 38.07% 2.59%
Belgium-Wallonia 1.94% 61.50% 36.56% 1.22%
South Korea 13.92% 53.80% 32.28% 3.67%
Great Britain 2.44% 66.75% 30.81% 2.31%
Australia 1.69% 72.43% 25.88% 3.69%
Austria 12.95% 62.24% 24.81% 2.70%
Turkey 39.50% 39.78% 20.73% 4.24%
Netherlands 3.45% 76.02% 20.53% 3.27%
Chile 16.44% 63.40% 20.16% 4.15%
Germany-West 6.99% 74.24% 18.77% 2.84%
Japan 17.85% 64.89% 17.26% 2.51%
Mexico 29.85% 57.57% 12.57% 3.47%
Switzerland 7.96% 80.41% 11.63% 3.47%
Total 8.52% 49.00% 42.47% 100.00%
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Table 5.29. Should women work: youngest child in school. 
 
 
Table 5.30. Should women work: youngest child in school. 
 
  
Welfare Regime Stay home Work pt Work ft Total
Liberal 2.94% 57.55% 39.51% 14.57%
Conservative 7.17% 60.20% 32.63% 32.52%
Social Democratic 1.36% 30.94% 67.71% 10.84%
Non-Categorized 13.27% 42.76% 43.97% 42.07%
Total 8.49% 49.31% 42.21% 100.00%
Sex Stay home Work pt Work ft Total
Male 10.06% 46.94% 43.00% 45.14%
Female 7.26% 50.66% 42.08% 54.86%
Total 8.53% 48.98% 42.49% 100.00%
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Table 5.31. Working mom: preschool child is likely to suffer if mom has full time 
job. 
 
*Ordered by percent answering “Strongly disagree”.  
Country S. Agree Agree Neutral Disagree S. Disagree Total
Denmark 5.00% 16.95% 10.75% 16.73% 50.56% 3.91%
Germany-East 5.90% 11.44% 11.07% 29.34% 42.25% 1.58%
Sweden 2.43% 11.59% 21.19% 27.48% 37.31% 2.65%
Japan 4.16% 16.75% 30.40% 14.23% 34.46% 3.02%
France 9.54% 22.87% 18.42% 21.07% 28.11% 5.85%
Norway 1.27% 13.16% 15.86% 41.95% 27.76% 3.68%
Finland 4.17% 16.76% 12.96% 38.52% 27.59% 3.16%
Belgium-Wallonia 10.05% 18.69% 19.16% 25.47% 26.64% 1.25%
Iceland 1.18% 11.92% 15.74% 47.68% 23.48% 3.21%
Belgium-Brussels 15.37% 20.49% 17.37% 23.61% 23.16% 1.31%
Czech Republic 10.02% 22.40% 22.83% 24.15% 20.59% 4.84%
Canada 4.92% 21.97% 18.81% 33.84% 20.45% 2.31%
Slovakia 10.73% 22.39% 21.18% 27.33% 18.38% 3.13%
Germany-West 11.41% 26.61% 11.58% 32.36% 18.04% 3.30%
Ireland 4.65% 20.51% 16.90% 40.65% 17.28% 3.08%
Netherlands 4.88% 23.40% 19.61% 35.86% 16.25% 3.47%
Belgium-Flanders 4.80% 22.73% 26.17% 31.49% 14.81% 2.80%
Australia 4.70% 25.64% 18.80% 36.70% 14.17% 4.23%
Slovenia 3.78% 26.89% 20.14% 36.20% 12.99% 2.86%
Great Britain 3.95% 26.54% 22.48% 35.53% 11.51% 2.66%
Switzerland 7.24% 35.44% 18.30% 29.87% 9.15% 3.51%
Austria 19.56% 38.52% 15.35% 18.15% 8.43% 2.91%
Hungary 22.32% 28.42% 22.32% 19.47% 7.47% 2.78%
Israel 8.00% 39.39% 19.06% 27.70% 5.85% 3.25%
Poland 10.02% 36.33% 14.33% 33.61% 5.71% 3.12%
South Korea 22.99% 46.14% 14.81% 11.46% 4.60% 3.75%
Turkey 23.19% 35.57% 18.26% 18.60% 4.38% 4.27%
Latvia 19.35% 39.64% 15.59% 21.44% 3.97% 2.79%
Mexico 26.94% 43.67% 10.81% 15.37% 3.21% 3.46%
Chile 12.25% 55.74% 15.79% 14.59% 1.63% 4.13%
United States 6.74% 27.43% 50.47% 15.36% 0.00% 3.73%
Total 9.85% 27.46% 19.06% 26.81% 16.82% 100.00%
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Welfare Regime S. Agree Agree Neutral DisagreeS. Disagree Total
Liberal 5.07% 24.69% 26.42% 31.88% 11.93% 17.30%
Conservative 10.59% 27.32% 18.56% 24.29% 19.24% 35.41%
Social Democratic 3.48% 15.60% 13.15% 31.77% 36.01% 11.62%
Non-Categorized 14.07% 34.83% 17.19% 25.57% 8.34% 35.66%
Total 10.05% 28.18% 18.80% 26.93% 16.04% 100.00%
Sex S. Agree Agree Neutral DisagreeS. Disagree Total
Male 10.31% 30.03% 19.72% 26.19% 13.75% 45.09%
Female 9.48% 25.36% 18.51% 27.30% 19.36% 54.91%
Total 9.85% 27.46% 19.06% 26.80% 16.83% 100.00%
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Table 5.34. Working mom: family life is likely to suffer if mom has full time job. 
 
*Ordered by percent answering “Strongly disagree”.  
Country S. Agree Agree Neutral Disagree S. Disagree Total
Denmark 5.51% 12.72% 8.63% 14.21% 58.93% 3.92%
Germany-East 4.61% 12.73% 11.44% 31.37% 39.85% 1.58%
Finland 2.77% 10.81% 12.01% 34.75% 39.65% 3.16%
Sweden 2.51% 13.43% 16.38% 28.49% 39.19% 2.67%
Japan 6.92% 18.96% 29.76% 14.79% 29.57% 3.08%
France 11.25% 21.65% 17.72% 22.35% 27.03% 5.86%
Belgium-Brussels 12.86% 22.62% 14.86% 22.84% 26.83% 1.32%
Iceland 2.08% 14.66% 16.11% 41.45% 25.70% 3.22%
Canada 3.82% 21.12% 15.78% 34.22% 25.06% 2.29%
Norway 1.99% 18.20% 18.92% 37.84% 23.05% 3.67%
Belgium-Wallonia 11.63% 24.42% 20.23% 22.09% 21.63% 1.25%
Germany-West 13.62% 25.02% 13.00% 27.32% 21.04% 3.30%
United States 5.78% 22.63% 11.79% 40.03% 19.78% 3.69%
Czech Republic 9.84% 21.73% 26.55% 22.15% 19.73% 4.83%
Ireland 6.93% 27.35% 13.11% 33.71% 18.90% 3.07%
Australia 6.69% 29.31% 16.90% 30.41% 16.69% 4.23%
Belgium-Flanders 5.85% 27.17% 20.90% 29.99% 16.09% 2.79%
Netherlands 5.99% 28.12% 20.05% 29.95% 15.89% 3.51%
Slovakia 12.90% 25.16% 22.69% 24.61% 14.64% 3.19%
Great Britain 4.50% 24.92% 24.15% 32.60% 13.83% 2.66%
Slovenia 5.13% 33.95% 21.64% 28.92% 10.36% 2.84%
Austria 18.31% 36.82% 16.12% 19.00% 9.75% 2.93%
Turkey 17.98% 25.29% 23.44% 23.79% 9.50% 4.27%
Hungary 18.32% 26.74% 26.74% 19.05% 9.16% 2.77%
Poland 7.34% 29.63% 14.11% 40.64% 8.28% 3.10%
Switzerland 10.61% 36.98% 16.75% 27.45% 8.21% 3.52%
Israel 9.03% 32.43% 26.47% 25.29% 6.78% 3.23%
Latvia 19.33% 32.71% 19.54% 22.99% 5.43% 2.79%
South Korea 19.78% 42.76% 16.36% 15.81% 5.30% 3.74%
Mexico 27.93% 43.38% 11.04% 14.18% 3.48% 3.44%
Chile 10.67% 56.26% 20.77% 11.31% 1.00% 4.10%
Total 9.92% 26.92% 18.33% 26.21% 18.62% 100.00%
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Table 5.35. Working mom: family life is likely to suffer if mom has full time job. 
 
 
Table 5.36. Working mom: family life is likely to suffer if mom has full time job. 
 
  
Welfare Regime S. Agree Agree Neutral DisagreeS. Disagree Total
Liberal 5.75% 25.48% 16.03% 34.19% 18.56% 17.23%
Conservative 11.36% 28.01% 18.17% 23.55% 18.92% 35.54%
Social Democratic 3.50% 14.03% 13.14% 28.31% 41.02% 11.62%
Non-Categorized 13.22% 32.58% 20.24% 24.75% 9.21% 35.62%
Total 10.14% 27.58% 17.95% 26.36% 17.97% 100.00%
Sex S. Agree Agree Neutral DisagreeS. Disagree Total
Male 9.75% 27.60% 19.14% 26.74% 16.77% 45.18%
Female 10.07% 26.35% 17.68% 25.76% 20.15% 54.82%
Total 9.92% 26.91% 18.34% 26.20% 18.62% 100.00%
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(Mean out of 5)
Best Child 
Care Option 
(Mean out of 6)
Breadwinner-
Homemaker 
(Mean out of 5)
Women Really 
Want Family 
(Mean out of 5)
Liberal 2.07 3.73 1.89 3.31
Conservative 2.11 3.69 2.15 3.3
Social Democratic 2.41 4.26 2.53 3.66
Non-Categorized 1.79 3.07 1.94 2.67
Reproductive Labor Category
Welfare Regime Chores: Laundry 
(Mean out of 5)
Chores: 
Sick Care
(Mean out of 5)
Chores: 
Clean House
(Mean out of 5)
Chores: 
Cook Meals 
(Mean out of 5)
Liberal 2.00 2.37 2.24 2.31
Conservative 1.77 2.29 2.09 2.06
Social Democratic 1.95 2.57 2.38 2.50





(Mean out of 3)
Wom Work: 
School Child 
(Mean out of 3)
Wom Work: Child 
Suffers 
(Mean out of 5)
Wom Work: 
Family Suffers
(Mean out of 5)
Liberal 2.37 1.73 3.21 3.34
Conservative 2.25 1.78 3.14 3.11
Social Democratic 2.66 2.24 3.81 3.89
Non-Categorized 2.31 1.83 2.79 2.84
Note: Higher scores correspond with more progressive attitudes.
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Appendix 3: Tables for Chapter 6 
Table 6.01. Results of confirmatory factor analyses for three latent measures. 
 
DGCL = De-gendered conception of labor 
GERL = Gender equality in reproductive labor 
GEPL = Gender equality in productive labor  
Factor Eigenvalue Prop. Explained
DGCL 1.25 1.33
Variables Loading Alpha
   Q1.1 0.47 0.66
   Q1.2 0.55 0.62
   Q1.3 0.63 0.54
   Q1.4 0.57 0.59
Factor Eigenvalue Prop. Explained
GERL 1.73 1.27
Variables Loading Alpha
   Q2.1 0.67 0.71
   Q2.2 0.56 0.75
   Q2.3 0.73 0.68
   Q2.4 0.67 0.71
Factor Eigenvalue Prop. Explained
GEPL 1.57 1.12
Variables Loading Alpha
   Q3.1 0.56 0.68
   Q3.2 0.61 0.71
   Q3.3 0.66 0.58
   Q3.4 0.68 0.58
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Table 6.02. Results of assessing structural equations model fit across sex. 
 
  
Fit Statistic Value Fit Statistic Value
RMSEA 0.081 RMSEA 0.065
CFI 0.98 CFI 0.98
TLI 0.95 TLI 0.96
SBIC 292.56 SBIC 313.51
χ2 333.10 χ2 384.45
DEGENDER (lrtest)
Fit Statistic Value Fit Statistic Value
RMSEA 0.023 RMSEA 0.024
CFI 0.999 CFI 0.998
TLI 0.997 TLI 0.996
SBIC -14.36 SBIC -19.444
χ2 25.41 χ2 50.16
HOUSEHOLD (lrtest)
Fit Statistic Value Fit Statistic Value
RMSEA 0.044 RMSEA 0.051
CFI 0.997 CFI 0.992
TLI 0.99 TLI 0.987
SBIC 76.26 SBIC 210.33
χ2 117.48 χ2 282.45
WOMWRK (lrtest) 0.00
De-Gendered Conception of Labor
Group Invariant: none Group Invariant: mcoef
0.00
0.00
Group Invariant: none Group Invariant: mcoef
Household Labor Distribution
Attitudes toward Women in Workforce
Group Invariant: none Group Invariant: mcoef
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Fit Statistic Value Fit Statistic Value
M1F SBIC 5645.35 M3F SBIC -29.53
M3F SBIC -29.53 MHF SBIC (limited covariance) 1111.72
M1F χ2 6054.54 M3F χ2 353.55
M3F χ2 353.55 MHF χ2 1564.45
M1F M3F lrtest: 0.00 M3F MHF lrtest: 0.00
Comparing Male 1-Factor to Male 3-Factor Comparing Male 3-Factor to Male Hierarchical
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Table 6.04. Male 3-factor measurement model results. 
 
 
DGCL = De-gendered conception of labor 
GERL = Gender equality in reproductive labor 
GEPL = Gender equality in productive labor 
 
Table 6.05. Fit statistics for male 3-factor measurement model. 
 
  
Standardized Coef. Std. Err.
Divleave <- DGCL 0.37*** 0.01
    Cons 2.40
Bestcare <- DGCL 0.51*** 0.01
    Cons 1.96
Bwhmmodel <- DGCL 0.75*** 0.01
    Cons 2.54
Womwant <- DGCL 0.66*** 0.01
    Cons 2.40
Divlaundryf <- GERL 0.69*** 0.01
    Cons 1.80
Divsickf <- GERL 0.60*** 0.01
    Cons 2.76
Divcleanf <- GERL 0.80*** 0.01
    Cons 2.31
Divcookf <- GERL 0.70*** 0.01
    Cons 2.04
Wmwrkschool <- GEPL 0.52*** 0.01
    Cons 3.48
Wmwrkyoung <- GEPL 0.61*** 0.01
    Cons 2.65
Presuff <- GEPL 0.65*** 0.01
    Cons 2.38
Famsuff <- GEPL 0.67*** 0.01
    Cons 2.41












Fit Statistic Value Fit Statistic Value
F1F SBIC 4686.12 F3F SBIC -12.59
F3F SBIC -12.59 FHF SBIC 8.06
F1F χ2 5102.86 F3F χ2 368.68
F3F χ2 368.68 FHF χ2 407.07
F1F F3F lrtest: 0.00 F3F FHF lrtest: 0.00
Comparing Female 1-Factor to Female 3-Factor Comparing Female 1-Factor to Female 3-Factor
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Table 6.07. Female 3-factor measurement model results. 
 
 
DGCL = De-gendered conception of labor 
GERL = Gender equality in reproductive labor 
GEPL = Gender equality in productive labor 
 
Table 6.08. Fit statistics for female 3-factor measurement model. 
  
Standardized Coef. Std. Err.
Divleave <- DGCL 0.37*** 0.01
    Cons 2.56
Bestcare <- DGCL 0.52*** 0.01
    Cons 2.05
Bwhmmodel <- DGCL 0.75*** 0.01
    Cons 2.77
Womwant <- DGCL 0.68*** 0.01
    Cons 2.38
Divlaundryf <- GERL 0.60*** 0.01
    Cons 1.75
Divsickf <- GERL 0.57*** 0.01
    Cons 2.34
Divcleanf <- GERL 0.75*** 0.01
    Cons 2.10
Divcookf <- GERL 0.66*** 0.01
    Cons 1.93
Wmwrkschool <- GEPL 0.45*** 0.01
    Cons 3.75
Wmwrkyoung <- GEPL 0.58*** 0.01
    Cons 2.89
Presuff <- GEPL 0.70*** 0.01
    Cons 2.41
Famsuff <- GEPL 0.69*** 0.01
    Cons 2.37








Appendix 4: Figures for Chapter 6 
 













Figure 4. Path diagram of bifactor measurement model. 
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Appendix 5: Tables for Chapter 7 
 
Table 7.01. Results for male 3-factor structural model DGCL latent measure. 
 
 
DGCL = De-gendered conception of labor 
  
Standardized Coef. Std. Err.
Liberal Welfare Regime --- ---
   Conservative Welfare Regime 0.09*** 0.02
   Social Democratic Welfare Regime 0.26*** 0.02
   Non-Categorized Welfare Regime -0.11*** 0.02
Age in Years -0.07*** 0.02
Education in Years 0.25*** 0.02
Never Worked --- ---
   Not Currently Working -0.06 0.09
   Currently Working -0.06 0.09
Never Married --- ---
   Currently Married -0.05** 0.02
   Post Married -0.01 0.02
Rural Residence --- 0.02
   Town Residence -0.04* 0.02
   Suburban Residence 0.00 0.02
   City Residence 0.00 0.02
Poor Health --- ---
   Satisfactory Health 0.05* 0.02
   Good Health 0.08*** 0.02
Never Attend Religious Services --- ---
   Attend few times per year or less -0.05** 0.02
   Attend once per month or more -0.09*** 0.02
   Attend once per week or more -0.16*** 0.02
Poorest Income Quintile --- ---
   Second Poorest Income Quintile 0.02 0.02
   Middle Income Quintile 0.08** 0.02
   Second Richest Income Quintile 0.11*** 0.03
   Richest Income Quintile 0.17*** 0.03
p<.05*, p<.01**, p<.000***, p<.10† n = 4043
DEGENDER <- (DGCL)
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GERL = Gender equality in reproductive labor 
  
Standardized Coef. Std. Err.
Liberal Welfare Regime --- ---
   Conservative Welfare Regime -0.09*** 0.02
   Social Democratic Welfare Regime 0.07** 0.02
   Non-Categorized Welfare Regime -0.07** 0.02
Age in Years -0.17*** 0.02
Education in Years 0.09*** 0.02
Never Worked --- ---
   Not Currently Working -0.12 0.09
   Currently Working -0.28** 0.09
Never Married --- ---
   Currently Married -0.10*** 0.02
   Post Married 0.03 0.02
Rural Residence --- ---
   Town Residence 0.05** 0.02
   Suburban Residence 0.05* 0.02
   City Residence 0.08*** 0.02
Poor Health --- ---
   Satisfactory Health 0.06** 0.02
   Good Health 0.07** 0.02
Never Attend Religious Services --- ---
   Attend few times per year or less -0.02 0.02
   Attend once per month or more -0.01 0.02
   Attend once per week or more 0.05* 0.02
Poorest Income Quintile --- ---
   Second Poorest Income Quintile -0.01 0.02
   Middle Income Quintile 0.03 0.03
   Second Richest Income Quintile 0.02 0.03
   Richest Income Quintile 0.04 0.03
p<.05*, p<.01**, p<.000***, p<.10† n = 4043 --- Ref. Cat.
HOUSEHOLD <- (GERL)
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GEPL = Gender equality in productive labor 
  
Standardized Coef. Std. Err.
Liberal Welfare Regime --- ---
   Conservative Welfare Regime -0.16*** 0.02
   Social Democratic Welfare Regime 0.26*** 0.02
   Non-Categorized Welfare Regime -0.03 0.02
Age in Years -0.09*** 0.02
Education in Years 0.20*** 0.02
Never Worked ---
   Not Currently Working 0.00 0.09
   Currently Working -0.02 0.09
Never Married --- ---
   Currently Married -0.08*** 0.02
   Post Married -0.05* 0.02
Rural Residence --- ---
   Town Residence -0.02 0.02
   Suburban Residence -0.02 0.02
   City Residence -0.00 0.02
Poor Health --- ---
   Satisfactory Health 0.03 0.02
   Good Health 0.04 0.02
Never Attend Religious Services --- ---
   Attend few times per year or less -0.07** 0.02
   Attend once per month or more -0.12*** 0.02
   Attend once per week or more -0.18*** 0.02
Poorest Income Quintile --- ---
   Second Poorest Income Quintile 0.05† 0.02
   Middle Income Quintile 0.09** 0.03
   Second Richest Income Quintile 0.12*** 0.03
   Richest Income Quintile 0.17*** 0.03
p<.05*, p<.01**, p<.000***, p<.10† n = 4043 --- Ref. Cat.
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Standardized Coef. Std. Err.
Divleave <- DEGENDER 0.41*** 0.02
    Cons 2.31
Bestcare <- DEGENDER 0.51*** 0.01
    Cons 1.74
Bwhmmodel <- DEGENDER 0.77*** 0.01
    Cons 2.24
Womwant <- DEGENDER 0.66*** 0.01
    Cons 2.15
Divlaundryf <- HOUSEHOLD 0.62*** 0.01
    Cons 2.42
Divsickf <- HOUSEHOLD 0.52*** 0.01
    Cons 3.43
Divcleanf <- HOUSEHOLD 0.75*** 0.01
    Cons 3.15
Divcookf <- HOUSEHOLD 0.64*** 0.01
    Cons 2.71
Wmwrkschool <- WOMWRK 0.57*** 0.01
    Cons 3.81
Wmwrkyoung <- WOMWRK 0.63*** 0.01
    Cons 2.70
Presuff <- WOMWRK 0.63*** 0.01
    Cons 2.40
Famsuff <- WOMWRK 0.68*** 0.01
    Cons 2.38








Table 7.06. Results for female 3-factor structural model DGCL latent measure. 
 
 
DGCL = De-gendered conception of labor 
  
Standardized Coef. Std. Err.
DEGENDER <- (DGCL)
Liberal Welfare Regime --- ---
   Conservative Welfare Regime 0.11*** 0.02
   Social Democratic Welfare Regime 0.22*** 0.02
   Non-Categorized Welfare Regime -0.11*** 0.02
Age in Years 0.08*** 0.02
Education in Years 0.29*** 0.02
Never Worked --- ---
   Not Currently Working 0.10** 0.03
   Currently Working 0.24*** 0.03
Never Married --- ---
   Currently Married -0.07*** 0.02
   Post Married -0.00 0.02
Rural Residence --- ---
   Town Residence -0.02 0.02
   Suburban Residence 0.03† 0.02
   City Residence 0.00† 0.02
Poor Health --- ---
   Satisfactory Health 0.04* 0.02
   Good Health 0.12*** 0.02
Never Attend Religious Services --- ---
   Attend few times per year or less -0.03† 0.02
   Attend once per month or more -0.10*** 0.02
   Attend once per week or more 0.16*** 0.02
Poorest Income Quintile --- ---
   Second Poorest Income Quintile 0.02 0.02
   Middle Income Quintile 0.05* 0.02
   Second Richest Income Quintile 0.05* 0.02
   Richest Income Quintile 0.07** 0.02
p<.05*, p<.01**, p<.000***, p<.10† n = 4539 --- Ref. Cat.
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Table 7.07. Results for female 3-factor structural model GERL latent measure. 
 
 
GERL = Gender equality in reproductive labor 
  
Standardized Coef. Std. Err.
HOUSEHOLD <- (GERL)
Liberal Welfare Regime --- ---
   Conservative Welfare Regime -0.08** 0.02
   Social Democratic Welfare Regime 0.10*** 0.02
   Non-Categorized Welfare Regime -0.03 0.02
Age in Years -0.00 0.02
Education in Years 0.15*** 0.02
Never Worked ---
   Not Currently Working 0.03 0.04
   Currently Working 0.17*** 0.04
Never Married --- ---
   Currently Married -0.12*** 0.02
   Post Married -0.07*** 0.02
Rural Residence --- ---
   Town Residence 0.07** 0.02
   Suburban Residence 0.06** 0.02
   City Residence 0.12*** 0.02
Poor Health --- ---
   Satisfactory Health -0.04* 0.02
   Good Health -0.01 0.02
Never Attend Religious Services --- ---
   Attend few times per year or less 0.02 0.02
   Attend once per month or more -0.03 0.02
   Attend once per week or more -0.03 0.02
Poorest Income Quintile --- ---
   Second Poorest Income Quintile -0.02 0.02
   Middle Income Quintile -0.03 0.02
   Second Richest Income Quintile -0.01 0.03
   Richest Income Quintile 0.01 0.03
p<.05*, p<.01**, p<.000***, p<.10† n = 4539 --- Ref. Cat.
163 
Table 7.08. Results for female 3-factor structural model GEPL latent measure. 
 
 
GEPL = Gender equality in productive labor 
 
  
Standardized Coef. Std. Err.
WOMWRK <- (GEPL)
Liberal Welfare Regime --- ---
   Conservative Welfare Regime -0.15*** 0.02
   Social Democratic Welfare Regime 0.19*** 0.02
   Non-Categorized Welfare Regime -0.05** 0.02
Age in Years 0.08*** 0.02
Education in Years 0.20*** 0.02
Never Worked ---
   Not Currently Working 0.18*** 0.04
   Currently Working 0.33*** 0.04
Never Married --- ---
   Currently Married -0.12*** 0.02
   Post Married -0.05** 0.02
Rural Residence --- ---
   Town Residence -0.03† 0.02
   Suburban Residence -0.04* 0.02
   City Residence -0.01 0.02
Poor Health --- ---
   Satisfactory Health 0.09*** 0.02
   Good Health 0.15*** 0.02
Never Attend Religious Services --- ---
   Attend few times per year or less -0.03 0.02
   Attend once per month or more -0.10*** 0.02
   Attend once per week or more -0.16*** 0.02
Poorest Income Quintile --- ---
   Second Poorest Income Quintile 0.02 0.02
   Middle Income Quintile 0.02 0.02
   Second Richest Income Quintile 0.04 0.03
   Richest Income Quintile 0.06* 0.03
p<.05*, p<.01**, p<.000***, p<.10† n = 4539 --- Ref. Cat.
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Table 7.10. Fit statistics for female 3-factor structural model. 
 
  
Standardized Coef. Std. Err.
Divleave <- DEGENDER 0.43*** 0.01
    Cons 2.02
Bestcare <- DEGENDER 0.53*** 0.01
    Cons 1.24
Bwhmmodel <- DEGENDER 0.79*** 0.01
    Cons 1.56
Womwant <- DEGENDER 0.65*** 0.01
    Cons 1.40
Divlaundryf <- HOUSEHOLD 0.57*** 0.01
    Cons 1.49
Divsickf <- HOUSEHOLD 0.544*** 0.01
    Cons 2.21
Divcleanf <- HOUSEHOLD 0.70*** 0.01
    Cons 1.87
Divcookf <- HOUSEHOLD 0.63*** 0.01
    Cons 1.71
Wmwrkschool <- WOMWRK 0.46*** 0.01
    Cons 3.60
Wmwrkyoung <- WOMWRK 0.63*** 0.01
    Cons 2.28
Presuff <- WOMWRK 0.67*** 0.01
    Cons 1.72
Famsuff <- WOMWRK 0.69*** 0.01
    Cons 1.61








Appendix 6: Figures for Chapter 7 
Figure 5. Predictor relationships consistent across sex and latent measure. 
 
Figure 6. Predictor relationships consistent for men across all latent measures. 
 
Figure 7. Predictor relationships consistent for women across all latent measures. 
 
Figure 8. Predictor relationships consistent for both sexes within DGLC measure. 
 
Figure 9. Predictor relationships consistent for both sexes within GERL measure. 
 




Universally Positive Universally Negative Universally Non-Significant
Years of Education Currently Married (None)
Social Democratic Welfare Regime
Positive for All Men Negative for All Men Non-significant for All Men
Years of education Age Not currently working
Social democratic welfare regime Currently married Second-poorest quintile
Positive for All Women Negative for All Women Non-significant for All Women
Years of education Currently married Yearly religious attendance
Currently working Second-poorest quintile
Social democratic welfare regime
Positive for both sexes Negative for both sexes Non-significant for both sexes
Years of education Currently married Post-married
Satisfactory health Monthly religious attendance Suburban residence
Good health Weekly religious attendance City residence




Social democratic welfare regime
Positive for both sexes Negative for both sexes Non-significant for both sexes
Years of education Currently married Not currently working
Town residence Conservative welfare regime Yearly religious attendance
Suburban residence Monthly religious attendance
City residence Second-poorest quintile
Social democratic welfare regime Middle quintile
Second-richest quintile
Richest quintile
Positive for both sexes Negative for both sexes Non-significant for both sexes
Years of education Currently married Town residence
Richest quintile Post-married City residence




































Richest quintile Yearly religious attendance
Social democratic welfare regime Monthly religious attendance
Weekly religious attendance
Weekly religious attendance




Women in Paid 
Labor
Years of education Age
Middle quintile Currently married
Second-richest quintile
Currently married
City residence Conservative welfare regime
Satisfactory health Non-categorized welfare regime
Good health
Conservative welfare regime Non-categorized welfare regime





Years of education Age
Town residence Currently working
Suburban residence
Middle quintile Yearly religious attendance
Second-richest quintile Monthly religious attendance





Years of education Age
Satisfactory health Currently married
Good health Town residence
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Good health Conservative welfare regime
Richest quintile Non-categorized welfare regime




Women in Paid 
Labor
Age Currently married
Years of education Post-married
Not currently working Suburban residence
Currently working Monthly religious attendance
Satisfactory health





Years of education Currently married
Currently working Post-married
Town residence Satisfactory health





Social democratic welfare regime








Years of education Monthly religious attendance
Not currently working Weekly religious attendance
